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ABSTRACT 
In the postwar United States, aluminum became more widely used than any other metal 
in building construction except for steel. It was first produced in the early nineteenth century, 
finding architectural uses in the latter part of the century. By the 1960s, it was broadly employed 
to clad buildings in the form of frames, panels and screens. Because it was a new and extensively 
useful material, producers believed that its identity must be controlled. Focusing on the 
marketing mechanisms of Alcoa, Reynolds and Kawneer in the decades surrounding World War 
II, this dissertation examines the way in which commercial aluminum cladding was marketed as 
both instrumental in modernization and an image of modernity. 
Producers claimed that aluminum possessed properties which they believed underpinned 
the agency of aluminum to enact specific advantages for buyers. Properties that were identified 
by promoters, such as its relative lightness, ductility and particular visual characteristics were 
marketed within the context of capitalism as the ability of aluminum to reduce building cost, 
increase profit and reflect beauty. In turn, these advantages were promoted as enacting prosperity 
for the buyer and the commercial districts in which aluminum cladding was deployed. 
The promoted advantages of aluminum cladding and its underlying abilities were carried as 
messages in visual and textual productions. Furthermore, aluminum-clad buildings themselves 
were employed by promoters as “silent salesmen,” advertising aluminum to potential buyers, and 
as “machines for selling,” able to attract customers and make merchants profitable.  
Reflecting upon the assertions of promoters that aluminum held the ability to modernize 
the commercial landscape, I argue that for aluminum cladding promoters, modernism – the 
reactions to modernity in visual, textual and architectural productions – was a marketing project. 
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The reproduction of aluminum-clad buildings in promotional material constituted a modernism 
to sell for the merchant, the corporation and the aluminum producer.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Sell them their dreams, sell them what they longed for and hoped for and almost despair to 
having. Sell them this hope, and you won't have to worry about selling them goods.  
- Hellen Landen Cass 
 
In 1967 the small town of Paola, Kansas, enacted a radical architectural transformation. 
Every façade facing the town square, on all four sides, was covered in either blue, green, yellow 
or red aluminum cladding. In response, project leaders declared that the town had finally 
modernized. The newspaper declared, “Facelift Propels Town Into Space Age”1 as though this 
was the attainment of a long-predicted arrival of “the future.” Approximately one hundred years 
earlier, Jules Verne wrote Journey to the Moon, predicting the use of aluminum – at the time a 
shiny, adaptable new material – would be someday used for space travel. Many other writers, 
manufacturers and architects saw in aluminum a vessel to bring about a bright and prosperous 
future, a virtual aluminum time machine.  
Aluminum was understood by aluminum producers and cladding manufacturers to hold 
specific properties, in turn marketed as advantages, through which promoters believed aluminum 
possessed the agency to enact prosperity. With a specific focus on commercial aluminum 
cladding, this dissertation examines (1) The ways in which aluminum was believed by promoters 
to possess properties leading to its enactment as an agent of modernization, that is, what 
aluminum was believed to be able to do; (2) The ways in which aluminum cladding was 
promoted as an image of modernity. I denote these two concerns as a focus on instrumentality 
                                                 
1 Forrest Hintz, “Facelift Propels Town into Space Age,” Wichita Eagle, June 15, 1968, 8a. 
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and image. Producers believed that aluminum cladding was instrumental because of their 
intentional engagement with the claimed abilities of aluminum to modernize the commercial 
landscape – not only by recladding existing buildings with aluminum, but also by cladding new 
buildings. The image of aluminum cladding was carried in visual productions such as 
photographs and renderings, textual productions in print, descriptions, and by aluminum-clad 
buildings themselves. Promoters intended for aluminum cladding to convey an image of 
modernity, arguing that the image and instrumentality of aluminum could enact prosperity.  
What follows is an analysis of how this dissertation contributes to the state of the field 
surrounding aluminum cladding, the commercial landscape, and modern architecture. It will 
summarize the questions and answers that have been asked by previous scholars and show how I 
build upon existing scholarship by extending new questions and providing new answers. This 
analysis is underpinned by the central question of this dissertation, which investigates the ways 
in which commercial aluminum cladding played a role in defining modern architecture. As such, 
the principal areas of scholarship informing this dissertation examine, at a wider scope, the 
contextual histories of modern architecture as it developed along with the accretions of 
consumerism that rose in the twentieth century. Within this wider, historical context, I also focus 
upon scholarship that studies the institutions and commitments governing the development of 
aluminum cladding. 
Temporally, the span of focus begins with the nascent development of the aluminum 
industry in the mid-nineteenth century and extends to the widespread application of aluminum 
cladding in the mid-twentieth century. In this period, industrial production and capitalism 
expanded as practices within economic systems that have been characterized variously as 
command economies, markets regulated in coordination with state control, and monopolies 
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permitted to embolden or diminish in accordance with the regulatory machinations of 
governmental policies. This literature review begins with scholarship that examines the 
interaction of these larger contexts on architecture and the consumer sphere. I form three 
categories to frame this review of literature. They are rising consumerism, the industrial 
production of aluminum, and war, which I will examine in turn. Because these categories are 
broad, I limit my examination to the literature which is salient to modern architecture and 
aluminum cladding.  
Following the afore-mentioned contextual histories and studies, I will focus on 
scholarship more closely concerning aluminum and modern architecture. These areas of study 
examine the conceptual and perceptual spaces of modernism, regimes of image production, and 
material agency. I will first lay out the ways modernism has been broadly understood by scholars 
to contextualize how aluminum producers framed the metal as modern and able to modernize the 
landscape. The next section explores scholarship that asks how image making, the movement of 
imagery and the assumptions underlying their production shaped twentieth-century architecture. 
Finally, I will explore theories of materiality and agency that expand agency beyond the human 
dimension to the material dimension. This scholarship will contextualize and explain the ways in 
which aluminum promoters assigned agency to aluminum and imagined their own agency as an 
interaction with the material. 
 
Rising Consumerism 
Aluminum producers marketed aluminum cladding to decision makers involved in 
building construction. Although cladding was not sold as a consumer item, it was sold in the 
context of rising consumerism that accelerated and became particularly acute after World War II. 
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Notably, Kawneer capitalized on rising consumerism by arguing that aluminum could help the 
merchant sell more goods, playing a central role as a visible element of a machine for selling. 
Aluminum was a necessary component, Kawneer maintained, to create an effective machine with 
the goal of increased prosperity for the merchant and the community. Lizabeth Cohen, in A 
Consumers' Republic: The Politics of Mass Consumption, describes this context, arguing that, in 
the aftermath of World War II, a foundational shift in the United States took place, which the 
book denotes as a Consumer's Republic. Cohen asks how government and private industry 
worked as part of a "complex shared commitment" to reconstruct the economy and bolster 
democratic values by expanding mass consumption. She argues that mass consumption 
developed in the postwar period through "complex shared commitment(s)" between 
policymakers, business and labor leaders and civic groups.2 Thus, it was not solely capitalists, 
nor solely policymakers, but the interaction between these groups and others, that worked to give 
rise to the consumer economy. This dissertation examines some of these interactions and 
proposes they should be understood as transversal relationships. These are relationships that 
reinforce the commitments and goals of the parties involved but also interact in tension. In 
particular, the interaction between government regulators and aluminum producers through 
patent law mechanisms enabled a virtual monopoly on a particular aluminum producing process, 
or a particular configuration of an aluminum product for a specified period, while during the 
same time, and especially over the course of the first half of the twentieth century, the US 
government waged a war against industrial monopoly, accusing Alcoa of just that, and facilitated 
the development of rivals Reynolds Metals Company and Kaiser Aluminum. 
                                                 
2 Lizabeth Cohen, A Consumers’ Republic: The Politics of Mass Consumption in Postwar America (New York: 
Vintage Books, 2004), 11. 
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While the afore-mentioned transversal relationships bolster Cohen's thesis concerning 
"complex shared commitments," another argument of this dissertation expands her thesis beyond 
the suburban realm. Cohen's study links the Consumer's Republic to architecture through the 
suburbs and shopping centers. Cohen maintains mass consumption, as an engine of renewal, 
largely took place in the suburbs and regional shopping centers. Cohen argues the suburbs were 
believed to hold the promise of fostering a democratic society by promoting ownership and 
engagement with community, despite falling short on these aspirations. Likewise, the new 
regional shopping centers were promoted by developers as the new civic centers, but fell short in 
providing the public space found in town squares of the city and smaller towns.  
This dissertation examines two of these town square domains — Niles, Michigan and 
Paola, Kansas —  finding that each were envisioned as landscapes to foster mass consumption, 
yet remained a part of the public sphere, borrowing and sometimes appropriating the public 
space of sidewalks and town square green spaces. In the case of Niles, Kawneer sought to 
replicate its aluminum façade and storefront products all along the street front as a means of 
modernizing the commercial landscape with its products, promoting the endeavor as a mode of 
generating prosperity for the merchant and the town. This was envisioned as a way of fighting 
back against the encroachment of regional shopping centers, which was explicitly identified as 
an existential crisis by the Paola, Kansas Chamber of Commerce. Paola advocates sought to 
create a shopping center on the square by cladding the entire façades of all four sides of the town 
square in colored aluminum slipcovers with a continuous, aluminum canopy over the sidewalks, 
creating a visually cohesive continuity. The aluminum supplier, Fashion Company, Inc., like 
Kawneer, the supplier of aluminum in Niles, was ready to supply aluminum façades to towns in 
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the United States as a way of first and foremost generating profit for the aluminum supplier, and 
in conjunction, promising to increased sales and prosperity for the merchant and the town. 
The relationship between city centers, town commercial streets and regional shopping 
centers is explored in City Center to Regional Mall: Architecture, the Automobile, and Retailing 
in Los Angeles, 1920-1950.3 Richard Longstreth probes the factors that led to the development of 
regional shopping centers in LA, finding that they are widely applicable as influences on the 
wider commercial landscape across the United States. Longstreth's contribution in this area of 
inquiry is significant because it argues there were many explanations, beyond the often-identified 
automobile, for regional decentralization and concomitant suburbanization. These include 
changing economic structures, government policy encouraging suburbanization, population 
growth, lower land cost, and racist social attitudes and practices. Longstreth’s work in this study 
contextualizes this dissertation's analysis of the spread of aluminum cladding within existing 
commercial districts. City centers and small towns were sites targeted for sales opportunities by 
aluminum cladding manufacturers because, in the context of the rising consumerism of the early 
twentieth century, they experienced periods of commercial expansion or contraction depending 
upon national economic trends, governmental policies, and the outcome of capitalist production. 
Richard Longstreth has produced important work examining the interaction of economic trends, 
consumerism and architecture, particularly concerning the impact of these forces on the 
development of regional shopping centers. This dissertation magnifies scrutiny of the city center 
and town commercial spaces that were sites of amelioration in the wake of suburban expansion 
and the growth of those newer sites of consumption that Longstreth examines in detail.  
                                                 
3 Richard Longstreth, City Center to Regional Mall: Architecture, the Automobile, and Retailing in Los Angeles, 
1920-1950 (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997). 
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Focusing on governmental policy and its influence on architecture, Gabrielle Esperdy 
studies the street-front commercial domain by concentrating on the Main Street Modernization 
initiatives promoted by the US government and associated advocacy groups in the 1930s as a 
way of bringing prosperity to towns in the wake of the Great Depression and deferred 
maintenance of buildings. Esperdy’s research, first a dissertation and later adapted into a book 
entitled, Modernizing Main Street: Architecture and Consumer Culture in the New Deal, argues 
that such modernization schemes were not a borrowed modernism, but instead were a “fully-
realized, everyday modernism.”4 In doing so, Esperdy examines how building material 
manufacturers influenced the development of an identifiable commercial modernism. My study 
extends Esperdy's study by examining Main Street modernization efforts into the postwar period. 
Echoing Esperdy's argument that the modernism of Main Street is not borrowed, I show that 
such modern architecture sometimes served as the precursor to more widely celebrated works of 
modern architecture at larger scales. For instance, the often-repeated trope that modernism came 
to America with Walter Gropius is challenged by the modernism that developed with the all 
metal and glass store front façades developed by Kawneer in the first decade of the twentieth 
century. Functionally, these early deployments were focused squarely on increasing commercial 
activity and mass consumption. Formally they often eschewed ornamentation, favoring large 
glass windows and minimal-profile resilient metal sash, characteristics on par with the most 
celebrated modernist works. They were promoted by Kawneer as a modernization of the 
commercial landscape, and I argue they should be seen, echoing Esperdy, as a fully realized 
modernism, not a borrowed or backwater modernism.  
                                                 
4 Gabrielle Esperdy, “Modernizing Main Street: Everyday Architecture and the New Deal” (PhD diss., The City 
University of New York, 1999), 12. 
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I also extend Esperdy's scholarship by seeking to render more visible the influence of 
manufacturers on modern architecture. Esperdy shows that the Pittsburgh Plate Glass Company 
and Libbey-Owens-Ford Company, through their marketing campaigns, "were largely 
responsible for, the architectural formulation of the iconic streamlined storefront as it appeared 
on Main Street in the 1930s."5 Of material manufacturers, this dissertation focuses primarily on 
aluminum manufacturers of cladding systems. Like the plate glass manufacturers of Esperdy's 
research, aluminum manufacturers were influential on the development of modern architecture 
through their marketing campaigns, but also through the enormous resources, as vast industrial 
organizations, they were able to martial to develop new aluminum producing processes, design 
departments, patent applications, manufacturing procedures, and sales distribution networks to 
spread aluminum cladding and deploy it before decision makers in architecture firms and editors 
of influential magazines.  
Producers and manufacturers have been understudied as influential actors in the 
development of modern architecture. Instead, as Sarah Williams Goldhagen notes, theories 
developed to explain the relationship of modernity to modernism have focused largely on the 
canonical works and the canonical architects. While these agents in the development of modern 
architecture are crucial to scholarship, Goldhagen asserts this has led to a kind of selection bias 
which historians and theorists in many disciplines, but particularly in architectural history, have 
sought to counteract by looking beyond the icons of modernism.6 
In the history of modern architecture, this dissertation examines the marketing efforts of 
aluminum producers and manufacturers, which I characterize as a push into the market, rather 
                                                 
5 Ibid., 11. 
6 Sarah Williams Goldhagen, “Something to Talk About: Modernism, Discourse, Style,” Journal of the Society of 
Architectural Historians 64 (2005): 149. 
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than a mere response, or pull from the market by those who could be imagined demanding 
aluminum architectural building and cladding products. Manufacturers asserted that one of their 
primary endeavors was to make the market for a material that was relatively new and unknown 
— a material that furthermore held potential for many uses, if only its message could be spread. 
Indeed, aluminum had to be pushed into the market, because it required enormous monetary and 
natural resources, including dams on the world’s largest rivers, generators of electricity, and 
plants full of machinery and laborers to produce the shiny, white metal. But the mere existence 
of an ingot of aluminum would not create demand. Producers and manufacturers engaged in 
transversal relationships with outside designers, like architects, and simultaneously organized 
their own design staff. This close relationship between the production of aluminum and the 
design of cladding products placed producers and manufacturers in an important role defining 
the shape of modern architecture. 
 
Industrial Production of Aluminum 
Scholarship examining the aluminum industry is well developed, counterintuitively 
because of Alcoa's history of exclusivity. Alcoa had long been accused of monopolistic practices 
by the United States and competitors. A voluminous archive of documentation has been 
preserved from the private files of Alcoa in association with lawsuits and court actions during a 
long period in the first half of the twentieth century. Consequently, much of Alcoa's inner-
working`s have been examined, producing a body of scholarship that has focused on the 
aluminum industry from multiple angles. Into this body of scholarship this dissertation 
contributes, advancing greater visibility to aluminum in architecture in scholarship that largely 
explicates monopoly, economics, and industrial enterprise. Research into the history of 
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aluminum in architecture necessarily will draw from this body, exposing leads to archival 
sources and quotes from interviews otherwise unfound. 
Numerous studies have been instrumental in providing an overall view of the aluminum 
industry, including Market Control in the Aluminum Industry by Donald H. Wallace and Vertical 
Integration and Joint Ventures in the Aluminum Industry by John A. Stuckey.7 These books and 
many more were foundational to research in this dissertation. However, three studies in 
particular render a view of the largest and most crucial US aluminum producer, Alcoa, from 
angles that together show how Alcoa thought of itself, how outsiders evaluated the company's 
premises and commitments, and how Alcoa tangled with regulators and competitors. Each of the 
studies are surveyed below. The value of these studies to this dissertation lies in their revelation 
of the gritty, unglamorous work, legal wrangling, political machinations and managerial 
procedures imbricated in aluminum production, and by extension, the production of architecture.  
In Alcoa: An American Enterprise, Charles C. Carr provides what amounts to a defense 
of Alcoa, considering the negative publicity it received as the government and competitors 
leveled charges of monopoly against the company.8 Because Carr was a former director of public 
relations at Alcoa, however, he had access to company documents not made public. Carr's 
narrative explains company history, discussing the Alcoa origin story of Charles Martin Hall, a 
founder of the company, wherein he patented a system of dissolving alumina in a solution, thus 
obtaining small beads of aluminum metal. Carr also illuminates the reliance upon the legal 
mechanism of the patent in bringing aluminum to market. Reflecting on the dueling patents and 
legal battles among the early producers of aluminum, this dissertation frames this entanglement 
                                                 
7 Donald H. Wallace, Market Control in The Aluminum Industry (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1937); John 
A. Stuckey, Vertical Integration and Joint Ventures in The Aluminum Industry (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1983). 
8 Carr, Alcoa: An American Enterprise (New York: Rinehart & Co., 1952). 
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as a fundamental, transversal relationship. Its tranversality stems from the power of regulators to 
award a patent, granting a monopoly (for a time) to a particular producer, while at the same time, 
or soon after, the government directing that regulatory entity discouraged and often regulated in 
the opposite direction — against monopoly. Yet, these patent holders battled for the singular 
rights to production processes awarded by regulators who could assign ownership, underpinning 
the confidence of investors to fund the enormous industrial operation that aluminum required to 
yield marketable quantities of aluminum. I study these transversal relationships as foundational 
to the ways aluminum cladding spread in architecture. 
Less a defense and more a privileged biography, George David Smith's study, From 
Monopoly to Competition: The Transformation of Alcoa, 1888-1986, affords the reader a well-
researched history of the company that emerged when Alcoa sought ways to restructure its 
corporate management.9 With help from Alcoa, Smith accessed company records and documents 
and tells the expected story of monopoly, but also describes the competitive arena in which 
Alcoa operated. This study asks how the process of vertical integration (the integration of mining 
to manufacturing) contributed to the outcome of monopoly, and how competitors and regulators 
challenged that monopoly. One of the ways that Alcoa sought to restructure in confrontation with 
increased competition from Reynolds and Kaiser was by manufacturing its own end products. 
This presented a problem, for Alcoa had long claimed to supply aluminum to manufacturers, not 
compete with them. This is an example of the transversal relationship of intertwined 
collaboration and competition I maintain characterized the production of aluminum cladding. 
While Smith has excised and explained the competitive dynamics of Alcoa, this dissertation 
contributes to the field by showing how aluminum cladding was a product not solely of 
                                                 
9 George David Smith, From Monopoly to Competition: The Transformation of Alcoa, 1888-1986 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988). 
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monopoly on the one hand nor some idealized plane of competition on the other hand, but 
instead was a product of the interaction between the two. I show that in the production of 
aluminum cladding, producers of aluminum and end manufacturers of products were at once 
competitors and collaborators. Alcoa supplied aluminum to manufacturers and, at many times 
throughout its history, beginning with tea kettles in the late 1800s to cladding components in the 
mid-twentieth century, competed directly with them. Sometimes, the competition was through 
the manufacture of architectural components, and other times it was more indirect, such as when 
Alcoa collaborated with recognizable and influential architects to design cladding which could 
then be replicated as a product on many buildings. This was a mode not of manufacturing the 
cladding components, but of supplying the aluminum to execute a pre-designed panel such as the 
identical panels cladding the 99 Park Avenue and 460 Park Avenue buildings in New York. 
The third study, R&D for Industry: A Century of Technical Innovation at Alcoa, by 
Margaret B. W. Graham and Bettye H. Pruitt probes how Alcoa's research and development 
(R&D) enterprise was impacted by company growth, management decisions, and entanglement 
with government regulators and competitors.10 Like the previous two studies discussed, this book 
benefitted from access to Alcoa internal documents. Its difference lies in a focus on R&D — an 
area Alcoa was keen to reformulate when the book was written. It is a deep study of this 
enterprise, and this dissertation explicates Alcoa's R&D in comparison with practices at 
Reynolds and Kawneer in the context of the role R&D played in bringing aluminum cladding to 
the market for architecture. Graham and Pruitt's study is instrumental in exposing the role R&D 
played in the company. The relationship of research to development is the third transversal 
relationship that I argue characterizes the institutional ecology of aluminum cladding production, 
                                                 
10 Margaret B. W. Graham and Bettye Hobbs Pruitt, R&D for Industry: A Century of Technical Innovation at Alcoa 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 20. 
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manufacturing and marketing. In this dissertation, I show that development and design, and 
research and design often conceptually overlapped. Where research ended and development 
began was not always a clearly demarcated boundary. Design, as a practice, took place within 
each domain, even when a separate design department was established, as in the case of 
Kawneer. One significance of R&D to aluminum cladding production and marketing lies in its 
revered position by producers as the foundation of the industrial enterprise. Reynolds declared 
that a "company without research is dead," and none of the companies this dissertation examines 
believed R&D was irrelevant.11 Another significance of R&D to aluminum cladding that this 
dissertation articulates is the way designers and researchers within R&D departments worked 
with outside designers to produce aluminum cladding designs. Alcoa, for instance, attributed 
design authorship of the aluminum cladding on the Alcoa headquarters tower in part to its own 
designers, even while Harrison & Abramovitz claimed partial authorship, in particular, of the X 
pattern that characterized each panel. Beyond the cladding, Alcoa researchers and designers were 
instrumental in inserting aluminum into the design of the headquarters wherever practicable. 
This aspect of collaboration between designers inside and outside the R&D apparatus at all three 
companies I examine has been understudied, particularly in the way outside designers like 
Harrison & Abramovitz with Alcoa, and Ketchum, Gina & Sharp with Kawneer were closely 
brought into the fold as a strategy of gaining expertise, but also a keen marketing strategy 
appropriating these architects' existing relationship with magazine editors and wide name 
recognition. 
 
 
                                                 
11 “They Open New Markets,” Reynolds Review, May 1960, 2. 
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War 
The horizon of war looms large over the history of aluminum production in the twentieth-
century. From a wider perspective of study, war was similarly an inescapable influence on the 
development of modern architecture. The literature surrounding the entanglement of war on 
architecture culture is vast, but two studies stand out for their explication of war, its intersection 
with architecture, and its salience to this dissertation's areas of focus — the way aluminum 
cladding was produced, marketed and spread. 
194x: Architecture, Planning, and Consumer Culture on the American Homefront, by 
Andrew Shanken, asks how a post-World War II ethos of planning influenced economics, social 
sciences, and consumer culture, which in turn influenced architecture. Shanken frames this as a 
"shared temporal imagination" that became a "kind of cultural mantra, repeated endlessly by 
architects and captains of industry."12 Beyond identifying and exploring the dimensions of this 
ethos, Shanken asserts it became a normative mode of thought in architecture culture, extending 
from urban planning to individual acts at smaller scales. Among many other companies, Shanken 
lists Alcoa as one that became concerned with planning. This dissertation finds validation in 
Shanken's thesis that the ethos of planning is crucial to understanding American culture up after 
World War II. In particular, the marketing initiative begun during the final phases of World War 
II by Kawneer, entitled, A Plan for Modernizing Main Street explicitly borrowed the rhetoric of 
planning, declaring, "In every city, in every town, responsible and forward-looking groups are 
replanning their cities for tomorrow."13 Kawneer went beyond rhetoric, however, and sought to 
                                                 
12 Andrew M. Shanken, 194X: Architecture, Planning, and Consumer Culture on the American Homefront 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009), viii. 
13 Remodeled Main Street Niles, Michigan, (Niles, Mich.: The Kawneer Company, 1945), 3. 
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engage community leaders and civic groups in actual planning for a particular future—one of 
aluminum cladding on every street front façade.  
In light of Shanken's study, this dissertation contributes a nuance to his conclusion about 
the outcome of planning concerning his assertion that postwar planning is "a story of failure 
rather than resolution."14 Failure, of course, is always in reference to a given measure of 
assessment. Shanken's determination of failure rests on the outcome of private enterprise 
domination over collectivist, state planning initiatives in the United States, for example in the 
realm of postwar housing. On other measures, government planning was successfully 
implemented, especially in the realm of urban renewal, which aluminum promoters held as a 
successful model for the revitalization of town and city mercantile districts. The particular 
nuance, perhaps, lies in the lack of resolution of desired outcomes resultant from urban renewal 
at the large scale, and street front revitalization at the small scale. Close examination of, for 
instance, Robert Moses' initiatives in New York reveals urban renewal at once tore 
neighborhoods apart and wrecked the social fabric of spaces, but also enhanced parts of the city 
with parks or highways alleviating congestion and increasing the flow of goods and capital into 
and out of the city. Likewise, one might also assess an aluminum cladding project in Paola, 
Kansas or Niles, Michigan as a failure, because the aluminum façades in both towns were 
eventually removed. Yet, for several decades they remained and for a time increased commerce 
in those towns, only later to be understood as the reason commerce waned as time went on. 
Projects like Kawneer's A Plan for Modernizing Main Street were successful on some measures 
and failed on others. In part, this dissertation aims to illuminate the reasons for those successes 
and failures by revealing the larger trends with which they were engaged. 
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A second study also examines postwar planning as part of a larger survey of the way 
architects engaged with World War II. Architecture in Uniform: Designing and Building for the 
Second World War, by Jean-Louis Cohen advances the field of architectural history by 
expanding scrutiny of the ways architects tangibly contributed to war fighting, engaging in 
offensive and defensive building projects, planning, and contributing expertise — a domain of 
scholarship that Cohen notes is mostly left out in primary surveys of modern architecture.15 As 
Cohen notes in the preface, he has produced this scholarship as an entry into an expanded field of 
research. Such research does not end with World War II, but continues in studies such as this 
dissertation, which extends Cohen's study to examine how architects and the aluminum industry 
continued the relationships they had built during the war. The production of aluminum was 
vastly boosted by the war, dwarfing prewar output. One realization the reader of this dissertation 
should adopt is that, although the spread of aluminum in the twentieth century is resultant from 
plants built specifically for war production of aluminum components such as airplanes and 
munitions, an important distinction should be made. Aluminum cladding was not merely a 
byproduct of war. Despite any misunderstanding to the contrary, aluminum cladding was already 
accelerating in use and was used in architecture before World War II. The Rockefeller Center 
Building (1930-39) is one notable example, which employed thousands of cast aluminum 
spandrels under windows. Alcoa began a long relationship with the architecture firm Harrison & 
Abramovitz that accelerated soon after the end of World War II, leading to their most notable 
collaboration, the aluminum-clad Alcoa Building (1953) in Pittsburgh, the worldwide 
headquarters of the company for much of the twentieth century. Not only World War II but also 
previous wars were influential on aluminum production. From the aluminum armor and helmet 
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made for Napoleon to the aluminum airplane struts made for World War I aircraft, aluminum has 
been intertwined with war. War is best understood not as the causal primacy of aluminum 
production, but as an accelerant and booster to production. 
 
Modernity, Modernism, and Modernization 
An important consideration of this dissertation is to evaluate the ways in which aluminum 
promoters operated under assumptions about modernity. Derivatives of the word "modern" were 
deployed by promoters to sell aluminum. Kawneer claimed to modernize the commercial 
landscape with aluminum cladding, Alcoa promoted aluminum as an image of modernity and 
Reynolds heavily promoted its association with modern architects. What they shared, however, 
was a belief that aluminum was modern because it was an improvement over normative 
conditions — a superior way of cladding, building and enclosing space. This conception of 
modernity-as-superiority constitutes a construct that should be placed in context with other 
epistemologies of modernity because a dialectic of comparison reveals the extent to which 
promoters thought not about modernity as a social and cultural register, but as a composition of 
commercial and industrial capitalism. Important notions of modernism explored by scholars that 
have informed this study's critical investigation of aluminum and modernity are explored below. 
A review of literature situating modernism is complicated by three limitations. First, the 
definition of modernism is different among scholars even within the same discipline, and 
especially between those across disciplines. As Sarah Williams Goldhagen has observed, 
amongst architectural theorists, "formal criteria continue to set the terms of the debate."16 
Simultaneously, much scholarship within the circle of architectural scholarship does in fact find 
                                                 
16 Goldhagen, “Something to Talk About,” 149. 
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non-formal epistemes of modernism hold currency. Some of these discourses reflect the theories 
of scholars extending the construct of modernism into the horizons of class and culture. Second, 
definitions of modernism have changed over time. New texts have been translated and brought to 
the attention of scholars, and elsewhere scholars have reflected and advanced understandings 
constructed in dialogue with scholarship as it is disseminated through visual and textual 
productions. Third, deploying the word modern is an act of labeling to make more 
understandable phenomena that are linked in some regard. Discursively, the word modern is a 
heuristic — a label that groups common characteristics. Below, I will explore these 
characteristics as articulated by scholars who define a historical epistemology of modernity. 
Their frameworks illuminate the understanding of modernity held by aluminum promoters as 
imbricated within larger social and cultural regimes. 
I have borrowed from a particularization offered by Gwendolyn Wright of three salient 
words: modernization, modernity, and modernism. Wright has explained modernization as a 
process whereby production and consumption shifts away from local market economic primacy 
to international capitalism; modernity as the experience of an individual immersed in the 
intensities and fast-paced changes wrought by industrialization and capitalism, felt most acutely 
in the urban sphere; and modernism as the descriptions about and representations of modernity 
that for architecture, "appropriated images of standardization, speed, and simple, unadorned 
volumes."  While Wright does describe specific imagery, she also concedes that several formal 
vocabularies were developed to animate modern economic processes.17 
This dissertation extends Wright's articulation of modernism to include beliefs, spatial 
strategies, and visual and textual productions. Circumscribed this way, a block of aluminum-clad 
                                                 
17 Gwendolyn Wright, The Politics of Design in French Colonial Urbanism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
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buildings in Niles, Michigan, for instance, is properly described as modernism. However, the 
aluminum promoters in this study did not label aluminum-clad buildings modernism. They 
referred to them as agents of modernization or as simply modern. Reflecting on those processes 
or conditions, however, from the vantage point afforded by histories of twentieth-century 
architecture, bolsters the labeling of such projects as modernism. 
Terminological distinctions are important, but greater attention is paid in this study to the 
ways in which scholars have theorized modernism. And the formulation of those theories has 
been vast. It is well established among scholars that modernism is not monolithic but is instead a 
discourse. Despite the disparate theories defining modernism, and despite the differing 
approaches to its production, certain theories have been instrumental to situating the modernism 
promoted by aluminum marketers. Marshall Berman provides a productive entry into the study 
of modernism, especially as his frameworks can be employed to make sense of the ways 
aluminum promoters understood it. In his study, All That is Sold Melts Into Air: The Experience 
of Modernity, he identifies several theoretical frameworks that have dominated discourse about 
the subject, and also proposes normative theories describing the way observers should reflect on 
modernism.18 I will here examine frameworks Berman identifies to draw a distinction between a 
perceptual reading of aluminum cladding and the way it was promoted as modern. I will also 
analyze the way designers and planners substantiated new construction as an ameliorative, 
showing how both the site of amelioration and the act of amelioration have alternatively been 
implicated as modernism. 
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The first framework is the withdrawn tendency, wherein modern literature and visual arts, 
(Berman referencing Clement Greenberg,) retreats into art for itself. "The medium is the 
message," and the flatness of surface finds primacy as a "pure, self-referential art object."19 A 
visual appraisal of aluminum cladding might, at first glance, be easily classified as a withdrawn 
modernism. It is often flat, abstract, seemingly referential to its own surface, seeking not to relate 
to any rhythms of a greater urban context. For instance, the façade of the Alcoa tower is an 
abstract, repeating X pattern from the top story to the bottom. Yet, a retreat to self-reference is 
not how the promoters framed aluminum cladding. They claimed for aluminum great beauty and 
portrayed it as the rightful successor to a long tradition of material from the earth formed into 
works of useful art. Kawneer, for their part, often marketed aluminum as a producer and 
enlivener of commerce — an active, agentic aluminum imbricated in the commercial landscape. 
A second framework is the negative tendency. Here, Berman draws from the reflections of 
cultural critics to portray a modernism that "seeks the violent overthrow of all our values, and 
cares little about reconstructing the worlds it destroys."20 Popular critics of modern architecture 
are apt to claim that such interventions swung the wrecking ball on the existing urban fabric, 
sometimes portrayed as old or traditional, and replaced it with stoic, sterile towers, blocks, and 
highways.  
This more superficial critique of modernism and modernity is useful as a preface to a 
third vision of modernity Berman proposes, which entails those designers and planners who 
believed they could ameliorate what Berman identifies as "the personal and social dissonances of 
modern life." Le Corbusier's urban-scale tower and slab proposals figure into this 
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circumscription, as do Buckminster Fuller and the Futurist Marinetti.21 This ontology of 
modernity claims "modern life can be resolved by technological and administrative means," the 
pivotal factor for which hinges on "leaders with the will to use them."22 The implication is that 
the ills of modernity — the dirty, disorganized, dysfunctional streets, for example, could be 
ameliorated by the Futurist’s Manifesto, or Le Corbusier's Functional City — an "ultramodernity 
that could heal the modern city's wounds," writes Berman.23 
An immediate complication of the above two frames is that the first, modernism as a 
deleterious ameliorative, and the second, modernism as a deleterious condition to be ameliorated, 
cast modernism in opposing, incompatible frames. Once again, we confront the competing 
claims about modernity and modernism, which reveals the fundamental multivalence of the term 
modern and its derivatives. The word and concept is a way to categorize, make sense of, and 
communicate an identifiable set of conditions. These conceptual and terminological differences 
amplify Berman's insightful assertion that "forms of modernist thought and vision may congeal 
into dogmatic orthodoxies and become archaic" while other "modes of modernism" may ascend 
to primacy in scholarship examining the history of the twentieth century.24 
Berman's scholarship, pointing out the fact of multiple, sometimes competing definitions 
is important to this dissertation because it substantiates and contextualizes the aluminum 
promoters' distinctive way of conceptualizing what is modern. Their modern was not the 
deleterious condition to be ameliorated, nor was it the deleterious ameliorative. Instead, they 
must not have seen the architecture, for instance, of Le Corbusier as deleterious. For example, 
Kawneer borrowed the very terminology Le Corbusier made famous and redeployed it in the 
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commercial sphere of main street. Instead of a machine for living, Kawneer sought to transform 
the commercial landscape into a machine for selling. Reynolds commissioned a book series, 
Aluminum in Modern Architecture, about uses of aluminum in architecture that included 
interviews with the luminaires of modern architecture, including Mies van der Rohe. The 
specific understanding held by aluminum promoters implicated by the term modern lies in its use 
as a synonym for superiority. Aluminum cladding was claimed to be modern because promoters 
believed it to be, and promoted it as superior in function and beauty. Promoters substantiated the 
modernity of aluminum as imbedded in its very properties — what it could do. This agency, 
which I have found more useful to term instrumentality so as to put more emphasis on its 
engagement with human designers and workers rather than idealizing its autonomy, was central 
to promoters' arguments about why aluminum was modern. Aluminum could modernize, they 
asserted, because of its very properties, such as its light-weight, resistance to corrosion and 
claimed beauty. Furthermore, the result of modernization via aluminum cladding, and an 
extension of the instrumentality of aluminum, they further argued, was its ability to generate 
profit and bring prosperity to the merchant and the community. The analysis in this dissertation 
of aluminum cladding production reveals that modernism, for the aluminum promoters Alcoa, 
Reynolds and Kawneer, was a marketing project. The act of claiming that aluminum was modern 
and could modernize the commercial landscape was announced in visual and textual 
advertisements. Producers and manufacturers were not consumed with capturing the zeitgeist, or, 
as William Curtis has argued about the obsessions of early twentieth-century architects, 
"defining an architectural language appropriate to industrialized society.”25 Instead, Alcoa, 
Reynolds and Kawneer hoped to spread aluminum cladding across the nation as a profitable 
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enterprise. When buildings clad in aluminum, and claimed to be modern, were reproduced in 
magazines and promotional materials, these buildings themselves and the commercial landscapes 
they were inscribed within were redeployed as a marketing project. 
 
The Image 
Two bodies of scholarship concerning the image inform this dissertation. Because the 
image of aluminum was so important to promoters, this dissertation is informed by scholarship 
which elucidates the role of media and its entanglement with modernism. Second, scholarship 
which historicizes and theorizes materiality is important, especially where such work seeks to 
delaminate specific meanings from specific materials. I argue that aluminum is not inherently 
modern, but was instead purposely and repeatedly marketed as such by promoters. Of the 
scholars who have fostered this dissertation's position on the image of aluminum, two stand out. 
The first is Beatriz Colomina, whose study, Privacy and Publicity: Modern Architecture as Mass 
Media works to explain how mass media produces modern architecture. Colomina asks, how 
much of the history of architecture is prompted by the ubiquity of media as a readily available 
source material? She argues, "modern architecture only becomes modern with its engagement 
with media," pointing out that we have come to know modern architecture principally through 
the media, much as photographs of grain elevators in the United States were cited as influential 
by architects in Europe.26 Delving deeper into her argument, she asserts that modern architecture 
is properly understood as a system of overlapping representations.27 Not only are buildings 
represented in media, but the buildings themselves are also mechanisms of representation. 
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Colomina offers a germane framework for explaining the interaction between aluminum-
clad buildings and marketing material. Two sites of marketing intertwined. The buildings 
themselves were promoted as silent salesmen, representatives of the superiority of aluminum, 
and sales devices proudly looked upon by aluminum producers and manufacturers. Alcoa's 
towering headquarters in Pittsburgh and Reynolds Metals Great Lakes Regional Sales Office 
(1959) in Michigan, were explicit advertisements for aluminum, designed to be admired by 
passing pedestrians and cars. Kawneer appropriated an entire street front as a sales device, 
inviting potential purchasers to see aluminum cladding in action in Niles, Michigan, long a site 
of deployment for Kawneer's aluminum window frames and cladding. But a building was just the 
first step in the marketing project. These buildings were photographed and featured in news 
articles and advertisements — an amplification of a message designed to sell more aluminum. 
Building on the relationship between modern architecture and media identified by 
Colomina, I show how aluminum producers and manufacturers not only appropriated the 
commercial landscape, but also appropriated architects as marketing mediums. I argue that 
Alcoa, for instance, knew of the reputation held by Harrison & Abramovitz, and benefitted from 
their reputation as exemplary modern architects and the accompanying exposure they provided to 
magazines and other circles of influence. Similarly, Reynolds did not collaborate with unknown 
architects when designing their new regional headquarters buildings. To design the Reynolds 
Metals Great Lakes Regional Sales Office, they hired Minoru Yamasaki who was a young but 
respected architect who could echo the message of the advantages of aluminum. Beyond 
architects, producers collaborated with artists who could similarly echo the advantages of 
aluminum — one of which producers claimed was the beauty of aluminum. Purchasing art by 
artists like Picasso, Reynolds made sure to let visitors to their headquarters in Richmond, 
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Virginia, the Reynolds Executive Office Building (1958), know that modern art hung throughout 
the building, drawing a connection between the aesthetic value of modern art and the promoted 
advantage of beauty in aluminum. Judging from their cameos in yearly reports, executives 
seemed to love being photographed with a work of modern art in the background. Elsewhere, 
Reynolds hired artists to design sculptures of aluminum as awards to architects who designed the 
winners of the R.S. Reynolds Memorial Award for aluminum in architecture — yet another 
opportunity to spread the message by latching on to the fame of award winners and the exposure 
afforded to them in magazines and gala events. This dissertation shows that the modernism of 
aluminum clad buildings was effectively replicated in multiple mediums of mass media. 
Scholarship which historicizes and theorizes the image of materials is important, as I aim 
to show how the modernity of aluminum was not inherent to the material, but was instead an 
identity carefully crafted by promoters. Adrian Forty provides an important examination of 
concrete in the book, Concrete and Culture: A Material History, which prefigures this 
dissertation and its quest to challenge inherent meaning from material.28 Forty seeks to challenge 
the way the reader thinks about concrete, asking how negative and positive associations with 
concrete are formed. He shows that, on the one hand, concrete has had strong associations with 
modernity, as a product of scientific technology, but on the other hand, it is rooted in manual 
craft practices, suggesting otherwise. He provides wider analysis of the identity of concrete, but 
arrives at the conclusion that imagery of concrete, such as the circulation of American concrete 
grain elevators in Europe in publications like L'Esprit Nouveau helped tip the scale toward 
associations with the modern. Like Colomina, Forty finds that magazines played a defining role 
                                                 
28 Adrian Forty, Concrete and Culture: A Material History (London: Reaktion, 2012). 
 
26 
 
in constructing a modern identity, such as PA Magazine declaring that "the potential of concrete 
is untapped," aligning concrete with progress and the future.29  
The aluminum industry dedicated vast sums and marshalled a huge labor force to cast 
aluminum as modern, progressive and future-oriented. As Forty explains in the history of 
concrete, I find that aluminum also was a site of identity construction by industry promoters, 
advocates and mediums of media. Like concrete, aluminum was vulnerable to identities that 
could complicate selling it to markets that were not aware of its properties, because it was such a 
new material to the twentieth century. Historian Robert Friedel reveals that aluminum held a 
malleable identity from its early days in the nineteenth century, and Eric Schatzberg shows that 
indeed aluminum was vulnerable to other identities through use as beer cans and cookware.30 
These consumer products were profitable to producers too, thus necessitating a robust marketing 
project to maintain multiple, sometimes competing identities for aluminum. 
Expanding beyond analysis of identity and aluminum, this dissertation aims to engage an 
alternative material epistemology by suggesting that from the detail to the cultural landscape, 
there is no inherent meaning imbedded in a particular work of architecture. Assertions to the 
contrary hold currency in architectural history and theory. For instance, at the level of the detail, 
Marco Frascari has said details "can be regarded as the minimal units of signification in the 
architectural production of meanings" suggesting that a given meaning can be embedded within 
architecture.31 Inscribed at the scale of building façade, Reinhold Martin has written that the steel 
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and glass façades of corporate buildings possess readable messages, such that its "physiognomy 
is given by the curtain wall, an infinitely repeatable surface designed to mirror the infinitely 
variable desires of the corporate subject" whereby the façade pattern expressed corporate, 
organizational logics.32 At the scale of the visual and ideological landscape, Joan Ockman has 
written that the second generation of steel and glass international style modernism is a “fully 
embodied expression of advanced capitalism, corporate bureaucracy and big business.”33 Each of 
these readings of architecture inscribes a particular, inherent meaning. Imbedded within a circle 
of critical theory, and inflected by historical realism, wherein that which is understood as real has 
been marked by social, political, cultural, economic values, an asserted, inherent meaning can be 
understood as essentially true given the afore-mentioned values, despite the subjectivity of 
meaning-making. Yet, if the subjectivity of meaning is given primacy rather than an aim to craft 
narratives of essentialism, wherein a building or material is asserted to possess an inherent 
meaning, identity is more productively understood as contested, conferring the necessity of 
promoters of any idea, and particularly to this study the promotion of aluminum as modern by 
aluminum advocates, to engage in robust identity construction. 
 
Agentic Materiality 
Both the constructed meanings and the claimed capacities of materials are important to a 
multivalent study of aluminum materiality, but the history of twentieth-century scholarship in the 
latter-part of the century surrounding materiality in architecture has largely sidestepped the 
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agency of materials, instead finding concern with meaning, semiotics, image, and causality as a 
complex of processes, less a complex of things.34  
Scholars studying aluminum in the context of the global apparatus of production and 
consumption have explained aluminum principally as a product of direct and sustained human 
action.  Mimi Sheller's study, Aluminum Dreams: The Making of Light Modernity, focuses on the 
on the human dimension as the driving force precipitating the extraction of resources from the 
earth.35 This is an important perspective, as aluminum came to fruition in a form isolated from 
other elements because of human intervention. In this formulation, aluminum is something made 
subject to the structure of human agency. The human dimension as a causal actor in the spread of 
aluminum has also been cogently explored by Dennis Doordan in "From Precious to Pervasive: 
Aluminum and Architecture." This chapter contribution to the exhibition catalog, Aluminum by 
Design, describes the spread of aluminum in postwar architecture as the result of technological 
momentum propelled by three actors: (1) Aluminum producers competing for, and seeking to 
develop new markets; (2) Architects seeking materials adaptable to programmatic requirements 
and their visions of modernity; (3) Inventors who sought to capitalize on the applications of 
aluminum.36 In addition to the human actor, this dissertation offers a complementary perspective: 
The material dimension as a causal actor. Woven throughout the narratives of scholarship about 
aluminum are references to its remarkable characteristics, such as its light-weight, workability, 
durability, and resistance to corrosion.  In this dissertation, I reveal that aluminum promoters 
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believed and framed aluminum to possess causal capacity. This dimension of aluminum 
production and promotion has not been adequately explored. I argue that the historical forces 
underpinning the popularity in use of aluminum in a wide spectrum of markets extends the 
umbrella of causation not only to human agency, but also to the degree of agency possessed by 
the metal. 
Before discussing literature which has helped extend analysis in this dissertation of 
aluminum as one agent among others, it is useful to summarize the producers' and manufacturers' 
practices and beliefs about the materiality of aluminum. A key historical perspective in this 
dissertation entails the way in which aluminum producers, manufacturers and their promoters 
understood and marketed aluminum. They believed that aluminum had distinct abilities that 
emanated directly from its properties. These properties were framed by promoters as advantages 
and marketed to end users in terms that amplified what aluminum could do, underpinned by its 
advantages. To select a few examples discussed in more detail in this study, Kawneer marketed 
aluminum as possessing the ability to modernize the landscape and generate prosperity for the 
merchant and community. Alcoa promoted aluminum as possessing the ability to yield more 
profitable rents from thinner exterior walls of aluminum. Reynolds touted aesthetic qualities of 
aluminum, claiming that its properties were the driving force of its "permanent natural beauty." 37 
Promoting the abilities of aluminum in terms that suggested autonomy was part of the way 
producers understood aluminum and marketed the mysterious material to buyers uneducated 
about the new metal. 
The contemporary scholarship discussed below engages theories of material agency. The 
belief that materials possess a degree of agency, however, is not new. In the arena of 
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architectural scholarship, Siegfried Giedion suggested that materials themselves changed the 
mechanization process.38 Stan Allen, in 1999 called for an approach that "understands 
architecture as material practice — as an activity that works in and among the world of things, 
and not exclusively with meaning and image."39 Further, a growing body of scholarship in 
anthropology and Science and Technology Studies, and studies of material culture, philosophy, 
and architecture ascribe a degree of agency to materials.  
Key insights by these scholars help to frame and situate the way aluminum promoters 
understood material agency. Within such scholarship, a central debate concerns the degree to 
which non-human, inorganic things possess what is commonly called agency. The definition of 
agency is important, but of more relevance to the historical research in this dissertation is the 
way agency has been ascribed to the material world. Agency has often been associated with 
notions of intentionality, creativity, and the ability to make change.40 Within cultural studies 
scholarship and sociological theory, agency has historically been understood as socially 
determined.41 Yet, within the rubrics of Actor Network Theory, New Materialisms, Object 
Oriented Ontology and Speculative Realisms, scholars and philosophers have extended agency to 
the non-human, inorganic realm. 
One side of this debate proposes things on the same ontological plane as humans. Jane 
Bennett's study, Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things, exemplifies this approach. 
Bennett assigns to matter a certain liveliness which at first glance might be mistaken for 
anthropomorphizing. But Bennett's theory goes beyond analogy with the human, for she finds 
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things, notably highlighting at one point metals, hold a “vitality,” by which she means, “the 
capacity of things — edibles, commodities, storms, metals — not only to impede or block the 
will and designs of humans but also to act as quasi agents or forces with trajectories, 
propensities, or tendencies of their own."42 Further, such things have a locus of power, a "thing-
power" which "gestures toward the strange ability of ordinary, man-made items to exceed their 
status as objects and to manifest traces of independence or aliveness."43 Bennett notably focuses 
on metals as an exemplar. Drawing from Deleuze and Guattari, she characterizes their 
description of metal as a thing that "best reveals this quivering effervescence; it is metal, bursting 
with a life."44 
Much like Bennett's terminological choices, the aluminum producers and manufacturers 
in this study, at first glance, seem to simply anthropomorphize the characteristics of aluminum, 
such as when an Alcoa marketing manager characterized the development of aluminum as a 
growth from "puny child to a strong young man."45 But their terminological choices extended 
deeper than analogy. Their descriptions of aluminum were embedded in a belief about the metal 
that it was animate, with its own behaviors, needs, abilities and desires. Much as Bennett has 
popularized metal as a "vital materiality," producers understood and promoted aluminum as 
possessing a strong degree of agency. Alcoa distributed an article with a section titled, “What 
aluminum can do.”46  Reynolds produced a handsome two-volume book set, Aluminum in 
Modern Architecture, as well as follow-up publications that celebrated the quotes of architects 
                                                 
42 Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things (Durham: Duke University Press, 2010), viii. 
43 Ibid., xvi. 
44 Ibid., 55. 
45 Metal Curtain Walls (Washington: Building Research Institute, Division of Engineering and Industrial Research, 
National Academy of Sciences, National Research Council, 1955), 162. 
46 Charles A. Scarlott, “The Bright Picture of Aluminum,” The Westinghouse ENGINEER, May, 1953, 5. Citations 
refer to the Aluminum Company of America reprint, box 140, Records of the Aluminum Company of America. 
 
32 
 
such as Buckminster Fuller and Eliot Noyes discussing aluminum in architecture, claiming for it 
“behaviors” and the ability to tell the architect “ways of using it right."47 
The beliefs of aluminum producers reflected a larger belief in material and architectural 
determinism as part of the wider contours of the social imagination. In the nineteenth century, 
anxiety about industrialization accompanied anxieties about the potentials of machines. Mary 
Shelley’s Frankenstein epitomized this discomfort, defining an image of the non-human and its 
imagined potentials. The material dimension, especially when defined as an assemblage of 
machinery, was understood by authors reacting to industrialization to have a degree of autonomy 
outside of human control, at least to the extent that it made their human masters uncomfortable 
with such autonomy.  
Aluminum cladding promoters did not believe that aluminum was alive in the 
Frankenstein sense of reifying the terror of machines. Aluminum was promoted as a liberator: it 
could transcend the past, pull society out of war, and modernize by inducing consumers to 
consume or increase the rentable floor space in high rise buildings or define a new image of 
prosperity which would in turn, promoters implied, make capitalists more profitable and 
consumers happier. Promoters also did not envision that aluminum had any transcendental 
qualities, such as a soul, that would bolster its aliveness. Western Christian belief, which 
excludes a soul for the non-human, was evident within the corporate apparatus of Alcoa, 
Reynolds and Kawneer. Christmas messages repeated year after year in newsletters explaining 
the important mission of defeating the Nazi’s and encouraging reverence to God. 
Instead of a living aluminum, marketing projects promoted an agentic aluminum. This 
was not dissimilar to the stance taken by modernist architects, who widely believed that modern 
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architecture could “do.” The belief that architecture can influence human behavior is no stranger 
to modernists. Such architectural determinism is reflected in, for instance, Le Corbusier’s 
machine for living in, where a house as a machine was believed to possess the ability to make 
life better for the inhabitants. Architects commenting on aluminum also asserted that aluminum 
was at least semi-autonomous. When architect Welton Becket said that aluminum “… permits 
the architect to design with a more airy feeling and gives him an opportunity to vary building 
faces and spandrels” he was not anthropomorphizing aluminum.48 These conceptions are deeper 
than merely borrowing human terms to describe materials as an exercise in analogy. These 
statements reflect a belief in a mind-independent material reality, not yet challenged by the 
poststructuralist epistemologies and philosophical idealism to become more widely 
intellectualized later in the century. Aluminum promoters simultaneously seized upon these 
beliefs in architecture culture as a marketing strategy. They marketed modernism to modernist 
architects, appealing to their sense of architectural and material determinism and marketed to end 
users, promoting aluminum as having the ability to bring financial advantage through increased 
sales and profit.  
If Bennett can be thought of to occupy one side of a debate about the agency of things, 
from another perspective stands anthropologist Alfred Gell's work, Art and Agency: An 
Anthropological Theory.49 Proposed in 1998, this study extends agency to objects, but only 
subject to human agency. Gell does not ascribe full agency to things, writing “'things' cannot, by 
definition have intentions.” However, in an interaction with the human, social sphere, Gell 
qualifies them as secondary agents, denoted as lacking real agency with intention and will.50 
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Likewise, Actor Network Theory authors, such as Bruno Latour, propose agency as an ontology 
of interactions. Latour might describe aluminum as an actor, in which “there is no other way to 
define an actor but through its action, and there is no other way to define an action but by asking 
what other actors are modified, transformed, perturbed, or created by the character that is the 
focus of attention.”51 
The perspectives afforded by theorists like Gell and Latour confer clarity on the 
interactions aluminum producers understood existed between their metal and their industrial 
enterprise. Although producers believed aluminum possessed a strong degree of autonomy with 
abilities independent of humans, they also were quick to promote their own role in its 
development into a useful material. “What does aluminum need of man? Everything,” declared 
an industry publication.52 Reynolds found fortuitous opportunities to promote their intentionality, 
declaring, “the drive, innovation and determination of men in the industry like R.S. Reynolds, 
Sr., founder of Reynolds Metals Company, have made the mid-Twentieth Century the “Age of 
Aluminum.””53 
Because human entanglement with the metal was a crucial element of its history, I often 
use the term instrumentality to suggest aluminum producers did not believe the metal was wholly 
autonomous or self-precipitating, but engaged in a co-constitutive relationship with the human 
dimension. Here I draw a distinction from Jane Bennett's formulation. Bennett specifically 
avoids a hierarchical relationship between the human and non-human, writing, “My hunch is the 
image of dead or thoroughly instrumentalized matter feeds human hubris.” However, upon study 
of the positions of aluminum producers, manufacturers and their promoters, it is clear they 
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52 Aluminum: How It’s Made and Where It’s Used, 29-30. 
53 Reynolds Aluminum and the People Who Make It, 2. 
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believed the reason aluminum spread was an interaction between the properties of aluminum and 
their efforts to bring raw materials out of the ground, make aluminum products, and push them 
into a market. 
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CHAPTER 1: OUT OF THE GROUND AND ONTO THE WORLD STAGE 
 
 
To borrow the words of economic historian Alfred Chandler, “most histories have to 
begin before the beginning.”54 Covering the time period of the nineteenth century, this chapter 
provides a history of the early development of aluminum as a material understood as holding 
utility and imagined with great potentials. It demonstrates how, through maneuvers to secure 
intellectual property and in the context of nascent structures of capital investment, ancillary 
inventions and industrial procedures, aluminum production emerged rapidly as an institutional 
and industrial ecology marked by the intertwining of both collaborative and competitive forces. 
Rather than hampering development, these transversal relationships, seemingly at odds, were 
mutually reinforcing as a defining characteristic of early aluminum production. Furthermore, this 
odd couple of co-constitutive forces continued to shape the development of aluminum 
production, and more specifically to this study, the spread of aluminum cladding products well 
into the postwar period. The theme of simultaneous collaboration and competition as mutually 
reinforcing vectors will be explored throughout this dissertation. 
 
The Experimental Origins of Aluminum 
Promoters and scholars have cast aluminum as a modern material in contemporary and 
historical scholarship as well as in marketing publications.55 They have explained aluminum as a 
                                                 
54 Alfred D. Chandler, The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business (Cambridge, Mass.: 
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55 For further discussion of this perspective, see Sterling Brubaker, Trends in The World Aluminum Industry 
(Baltimore: Published for Resources for the Future by the Johns Hopkins University Press, 1967), 83. Dennis 
Doordan characterizes aluminum as a “major factor in the material culture of modern design.” Doordan, “From 
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metal born of science and the technical revolution of the nineteenth century.56 Yet, aluminum 
developed not only through the support of institutionally-backed laboratories, but also through 
amateur experiments by craftsmen investigating its chemical properties and capacities who only 
later sought capital investment. Claiming that aluminum is modern is to also expose particular 
values. Close examination reveals the claim of modernity for aluminum was tied to specific 
claims about its properties. 
Alumina is the naturally occurring oxide of aluminum. Although aluminum is more 
abundant than any other metal in the earth’s crust, it was not until the early nineteenth century 
that it was isolated apart from its chemical bond with other elements.57 A difficult problem for 
chemists was the separation of the metal from its oxide. In its natural state, aluminum is tightly 
bound to oxygen. To isolate it, two processes developed, sometimes deployed in combination, to 
break this aluminum-oxygen bond. Isolation, or reduction as it is more commonly known, has 
resulted from chemical processes and electrolytic processes, both of which had been employed to 
isolate other metals prior to aluminum. Exactly how reduction took place was central to 
experiments and advancements in aluminum production throughout the nineteenth century 
industrial era and into the twentieth century. To realize industrial scale production of aluminum, 
reduction relied on other inventions and processes, some of which would not be developed until 
the mid-nineteenth century.  
                                                 
56 This position is explained in Brubaker, Trends in the Aluminum Industry, 83. An article in Review of Reviews 
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After the invention of the voltaic pile (in 1800), an electric battery which facilitated 
discharge in controlled experiments, a notable, early electrolyzing experiment with alumina was 
carried out by British scientist Sir Humphrey Davey in 1807.58 Although he had been successful 
in reducing other metals with electric current, he was not successful in reducing aluminum.59 He 
did, however, bestow the name ‘aluminium’ on the metal-concept before it was eventually 
isolated years later.60 In 1825, Danish chemist Hans Christian Oersted demonstrated the 
successful reduction of aluminum using a chemical process. He produced a small mound of 
aluminum by heating together a potassium amalgam and aluminum chloride. Imbedded in this 
amalgam was a small bit of the metal. Oersted identified it as “a lump of metal which in color 
and luster somewhat resemble(s) tin.”61  
From its inception, aluminum was examined for its characteristics and imagined in terms 
of its potentials. Material analysis was constituent to a process which contributed to the 
conception of aluminum in terms of specific advantages. One of the earliest analytical 
measurements of aluminum was carried out by Frederick Wohler in 1845, supported by the 
University of Gottingen, after which aluminum was declared a lightweight material. Employing 
potassium in a chemical reduction process similar to that undertaken previously by Oersted, 
Wohler produced aluminum particles “as big as pinheads” and described their characteristics as 
                                                 
58 Electrolysis involves passing an electric current through a chemical solution to produce a reduction of elements. 
Today, it remains the most widely used method of reducing aluminum. 
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“light, ductile, stable in air, and can be melted with the heat from a laboratory blowpipe.”62 
Although the small size of these particles prevented them from being identified as possessing 
utility, larger pieces were soon produced in France by Henri St. Claire Deville of the Ecole 
Normale in Paris that were anticipated by Deville, industrialists and the French government as 
holding great potential for use. In 1854, Deville was the first to obtain quantities of aluminum 
which were promoted for commercial use.63 Substituting sodium for previous methods using 
potassium, this process produced “lumps the size of marbles” and because sodium was cheaper 
than potassium, commercial exploitation of aluminum production was feasible.64 Driven in part 
by Deville’s interest in promoting an aluminum industry,65 commercial plants employing the 
process began operating in France by 1855,66 and an aluminum bar resulting from Deville’s 
technique, produced at the Javel Chemical Works, was exhibited in the 1855 Paris Exhibition.67 
The display consisted of a bar inside a glass case, resting on black velvet, labeled “L’Argent de 
l’Argile” (the silver from clay).68 Here can be seen associations of high value but also quotidian 
origin placed on aluminum. It was at once called silver, referencing value and exclusivity, for it 
cost $100 a pound.69 But at the same time the description contrasted with its common origin, 
clay. 
                                                 
62 Ibid., 9. 
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The development of aluminum as a useful material was by no means a linear process, nor 
was it limited to France, and the web of intersecting inventions and experiments contributing to 
its development is testament to this point. This is important because it demonstrates that 
aluminum production, from its inception, was not a localized process, but instead, as shown later 
in this dissertation, was a global, institutional ecology. Furthermore, as production processes 
developed that varied only slightly, they were marked by competing interests and claims to 
intellectual property. In the late nineteenth century, these competing yet often mutually 
reinforcing processes emerged in Europe and the United States contemporaneously.  
In the same year Deville produced usable quantities of aluminum in 1854, another 
scientist, professor of Chemistry at Heidelberg University, Robert Von Bunsen, also found a way 
to isolate aluminum with sodium instead of potassium.70 The result was the clumping of 
aluminum into larger pieces. Two years later Alfred Monnier of Camden, New Jersey, was 
reported by The American Mining Magazine to have made aluminum in considerable enough 
quantity that it was displayed at the Franklin Institute in Philadelphia.71 The simultaneous 
experimentation with aluminum production in both Europe and the United States marked the 
beginning of a global industrial apparatus that fostered the spread of aluminum production on 
both continents and shaped them as the two main centers of power in the aluminum industry.  
The production technique that to this day the aluminum industry employs originated with 
two near-simultaneously developed electrolytic reduction processes —one originating in France 
and the other originating in the United States. Because of their stark similarity, but also because 
of the national division between them as patented processes, which enabled them to exist 
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temporally side-by-side without any legal conflict between the two, the last names of the 
inventors have been combined in nomenclature — the Hall-Héroult Process. These processes 
were a lower-cost, electrolytic rather than chemical method of separating aluminum from its 
oxide. Both were developed in 1886. And both were subsequently patented for use on their 
respective continents — the business interests of Charles Martin Hall holding the patent in the 
United States and the business interests of Paul Héroult holding the patent in France, with wide 
influence on the patents in other European nations.72 The Hall-Héroult process consisted of a 
bath of molten cryolite (a sodium fluoride mineral) at a temperature of 1800 degrees 
Fahrenheit,73 into which alumina is deposited. An electric current is passed through this solution 
(called an electrolyte) that is contained within a crucible lined with carbon. During the process, 
oxygen is deposited on carbon anodes held within this solution while metallic aluminum sinks to 
rest on the bottom of the crucible. In the experiment of Charles Martin Hall, who had been an 
amateur chemist since childhood and took an interest in chemistry and metallurgy in college, a 
gasoline burner was employed to heat the solution in the crucible, while electricity was supplied 
from a galvanic battery, producing a small button of aluminum. 74 How the solution was heated 
would become important later as patent battles ensued defining who exactly invented what — 
demarcating boundaries of intellectual property which would contribute to lost court battles but 
also underpin future fortunes.  
Patents played an important role in establishing the legal safety for corporations to share 
ideas with collaborators, and thus spread aluminum as a material in the commercial landscape. 
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Patents enabled corporations to simultaneously reveal trade secrets in marketing material under 
the watchful eye of competitors while minimizing the sense that revealing these secrets would 
lead to the demise of the company through advantages given to competitors. While legal 
maneuvering surrounding patents was a mainstay of the corporate machinations of aluminum 
companies, the earliest patent battles defined the major players in the global aluminum industry. 
Before patents were maneuvered into corporate ownership structures, however, aluminum 
experimenters intersected with sources of capital that would reinforce the boundaries of 
intellectual property. Without these funds, experimenters were not well capitalized. Because the 
chemical reduction process were found to be too expensive for profitable, industrial-scale 
production, it became critical to determine exactly how the solution (also called the electrolyte) 
inside the crucible could be  heated and the source of electricity for the process of electrolysis. In 
1887, Héroult patented an electric furnace – a system of heating not externally, but internally to 
the electrolyte. Like fellow Frenchman Deville, Héroult too believed aluminum had great profit 
potential. He sold his patent to Schweizerische Metallurgische Gesellschaft, formed in 1887 by 
Swiss industrial interests. The patent was subsequently licensed as well, specifically to a 
corporation formed by Héroult with the aid in turn of another corporation owned by parent 
company Schweizerische Metallurgische Gesellschaft — making three corporations with rights 
to the process. Two more entered the fray by 1896, establishing the primary founders of the 
European aluminum industry.75 Very soon after the production of aluminum through the 
electrolytic Hall-Héroult process, investors mobilized to exploit the metal. 
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While Héroult was maneuvering capital to protect patents on aluminum production, 
experimenters in the United States, besides Charles Martin Hall, also found ways to heat the 
crucible internally with electricity. In 1883, the Cowles brothers, Eugene H. Cowles and Alfred 
H. Cowles, sons of publisher Edwin Cowles of Cleveland, Ohio, employed an electric furnace 
they had devised using the current itself to produce heat rather than employing an external 
heating source to smelt zinc from a New Mexico mine they purchased.76 Following this, they 
turned to aluminum. They established two plants to pursue smelting — one in Lockport, New 
York, and one in Milton, England.77 Yet, they were unsuccessful in producing the metal in pure 
form. Their process instead yielded aluminum-copper alloy. Another experimenter in the United 
States, Charles M. Bradley, also developed a method to use electric current for smelting in 1883, 
a process recognized as the first in America to achieve internal heating of the electrolyte.78 These 
inventions would become entangled in legal challenges, with the Cowles eventually buying, or 
winning in court, the rights to the patents issued to Bradley.79  
Patents gave the holder a dominant position in a market for a period of time — a virtual 
monopoly — that is written into the United States constitution.80 The entanglement of the 
Bradley patents for electrically induced internal heating, now in the hands of The Cowles, and 
the Hall patent’s essential invention that “consisted in the discovery that alumina would dissolve 
                                                 
Gesellschaft to form Aluminum Industrie A.G. at Neuhausen, Switzerland. Another firm, Societe Electro-
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freely in cryolite”81 were essential to the industrial production of aluminum and would not be 
resolved until the early twentieth century. Sources of capital investment enabled the parties to 
wage battle in court and eventually wrest control of the aluminum market into the hands of a few 
corporate titans who competed in a global aluminum market. The dominant corporate entity in 
the United States began with the investors who collaborated with the young Charles Martin Hall 
to form a corporation that would eventually be named The Aluminum Company of America — 
ALCOA. 
 
Start-up Capital and the Launch of the Aluminum Industry 
Investors were foundational to the early development of the aluminum industry and were 
an important impetus to the spread of aluminum. Governments, banks and private individuals 
constituted the primary classes of investors. For instance, Napoleon III funded Saint-Claire 
Deville’s aluminum experiments in order to develop an aluminum production capacity for 
France. The German financial institution Gotha funded the Héroult-connected enterprises 
Allgemeine Elektrizitat Gesellschaft and Aluminum Industrie A.G., which aided the upward and 
downward integration of the chain of aluminum production for those companies and encouraged 
formalized managerial structures.82 In the United States, the Cowles brothers had connections to 
their father’s publishing enterprise, but Charles Martin Hall, just 23 years of age when he 
patented his aluminum making process, was not initially well-capitalized. After initially failing 
to obtain investors, he went to work for the Cowles operation. The Cowles had succeeded in 
producing copper-aluminum alloy, but not a commercially viable pure aluminum as had Hall. He 
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demonstrated his process to the Cowles at their Cleveland-based Electric Smelting and 
Aluminum Company, extending an option to them for the purchase of his patent. The Cowles did 
not exercise this option, and Hall left to seek funding elsewhere.83 He found that source of capital 
in Pittsburgh, the center of American steel and iron manufacturing. 
In the twentieth century, aluminum would compete directly with steel in the market for 
architectural cladding products. Its development and spread, however, intertwined with the steel 
industry from its earliest production through the capitalists who invested in Hall’s invention. In 
the late 1800s, Pittsburgh was a bustling steel town, attracting capital and intellect for the 
development of iron and steel. Captain Alfred E. Hunt was a metallurgist and businessman who 
would lead a group of investors to acquire Hall’s patent and use it for industrial scale production 
of aluminum. Educated at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, graduating with a degree in 
metallurgy in 1876, he moved to Pittsburgh to work in the steel industry and in 1887 bought an 
engineering testing agency with his business partner, George Hubbard Clapp, a chemist working 
for another steel company.84 Hunt himself had tried to reduce aluminum earlier in the 1880s but 
had failed. An acquaintance of Hunt, Romaine Cole, met Hall in Lockport, Pennsylvania and was 
aware of his aluminum production process. Cole also knew of Hunt’s interest in aluminum 
reduction and returned to Pittsburgh to try and connect Hall with Hunt. Indeed, Hunt was 
intrigued, and in 1888 he met with Hall in Pittsburgh. All the men — Hall, Hunt, Clapp and Cole 
agreed that Hall’s process had commercial potential and raised an initial seed of $20,000 to form 
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a company and build a pilot plant in Pittsburgh. Their funds were combined with those of 
investors who were employed in leading positions of steel companies, including Carbon Steel 
Company and Carnegie Steel Company.85 The company was formed on September 18, 1888, and 
was called the Pittsburgh Reduction Company, with the purpose “to exploit commercially the 
Hall discovery.”86 After the owners of the fledgling company determined that the pilot plant 
suggested the feasibility of commercial-scale aluminum production, they recognized the need for 
more funding if they were to go into full commercial production.87 They found it with the 
banking family T. Mellon & Sons, under the direction of Andrew W. Mellon. This early 
investment paid off the company’s debt, capitalized expansion of the company and gave the 
Mellon’s a large ownership stake.88  
With a well-capitalized position, the Pittsburgh Reduction Company engaged in 
expanding their physical plant and finding buyers for aluminum. But before the company could 
assert a position of dominance in the market, it needed the legal footing to do so. By design, 
patents enabled a time-limited monopoly. Such a condition rested on two factors. The 
monopolist had to hold legal right to the patent, and the monopolist had to exercise his rights to 
exploit the patent before it opened up to competitors as the patent expired. While the Pittsburgh 
Reduction Company held the Hall patent, it did not hold those patents controlled by the Cowles 
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family. The funding obtained by the Pittsburgh Reduction Company was crucial to asserting 
rights in court over intellectual property to which they believed they were entitled. It enabled 
them to wage battle in court over patents during the late nineteenth century when the company 
was attempting to gain a dominant foothold in the aluminum market. Conflict was minimized 
early between Hall and Héroult. The conflict with the Cowles, however, would not dissipate until 
the early twentieth century. Believing that the Cowles were infringing on their intellectual 
property, the Pittsburgh Reduction Company sued them for producing aluminum in an 
electrolytic process very similar to that protected by the Hall patent.89 Hall won this lawsuit in 
1893. Patent trouble was an existential threat to the company. But because it held legal right to 
the patent, at least for the next ten years before the Cowles won a counter suit, it was 
emboldened to establish the capital-intensive operations, from mining to smelting to selling, 
needed to bring aluminum to customers. It bought or leased exclusive rights to those lands where 
the raw materials of aluminum were mined, excluding competitors from access. And it forged an 
international partnership with the nascent European aluminum cartel to dominate the American 
market. Without legal right to intellectual property, the Cowles were prevented from effective 
participation in the rapidly growing aluminum market. 
 
Building the World Stage for Aluminum 
By the late nineteenth century, the companies that would dominate the twentieth-century 
aluminum market before World War II were already established. Capital accumulation and 
intellectual property rights enabled them to seek out the raw materials of aluminum first in 
Europe and the United States, and later in the Global South.  A global corporate-industrial 
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apparatus was marshalled to move bauxite, the raw material from which alumina is most 
economically extracted, over the ocean or across the rails to strategically located smelters near 
hydroelectric power sources and then to fabrication plants often in other locales, all controlled by 
managers in Western centers of finance and industry.  
Well before the emergence of industrial aluminum production, the clay-like material 
named bauxite was first discovered by French Chemist P. Bertheier in 1821 in Le Baux in the 
south of France.90 It is a clay-like substance described as “a mixture of hydrated oxides of 
aluminum containing silica, ferric oxide, and other impurities.”91  At an industrial scale, it was a 
more economical way of separating the alumina than other sources. In the United States, 
geologists discovered substances similar to bauxite which yielded alumina at Hermitage, near 
Rome, Georgia, in 1883.92 The Pittsburgh Reduction company initially bought partial ownership 
of an existing company, the Georgia Bauxite and Mining Company and finally purchased it in 
full.93 Mining bauxite in the United States began in 1889.94 Another more capital-intensive 
source was corundum, which was found in South Carolina. This was the source for the pyramidal 
cap of the Washington Monument, the first architectural application of aluminum in the United 
States.95  
Pausing to reflect on the Washington Monument is beneficial at this point because it 
shows the cultural and financial value associated with aluminum at the beginning of its 
widespread production. William Frismuth was a metallurgist in Philadelphia who specialized in 
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rare metals. He took an interest in aluminum and by the mid-1870s, had already procured several 
aluminum patents. He furthermore labeled himself as “the only manufacturer of aluminium and 
its alloys in the United States and Canada.”96 This notability and expertise attracted the attention 
of the engineer in charge of the construction of the Washington Monument.  
Aluminum was chosen for reasons of function, but the status of aluminum reinforced the 
decision. In terms of function, the cap was required to serve as an electrical conductor to arrest 
lighting at the tip. It also necessitated a metal that would not produce streaking from rain on the 
white stone cladding below, a notorious problem with copper, for instance. The status of 
aluminum as a novel material intrigued Frismuth, yet he was not fully confident that he could 
make such a large casting, which would be the largest casting ever made.97 For this reason, he 
cast both an aluminum-bronze cap, and a more questionable and difficult pure aluminum cap. Its 
weight was 100 ounces, and it measured 5.5 inches along each side and the same in height. The 
pure aluminum cap proved successful, and it was delivered from Frismuth’s foundry.  
It was not yet ready to find its place at the top, however, because first it required a 
polishing procedure, and then its status as a rarity was celebrated. It was displayed in Tiffany’s 
window in New York to be admired by passersby and written about by the press. Tiffany’s was 
fitting, as aluminum was still considered too expensive for widespread mass production. That 
only became possible upon the availability of electricity in sufficient quantities to facilitate a 
soon to be invented electrolytic method, an improvement upon the chemical method of isolating 
aluminum that Frismuth had used.  Its status was further celebrated because the ore for the cap 
was sourced not in France, but in the United States, a fitting source for a burgeoning patriotism. 
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On December 6, 1884, the cap was placed by men with a photographer standing on a platform 
surrounding the cap, with an inscription, reading in part, “This pyramid of pure aluminum was 
produced from the American ore Corrundum.”98 
Aluminum was shaping up to be an international competition, because if it could be 
produced in quantity, its properties were believed by promoters to be profitable for the seller and 
useful in many applications. The most fruitful source of alumina in the United States was found 
in Arkansas. State geologist John G. Branner found in 1887 the largest deposit of bauxite in the 
country. This source continued to serve the needs of the Pittsburgh Reduction Company and 
even its competitors after World War II. These early sources of alumina were commercially 
exploited under the auspices of the legal and regulatory framework of the laws of counties in 
North America and Europe. Once again, patent law was a mechanism governing the exploitation 
of alumina-containing materials. Before the expiration of the Bayer process, discovered in 1888, 
The Pittsburgh Reduction Company purchased alumina from the Pennsylvania Salt Company 
and the Merrimac Chemical Company,99 and also processed its own alumina at its New 
Kensington, Pennsylvania, plant using a carbon dioxite process.100 After the Bayer patent expired 
in 1903, this more economical process was employed in a new alumina processing facility the 
company established in East St. Louis with convenient access to the Mississippi River.  
Even before the Pittsburgh Reduction Company was founded in 1888, bauxite was 
imported by the Merrimac Chemical Company to the United States for use in the production of 
aluminum salts, first from Ireland and later from France, where the ore was attainable at a 
cheaper price.101 Although cautioning  that aluminum firms are indeed subject to their national 
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contexts, John Stuckey, author of Vertical Integration and Joint Ventures in The Aluminum 
Industry argues that aluminum firms of the late-nineteenth and twentieth centuries are best 
classified “on the basis of their status worldwide, with factors such as their home country or their 
participation in the aluminum industry of a particular country being of secondary importance. I 
assume that firms have global strategies, and I consider the markets for aluminum products (to 
the extent that they exist) to be world markets.”102  
Soon after the Hall and Héroult patents were absorbed by corporate entities, the 
aluminum market was essentially bifurcated between North America and Europe. The Pittsburgh 
Reduction Company dominated the aluminum market in the United States and dominated the 
Canadian market through its Canadian holdings, incorporated as the Northern Aluminum 
Company, Limited.103 A cartel of aluminum companies that was known as the Aluminum 
Association, established in 1901, dominated the European market. These confederations would 
compete, collude and run afoul of the laws of European countries and the United States until they 
disbanded after World War II. The Aluminum Association acted as a quasi-governmental 
agency, unifying policy decisions to one agency that otherwise would be subject to negotiations 
with government entities. Across the Atlantic, the North American corporate holdings controlled 
by the Pittsburgh Reduction Company gained a foothold before regulators in the United States 
reacted in opposition – which they would in varying degrees of influence until they broke up the 
North American aluminum market in more structural ways following World War II. The two 
entities, the Pittsburgh Reduction Company and the Aluminum Association controlled access to 
bauxite, regulated supply and output, limited competitive entrants to the market and, amongst 
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their respective members in either the US or Europe, shared marketing research and materials.104 
These goals were aimed at protecting and expanding market positions and maximizing profit 
potential, which was closely linked to the price of aluminum on the market.  
As private entities, profit was a motivator that underlay the actions taken by member 
companies. The price of aluminum had a complicated relationship with profit. On the one hand, a 
higher price of aluminum could yield more income for every unit of aluminum sold. On the other 
hand, in a field of competitors occupied by other metals such as brass and copper, producers 
lowered the price of aluminum in order to compete in the market. Employing electrolytic 
reduction rather than the more expensive chemical reduction was one way producers were able to 
sell aluminum at a lower price. Moving toward economies of scale by expanding quickly to 
industrial-scale production was another. Although the mythological origins of Hall’s aluminum 
production method were “the immortal woodshed” near his parent’s home,105 production at scale 
involved a capital intensive operation in terms of investment capital and human capital and a 
physical plant to process the raw materials of aluminum into a finished, sellable product. While 
aluminum production is indeed part of a wider web of relationality to social, economic and 
political forces, the tangible process of aluminum production, and of those cladding products 
which come from it, once industrialized became a complex, linear process that began with the 
dirty physicality of bauxite, moved to smelters and extended through factory production up and 
down the line of vertical integration. Because of the location of bauxite across the world, and 
because of the connectedness between the twin-spheres of finance and consumption in Europe 
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and the United States, the actual process of aluminum production was international soon after it 
moved out of the woodshed and into the plant.106 Aluminum production first coordinated only 
between Europe and the United States. In the twentieth century, it became an expanded global 
industrial process. An aluminum panel installed in the Midwestern United States in the postwar 
period might, for instance, have originated with bauxite in Guyana. Furthermore, the exigencies 
of international trade, pricing and tariffs which influenced the price and availability of aluminum 
was an interaction between nations and cartels. Aluminum became increasingly global after 
World War II. But before the turn of the century, the line of industrial aluminum production 
controlled by the European cartel and the Pittsburgh consortium was centered in two nations — 
France and the United States.107 This process began by mining the materials containing alumina 
and ended with a finished product consisting of near-pure aluminum or an alloy of aluminum and 
another metal.  
Before proceeding further, it is useful at this point to explain in brief the technical process 
of aluminum production from bauxite to finished product, because it reveals that the industrial 
process involved was highly complex, requiring great physical and capital resources. The basic 
steps of aluminum production proceed sequentially.108 (1) Mine the bauxite (or similar alumina-
holding raw material.) The bauxite is transported to milling plants, where it undergoes crushing, 
washing, drying, pulverizing and calculating — all processes to condition it for alumina 
extraction. (2) Produce alumina, extracting it from bauxite, employing the Bayer process and/or 
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the Pedersen process. The Bayer process is a separation process removing other elements from 
the alumina, such as the accompanying silica, iron oxide and minerals in the bauxite.109 The 
Pedersen process is an electrically-intensive process for processing sources of raw material in 
which alumina is less abundantly available.110 (3) Produce pig aluminum through the reduction 
of alumina, whereby an electric current is applied to a molten solution called cryolite contained 
within a crucible.111 This process separates the aluminum from its oxide, alumina, allowing the 
metal to collect at the bottom of the crucible, after which it is poured out and cooled into bars of 
aluminum (pig). (4) Fabricate aluminum as either castings (using sand, permanent molds, dies) 
or wrought (mill products: “sheets, plates, foils, extrusions, welded tubes, rolled and continuous-
cast rods and bars, bare wire, aluminum cables steel-reinforced, bare cables, forgings and 
impacts, and powders.)”112 (5) From these fabrications come manufactured finished aluminum 
goods, such as aluminum sash, aluminum screens and aluminum cladding.113
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CHAPTER 2: REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS SHAPE THE MARKET 
 
The United States government had such an influence on the aluminum industry that any 
examination of aluminum cladding, the way it developed and was marketed, must take into 
account the impact of regulatory bodies on the aluminum manufacturing enterprise. Prior to 
World War II, regulators in both the United Stated government and the International Aluminum 
Cartel, a group of aluminum producers colluding to regulate aluminum on the world stage, 
intervened in supply and production. After World War II, the union of aluminum and modern 
architecture can be easily understood as a corporate modernism, but it is better seen as a public-
private partnership. Joan Ockman, writing about postwar modernism in general characterizes the 
entanglement as “increasingly an accomplice of big business and government”114 which could 
also describe the relationship of these entities with aluminum cladding in particular. Government 
regulations and the influence of World War II shaped aluminum cladding in multivariate ways. It 
influenced through the enforcement of building codes, federal legislation that regulated supply 
and demand, patent law, restriction on monopolistic behavior and the facilitation of the creation 
of competition, giving birth to Reynolds Metals, a viable competitor in the United States for 
Alcoa.  
World War II did not mark the beginning of aluminum cladding in architecture, despite 
misunderstandings to the contrary. Aluminum cladding for commercial structures and framing 
for store fronts and windows was employed before the war and was increasing in use. The first 
use of aluminum in building construction in the United States was the Washington Monument 
(1884), capped with a small pyramid of aluminum. Cladding of aluminum first gained 
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widespread use as spandrels under windows, with the aluminum panels under the windows of the 
Chrysler Building (1929) one of the first applications, and others such as Rockefeller Center 
Building (1930-39) to follow. Then war intervened and shifted all aluminum production in the 
United States to war production. 
 
Government policy intertwined with the aluminum industry 
Postwar architectural modernism has often been examined as an entanglement between 
government regulations, the Cold War and the corporate sphere. For instance, Greg Castillo 
examines the role of domestic spaces in the Cold War,” and Sarah Williams Goldhagen describes 
the postwar period as “the spread of democracy and the growth of the welfare state, the cold war, 
the need to rebuild economies and destroyed cities, decolonialization, and the rapid 
dissemination of mass culture.”115 This study supports these characterizations and shows the 
entanglement of government and corporate industry in the mass production of aluminum 
architectural components. Producers and architects collaborated to confront regulatory barriers, 
devising ways to work with building codes, and in other schemes, to devise alternatives. The first 
building discussed in this section is the Equitable Building in Portland, Oregon, by Pietro 
Belluschi (1948.) This structure shows how the building code restricted Belluschi’s aspirations 
but also enabled a creative and unusual use of aluminum at that time. A second building, the 
Davenport Works Administration Building, (1949) by Harrison & Abramovitz, reveals the 
collaboration between Alcoa’s researchers and developers, and the architects who aimed to 
devise an aluminum curtain wall that satisfied the building code. The wall of this building was 
utilized as a pilot project that could be improved and deployed in cities where Alcoa hoped to 
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sell aluminum for building cladding. Government held the power to regulate the aluminum 
industry through law and appeal to patriotism. Patent law, court rulings, tariffs, tax advantages 
and building code enforcement are ways government regulated the reach and spread of 
aluminum products like commercial cladding. Through appeals to patriotism and civic duty, 
government also urged the aluminum industry to participate in war efforts. Commercial 
aluminum cladding was shaped by government policy that began in the late nineteenth century 
and continued into the postwar period. 
Beginning with the first investments in research and experimentation, producers in the 
aluminum industry were intertwined with government. At times, producers relied on government 
for funding and expansion, while at other times producers held a contentious relationship that 
threatened the collapse of their enterprise. Aluminum cladding is the product of a public-private 
partnership, not as a formal structure, but as a negotiated construct. In this arrangement, 
producers provide government with the knowledge and technical skill to accomplish 
governmental policy goals in defense and economic goals in defining how the US market for 
aluminum should be structured, and the government exercises control over producers by 
enforcing those goals and provides the legal and economic foundation upon which producers 
built the aluminum industry. The most contentious interaction between producers and the US 
government concerned the degree of market control producers were allowed to hold. On the one 
hand, monopoly over creative work was protected for a time by the government by virtue of US 
patent law. On the other hand, the US government discouraged monopoly through laws and court 
rulings, reduced the power of leading producer Alcoa, induced the formation of viable new 
producers and increased competition amongst producers vying for a profitable slice of the 
commercial aluminum market. Government policies both defended existing positions of power 
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held by producers through tariffs and tangible asset transfers, but also aided those same 
producers’ competition through the exercise of court rulings and competing asset transfers.  
When examining the role of governments and their influence on aluminum production, it 
is important to understand that governments did not operate as monolithic entities. Often, 
factions of the US government disagreed with a course of action in relationship with the 
aluminum industry. The actions of governments explained herein are instead the policy decisions 
of particular regulatory bodies within a government, such as the President’s office, Congress or 
an agency. For instance, while the Defense Plant Corporation worked with and benefitted from 
the industrial activity of Alcoa, the judicial branch and, during the war, the Department of Justice 
continued investigating Alcoa on accusations of monopoly. The US government’s actions for 
and against Alcoa show the degree to which government was intertwined with aluminum 
products in the pre– and post–World War II periods. The intertwining of government and the 
aluminum industry suggests the aluminum market never was a “free-market” economy during 
the early to mid-twentieth century but was instead a command economy during wartime, in 
which the government planned and controlled aluminum production, and was a mixed economy 
at all other times during this period, in which the government leveraged its influence to challenge 
Alcoa’s dominance and facilitate viable competitors. 
 
The United States vs Alcoa 
From its founding in 1888 as the Pittsburgh Reduction Company, Alcoa enjoyed 
monopoly status in the United States, bolstered substantially by the legal protection of its 
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patents.116 Patents granted a period of time for the Aluminum Company of America (Alcoa) to 
exploit intellectual property for further development. This fact gave it a jump start and 
contributed to Alcoa as the dominant producer in the United States until World War II. Two 
years after the company’s founding, however, the U.S. Congress began to frown upon monopoly 
as a corporate condition. The Sherman Act of July 2, 1890, is described as an act in which: 
“Congress thus criminalized agreements in restraint of trade, monopolization, attempts to 
monopolize, and conspiracies to monopolize; authorized the federal government to seek 
injunctive relief; authorized persons injured in their business and property to sue for treble 
damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs; and then left it to the federal courts to work out the details 
on a common law basis.”117 The Pittsburgh Reduction Company’s (later Alcoa’s) important 
Bradley patent expired in 1909, and by 1910, the US government began investigating the 
Alcoa.118 Because Alcoa had been under near-continuous investigation by branches of the US 
government from this time until the 1950s, 119 volumes of archival material have been retained as 
mandated by court proceedings.120 The most impactful charges brought against Alcoa by the 
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government began in April, 1937 when the Justice Department brought anti-trust charges against 
the company. The government accused Alcoa of monopoly, excluding competitors by 
aggressively expanding up and down the chain of production, engaging in exclusive electrical 
power contracts and participating with the international aluminum cartel in schemes to divide the 
worldwide aluminum market amongst its members, shutting out competitors.121 Meanwhile, 
World War II erupted, and Alcoa began production of aluminum for the war. The Defense Plant 
Corporation (DPC) was formed in August 1940 to provide the regulatory structure and funding 
for the construction of aluminum plants across the United States, most of which Alcoa 
operated.122 This is emblematic of the aluminum industry’s relationship with the government — 
factions simultaneously cooperating and conflicting — with the stakes set as company survival 
and industry productivity for the war effort.  
The DPC was an enormous apparatus transforming large swaths of the US economy, for 
a time, into a command economy. Upon its dissolution in 1945, the DPC owned between 10 to 
12 percent of the entire industrial capacity of the United States. In approximate terms, it 
controlled 96 percent of the synthetic rubber industry, 90 percent of magnesium production, 71 
percent of aircraft manufacturing and 58 percent of the aluminum industry.123 Its influence over 
the aluminum industry was envisioned by the government to effectuate the manufacture of 
approximately 50,000 planes per year.124 Alcoa played a significant role in the DFC-directed 
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expansion of the aluminum industry. The DFC relied on Alcoa as a fount of expertise in plant 
construction and aluminum production. Two-thirds of all expenditure for industrial facilities, 
totaling $25 billion, was financed by the government.125  
Soon after the DFC initiative was underway, Judge Francis G. Caffey heard the case, 
which had originated in 1937, and issued his decision in 1941, clearing Alcoa of all charges. 
Alcoa churned out aluminum for the war, but their legal troubles related to monopoly were not 
over. A component to the complaints against the company was a petition to dissolve Alcoa, thus 
precluding its monopoly. Caffey’s decision was appealed by the Justice Department and sent to 
the Supreme Court, which, lacking a quorum, could not hear the case. Congress intervened to 
send it to a US Circuit Court of Appeals where Judge Learned Hand in 1945 affirmed Caffey’s 
ruling on all findings and conclusions, with the exception of charges of monopoly and price 
manipulation.126 Simultaneous events impacted the court, however, and Judge Hand postponed 
any potential dissolution of Alcoa to end monopoly, realizing that the aluminum plants built with 
government funds and operated by Alcoa during the war could be transferred after the war to 
upstart competitors, breaking Alcoa’s monopoly. The Justice Department, at war’s end, refused 
to authorize the transfer of the plants Alcoa had built and then leased from the government.  
Upon cancelling the leases that Alcoa and the government had agreed to, the government 
directly engaged in forming the postwar aluminum industry. Several factions of the government 
agreed with this goal. In 1945, the Attorney General proposed to Congress to “recast” the 
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aluminum industry into several competitors, 127 The President of the United States articulated his 
hope that the plants could be disposed of in a manner that would create competition,128 and the 
Surplus Property Act authorized a board of experts to propose ways the plants could be disposed 
of with the intent of creating competition for Alcoa. The Surplus Property Board maintained that 
increased competition in the aluminum industry would have several positive effects. Competition 
was argued in terms of: “greater production, employment…[.] It will promote national 
security.”129 The keystone of the government-held properties—and one built and leased by 
Alcoa—was the state-of-the-art Hurricane Creek alumina plant in Arkansas, built in 1942. It held 
the advantage of close proximity to the leading source of domestic bauxite, was near the 
government’s large stockpile of aluminum and was underpinned by patented processes held by 
Alcoa.130 During the war, Alcoa had operated this plant using its proprietary alumina-processing 
equipment. The Surplus Property Board contended that to create a competitive environment, not 
only this plant but also the patented processes tied to it should be transferred to a viable 
competitor. With Alcoa’s lease cancelled, the government negotiated with Reynolds to take over 
this plant and negotiated with Alcoa to release its patents. Under protest from Alcoa executive 
Arthur Davis, Alcoa did agree to release the patents and Reynolds was granted access to them, 
taking control of the Hurricane Creek plant. Kaiser Aluminum was the second competitor 
granted plants from the government. Alcoa, Reynolds and Kaiser were the primary producers 
that formed the new competitive landscape for aluminum, supported with generous subsidies, 
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key patents freed to competitors and plants distributed across the nation. Reynolds paid $57.6 
million for plants and equipment valued at $174 million, paying $3 million in cash. Kaiser paid 
$43.5 million for plants and equipment valued at $127 million.131 Alcoa retained use of select 
plants built with government funds. These assets, the need for new building stock and the 
collective experience in metal manufacturing held by these corporations positioned them 
advantageously for the postwar era. 
Despite the government’s role in creating robust competition in the aluminum industry, 
the Justice Department continued to seek Alcoa’s dissolution. The judge hearing this case in 
1950, Judge John C. Knox, ruled against dissolution, but instead ordered that the major 
shareholders in Alcoa must not also hold shares, as they had, in Aluminum Limited, the 
Canadian company, because doing so tied these two companies too closely together, in effect 
forming a conglomerate that was argued could still exercise disproportionate control over 
Reynolds and Kaiser.132 Then, the judge extended jurisdiction over Alcoa for another five 
years—a wait-and-see period to observe whether Alcoa’s dominance really would be challenged 
by the competitive forces of Reynolds and Kaiser. 
 
An American Oligopoly of Competitive Producers on the World Stage 
The government had directly compelled a new competitive landscape for the aluminum 
industry in the United States through favorable tax policies, generous loan and lease agreements, 
forced patent transfers and the threat of dissolution. The government was driven by the goals of 
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raising employment,133 fostering competition134 and, in the words of the Surplus Property Board, 
promoting “national security.”135 But there was a larger reason for these goals: the competitive 
position of the United States as an entity on the world stage. American producers were not alone 
in the world of aluminum. After World War II, Western European producers were joined by 
Eastern European producers and the industrial apparatus of the Soviet Union. Aluminum was, 
from the start, an international industry and became global as bauxite was mined in the global 
South and the Caribbean region. Through government intervention, it defined an American 
apparatus of industrial production comprising a distributed network of producers. 
One important political tool employed by nations in competition with others in aluminum 
production was the tariff — a tool directed both ways between European and American 
producers. The French firm Pechiney Compagnie de Produits Chimique et Electrometallurgiques 
was privileged by government tariffs on international imports,136 while the Pittsburgh Reduction 
Company’s (Alcoa’s) profits, in its first decade and beyond, were aided by tariff protection in the 
United States,137 having the effect of suppressing foreign competitors.138 Producers in the United 
States kept a close watch on tariffs, attempting where possible to exert influence. As an 
aggressive new competitor to Alcoa, Reynolds was especially keen on leveraging the tariff 
against Alcoa. Reynolds protested what it said was a low tariff on Canadian aluminum, given 
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that Alcoa had a close relationship through stock ties to the Canadian producer Alcan.139 Not 
only was the tariff a tool used against foreign competitors but it also served as a leveraging tool 
of competition between domestic producers. 
 
The public-private foundation of aluminum cladding 
The spread of aluminum cladding in the postwar period was a product of an industry with 
direct and ample financial support from the government. The aluminum industry was not a “free 
market” in the most common sense of the phrase. Moving from the domestic monopoly status of 
a sole US producer to a domestic oligopoly of a few producers, industrialists were supported by 
production during three twentieth-century wars and by the direct intervention of the government 
into the aluminum industry. The postwar spread of a corporate-oriented architecture is partly 
attributable to government intervention transforming a command economy into a circumstance in 
which control over industry was gradually relinquished to the private sector. When aluminum 
producers aligned with government goals, government could be highly enabling. Conversely, 
when producers diverged from government goals, government could, given enough time, end 
long-established industry plans. Despite the variability in benefit of the aluminum industry’s 
relationship with the government, the United States presented an advantageous environment for 
aluminum production. The country had a well-developed infrastructure comprising electrical 
distribution and natural resources such as coal and major rivers which could be, and were, 
dammed for the enormous amounts of electricity from hydroelectric generators required to power 
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smelting operations.140 Despite involvement in three major resource-consuming wars, the United 
States also provided a stable political location. The high-levels of investment required for 
industrial-scale aluminum production necessitated political stability and a large potential 
market.141 The high rate of aluminum-industry expansion in the first half of the twentieth century 
was facilitated by the involvement of the US government through direct investment, a 
government policy favoring growth, 142 and a politically stable, growing market for aluminum. 
 
War as an accelerator, not an originator of aluminum production 
Modern architecture in the postwar period was markedly influenced by World War II. As Beatriz 
Colomina writes, “The bright experiments of postwar American architecture are covertly 
organized by the trauma of war — the trauma of the war that just finished and the trauma of the 
fact that it had not really finished after all.”143 This trauma overshadows currents in the 
development of modern architecture that began in the prewar period, only to be brought to a halt 
as production facilities stopped manufacturing materials for the building industry and instead 
accelerated production for the war. In the history of aluminum, it is sometimes said that 
aluminum was not widely used in building before World War II.144  Widespread use is, of 
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course, a relative assessment. What is clear, however, is that aluminum was, in fact, used in 
many of the same building applications before World War II as after.  
Innovation in building materials such as aluminum was sourced in discoveries about the 
metal often because of war production. For instance, writes Bowley: “It will be noticed that the 
introduction of aluminum has increased resources available for building by the discovery of 
important building properties in a material previously regarded as unsuitable. This discovery was 
exogenous to the building and building-material industries and must be attributed…to the aircraft 
industry and engineers aided by the Aluminum Development Association and the 
government.”145 Development of new uses for aluminum in building occurred before World War 
II in robust ways. Yet it is true that World War II, and a string of wars preceding it, did play a 
significant role in the development of the building market for aluminum products. From the 
earliest days of aluminum production, commanders envisioned the production process as holding 
potential advantages for war fighting. War, and especially World War II, most certainly was an 
important influence on the development of architectural aluminum-building products, but it is 
more useful to see how war acted not as a cause but as an accelerator of aluminum production, 
extending from new knowledge, procedures and physical infrastructure resulting from the 
production of war materials. Furthermore, war and its relationship with aluminum production 
extended beyond World War II, encompassing the Korean conflict and the Cold War. 
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The earliest intersection between war and aluminum was the funding of 3,000 francs by 
the French Academy to foster research on aluminum. Napoleon III was the patron for Saint-
Claire Deville’s aluminum experiments in France. In 1855 Deville commissioned aluminum 
tableware with a value greater than gold; it is said that he allowed his important guests to use the 
utensils at the banquet table.146 In 1857 an aluminum baby rattle was presented by Deville to the 
infant son of Napoleon III.147 But Napoleon was not solely interested in trinkets and tableware. 
Emperor Napoleon III funded Henri St. Claire Deville with the aim of developing an aluminum 
industry that could produce lightweight but robust military equipment. Aluminum was cast into 
imperial eagles for French army standards and in 1858 breastplate armor was made for 
Napoleon. 148 In 1892 the French government ordered torpedo boats made of aluminum.149 
France’s leading role in the development of aluminum on an industrial scale afforded the nation 
advantages that it sought to exploit for military gain.  Despite Napoleon’s aspirations, it is 
incorrect to attribute the development of aluminum in France solely as a contribution to war-
fighting capability. Deville anticipated its use in the domestic and commercial spheres, 
predicting it would become more widespread if its price were reduced.150 Yet, in addition to 
private investment, funding by governments contributed to the development of aluminum, 
especially as an instrument of war. 
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War, Aluminum and the United States 
As another center of industrial aluminum production, the producers and manufacturers in 
the United States also capitalized on their first-mover advantage and sought out uses for 
aluminum as a war material.151 Theodore Roosevelt used an aluminum canteen during the 
Spanish-American War, and cavalrymen in that war secured their tents with aluminum stakes.152 
As Alcoa historian Charles Carr notes, military uses included “dust for explosives, drop bombs, 
fuses, flares, hand grenades, heavy ammunition, rifle cartridges, and for airplanes, aeronautical 
engines, castings.”153 World War I was a much greater catalyst than previous wars in spurring 
aluminum production. Alcoa’s production of aluminum grew to 152 million pounds per year in 
1917,154 boosting the growth of Alcoa.155 Primary aluminum producers and aluminum 
architectural product manufacturers largely dedicated their facilities to the War effort. By 1917 
approximately ninety percent of aluminum production in the US was directed to military 
requirements. By 1918, capacity of aluminum production rose forty percent over production at 
the beginning of the war.156 Kawneer, a manufacturer of metal storefront systems, dedicated its 
factory to the production of metal aircraft frames for the war, adapting techniques for 
manufacturing storefront systems to the production of aircraft.157 Because Kawneer invented a 
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tubular steel strut employed in monoplanes and bi-planes, the company was officially 
commended by the War Department.158  
World War I had accelerated aluminum production in several ways. First, the war 
boosted research into and knowledge of aluminum manufacturing techniques. After the war, 
aluminum producers set up research laboratories manned by research staffs.159 Knowledge about 
effective casting techniques benefitted the market for aluminum car components. Second, 
knowledge of aluminum and its properties spread more widely amongst the engineering trades. 
As Donald Wallace’s 1937 study of the aluminum industry notes: “…the war accomplished more 
advertising in two years for this industry than a decade of New York copy could have done.”160 
This spreading knowledge was accompanied by an increasing adoption of aluminum over other 
metals. While all metals increased in use after World War I, aluminum saw faster growth than 
iron or copper in percentage increase.161 Lastly, the war repositioned  aluminum alliances, 
enabling the cooperation of producers with regimes outside of established regulatory 
frameworks. The aluminum cartel of Europe, which was a controlling force over aluminum 
production since its founding in 1901, dissolved in 1915 (but was reformed after the war) 
because, as a conglomerate of European aluminum producers, it held as members companies 
beholden to both the Germans and the Allied Powers. As a result, the respective governments 
stepped in to regulate the price and production of aluminum.162 Repositioning extended 
internationally, and Alcoa merged assets with a French start-up in the United States in 1916.163 
 
                                                 
158 “75 Kawneer Years…Only a Beginning,” supplement to Daily Star (Niles, Mich.) July 29, 1981, 7. 
159 Wallace, Market Control in the Aluminum Industry, 46. 
160 Ibid., 46. 
161 Engle, Mossé, and Gregory, Aluminum: An industrial Marketing Appraisal, 167. 
162 Louis Marlio, The Aluminum Cartel (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1947), 19. 
163 Wallace, Market Control in the Aluminum Industry, 116. 
71 
 
 
World War II and the growth of aluminum 
Many of the uses for aluminum and the aluminum-industry experiences during World 
War I were mirrored in World War II but on a larger scale. Contrary to some assertions, World 
War II did not mark the entry of aluminum into the building market. Before that conflict, the 
aluminum market was already expanding into industrial, building and domestic applications. In 
the late 1920s it was widely employed as window extrusions, storefronts and in sheet metal for 
architectural uses.164 Kawneer ran a profitable business using aluminum extrusions for 
storefronts from the late 1920s, and aluminum was firmly established as a leading material in 
storefront construction by the 1930s. Based on prewar sales, the industry was optimistic about 
postwar sales.165 Instead, more than other wars, World War II boosted production quantity, 
physical infrastructure and knowledge about aluminum. During World War II, production soared 
as orders arrived at the factory to manufacture military hardware and munitions. Factories 
produced war-fighting capability in what political scientist Joseph Nye has termed “hard 
power.”166 Such a power base lies in contrast to “soft power,” which is a mechanism of 
combative influence exercised through culture and policy, explained at length in the sphere of 
architecture by Greg Castillo in Cold War on the Homefront: The Soft Power of Midcentury 
Design.167 While soft power operates along vectors of influence such as propaganda, hard power, 
like wartime aluminum production, directly supplied the war with tangible material. After the 
war, production continued to increase and the purchase of aluminum products for uses in 
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architecture expanded widely. Aluminum manufacturers and scholars examining the field after 
the war pinned this expansion on a boost given by the war. As Colomina notes, “modern 
architecture borrowed — or perhaps “recycled” is a more accurate word — the techniques, 
materials, and ways of doing that were developed for the military.”168 This boost came from 
knowledge gained about aluminum during the war and expanded factory infrastructure on both 
sides of the Atlantic. 
Aluminum was deemed vital to waging war by the Nazi regime which rose to power in 
Germany. Rapid increase in aluminum production in Germany prior to the war perhaps signaled 
the coming conflict to such a degree that the cartel was justified as an early warning mechanism 
to conflict, and American industrialists argued for the United States to increase production in 
response to the increase in German aluminum production. In 1934 Germany requested that the 
cartel rapidly expand production to a level twice the consumption in that year. The cartel 
president was bound by agreement to comply. While the US Senate later contended that the 
cartel was complicit in Germany’s aggression, the cartel as a mechanism of communication 
between members who would become the Axis and Allied Powers may have exposed an 
otherwise-unknown prewar increase in aluminum production.169 By 1940 Germany dominated in 
metric tons of aluminum production, only to be surpassed in 1943 by the joint production of US 
and Canadian producers.170 American industrialist R. S. Reynolds raised awareness about 
Germany’s consumption of aluminum for airplanes and sounded the alarm in congress and on the 
radio. By his account, he traveled to Europe in 1939 to seek out suppliers of aluminum for his 
upstart aluminum concern because Alcoa declined to sell to his company. He could not secure 
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supplies of aluminum from England or Germany, but he did claim to discover that Germany was 
producing aluminum to build thousands of aircraft. This message he took to Congress in an 
appeal to the US government to loan him the funds necessary to build aluminum plants and to 
the radio airwaves to garner public support for his grander visions of industrial-scale production 
of aluminum.171 He forged relationships with a senator and officials at the Reconstruction 
Finance Corporation (RFC), a government entity established to fund industrial development for 
the war, and arranged a loan to build in Alabama his company’s first aluminum reduction plant, 
named after the senator who helped secure the $16 million loan from the RFC, Senator Lister 
Hill of Alabama.172 By 1944 Reynolds Metals had control of  40 plants for war production and 
would rise to be the primary domestic competitor to Alcoa and the second-largest producer in the 
United States.173 
At the beginning of the war, the United States was ill-prepared to produce aluminum for 
aircraft, hardware and the munitions that were deemed necessary to serve the needs of the 
military. A wider initiative by the US government instituted controls on the economy, including 
price controls on metals and federal funding directed to the building of factories for the 
production of aluminum. Factories were built under the mandate of the Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation, which, in turn, directed a subsidiary, the Defense Plant Corporation (DPC), created 
in August 1940.174 The US government engaged in plant construction in three ways. First, it built 
factories to increase the war arsenal. Second, it influenced the capacity of aluminum production 
by offering private capital special incentives, including tax amortization. Of the total $8.6 billion 
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invested in new plants privately, the sum of $6.1 billion was granted tax amortization, which 
allowed producers and manufacturers to depreciate the total cost of new facilities for tax 
purposes. This mechanism was directed where the government assessed a strong possibility of 
postwar profitable operation. Third, the DPC invested in the construction of manufacturing 
facilities. Over the course of the war it dedicated $7 billion to predominantly commercial 
industrial facilities where risk was excessive due to the possibility that the facilities would not 
maintain postwar operations in a profitable manner.175 These actions allowed the government to 
buy, sell, store and produce aluminum during the war. In comparison with 1939, a sevenfold 
increase in aluminum capacity accompanied the end of the war.176 
Aluminum producers and architectural aluminum product manufacturers were integrally 
engaged in producing hardware and munitions for the war. Research and development efforts 
established along with and in the wake of World War I were directed away from a commercial 
focus on, for instance, decorative finishes to military applications such as high-strength alloys 
and protective treatments.177 Kawneer was early to military production when the first substantive 
military airplane parts order was received by the company in 1937, well before the attack on 
Pearl Harbor.178 Alcoa similarly engaged early in the war. It began an expansion program in 
1938, “…foreseeing then a considerably greater demand for aluminum.”179 By 1944, an Alcoa 
internal company report revealed a substantial increase in production capacity: “It’s forging 
capacity was 45 times prewar capacity; its castings capacity 7 times; its extruded shapes capacity 
                                                 
175 White, “Financing Industrial Expansion for War: The Origin of the Defense Plant Corporation,” 157. 
176 Engle, Mossé, and Gregory, Aluminum: An Industrial Marketing Appraisal, 166. 
177 Ashby, “Aluminum Legacy,” 84. 
178 For an account of Kawneer’s involvement before World War II, see “75 Kawneer Years…Only a Beginning,” 10. 
179 Aluminum and World War II (Pittsburgh: Aluminum Company of America, March, 1944), p. 4, box 51, Records 
of the Aluminum Company of America. 
 
75 
 
10 times and its tubing 13 times. One Alcoa rolling mill is turning out, monthly, one and one-half 
times as much high-strength alloy sheet — the kind warplanes use — as the whole country 
produced in a full year, before the war.”180 
 
Production for the war 
During World War II, factories across the United States were tasked with producing war 
materials.181 Among many other applications, for instance, Kawneer made gunner pods for 
bombers; Alcoa produced propellers; and Reynolds made bombshells.182 By 1943 Reynolds was 
supplying the aluminum for 20,000 aircraft per year.183 In addition to actual production, 
aluminum manufacturers also were charged with raising funds through war bonds.  Like many 
corporations of the era, Alcoa also participated in bond sale drives.184 Similarly, Kawneer 
advertised its fifth war loan drive in 1944, whereby each employee was asked to purchase bonds 
in addition to funds directed to war bonds through the company’s regular payroll savings plan.185 
Additionally, executives in the company’s hometown were asked to each raise at least $1000 for 
the drive.186 While mandates and incentives spurred corporate participation in supplying material 
and labor for the war, these corporations were also driven by patriotism. Aluminum 
manufacturers engaged in the war effort genuinely believed it was their duty and that World War 
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II was a moment that could either be won or lost to tyranny. Reynolds stated: “1944 comes as the 
supreme challenge to our faith, our fiber and our courage. . . . For three long years you have 
sweated, you have produced, you have built. . . . The climax of all the dead centuries faces us 
today. . . . We shall decide forever whether the God or the Beast in man is to rule this war weary 
world.”  Kawneer, in a 1943 editorial expounding on the company’s production of parts for 
aircraft, wrote: “our single purpose must be to work hard, every day, every hour, every minute to 
produce that part.”187 
With aluminum manufacturers humming with activity — laborers working overtime and 
resources stretched thin — they were not able to simultaneously manufacture architectural 
components for the consumer market. Kawneer made no storefronts from 1942 through most of 
1945.188 Alcoa sensed an opening to begin fabrication of consumer aluminum again but found 
war needs too great: “During the latter part of the year [1944], due to an excessive amount of 
available aluminum, it was hoped that some civilian sales could be inaugurated; but before any 
programs could be formulated in this connection the war demand for aluminum rose again and at 
the present time there is no immediate hope that civilian sales can be undertaken at an early 
date.”189 Although aluminum production was almost exclusively aimed at the war, knowledge of 
aluminum properties and techniques for its formulation into useful commercial products 
advanced and perhaps was even amplified. 
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Formation of new knowledge about aluminum 
Like the increase in knowledge about aluminum that followed World War I, World War 
II accelerated this knowledge, increased the expertise and experience of the work force and 
spread awareness of the material amongst customers. Many new technical processes were 
developed for the war.190 Kawneer explained that during wartime production, knowledge was 
already being gained that would be used in postwar production: “the intensive wartime 
production of aluminum assemblies has taught us many new things about the fabrication and 
finishing of aluminum which will be reflected in our postwar products.”191 Reynolds Metals also 
found the end of the war accompanied a boost in knowledge: “its importance to the aircraft 
industry has resulted in a greater quantity of theoretical and empirical data than are available for 
many traditional building materials.”192 In the process, much expertise was gained about the 
refinement, production and fabrication of aluminum. To answer the question posed by a 
magazine in 1941, “How can this huge increase in productive capacity be kept at work when the 
defense emergency is over and military demand dries up?” Alcoa explained that it was 
“perfecting new uses and products, and storing them away until needed.”193 After six years of 
manufacturing war materials, Alcoa  expressed confidence that experience would prove useful to 
the commercial sphere: “technical progress resulting from the Company’s war effort will be 
beneficial to these customers in the development of their postwar products.”194 Educators also 
asserted that experience gained in war production had structural influences on industrial 
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production. Frederick M. Feiker, Dean of the School of Engineering at George Washington 
University, asserted: “The war has proved beyond doubt that enormous production goals are 
possible in a short time by the application and refinement of the American principles of 
simplification, standardization and mass production.”195 
 
Manufacturing during the war as a mode of education and marketing 
New knowledge about aluminum’s properties developed along with war production 
facilitated education about the material for laborers in manufacturing and enabled a virtual 
marketing medium for end users. The US Business and Defense Services Administration 
recognized that aluminum laborers had become increasingly skilled in the “handling and working 
of aluminum” because of the engagement of manufacturers in the war.196 Alcoa maintained that 
discoveries and techniques developed for war materials educated both laborers and end users: 
“the greatly increased use of aluminum provides an education relative to the metal’s properties 
and usefulness for those who were previously unfamiliar with it.”197 Beyond mere education, the 
war was a way to market the characteristics of aluminum, spreading the message of its virtues 
through firsthand experience and accounts of its usefulness in the war. Reflecting on the war 
years, Reynolds wrote: “The output of aircraft and other products of aluminum during 1941–
1945 caused many people to come into close contact with aluminum, and they were able to see 
its important advantages at first hand.”198 Buckminster Fuller was an early employer of this new 
knowledge. Fuller employed production techniques from an aircraft plant for his Dymaxion 
Dwelling Machine, producing variant prototypes of this deployable aluminum dwelling. This 
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type of adaptation was the sort of inventiveness manufacturers hoped would characterize the 
immediate postwar consumer market. 
 
Dreams of postwar markets emboldened by war production 
During World War II, many in the field of construction were planning for a postwar 
future. As Jean Louis Cohen shows, architects designed buildings anticipating the end of the war 
and imagined new uses for materials at war’s end.199 Well before the war, aluminum 
manufacturers framed the marketing of aluminum in terms of the future. World War II amplified 
these prognostications with a confidence emboldened by up to seven years of accelerated 
manufacturing. Manufacturers also anticipated a postwar expanding market due to deferred 
maintenance of existing buildings and projections for the need of new construction. The 
Magazine Modern Metals reported on Kawneer’s anticipation: “The men of Kawneer were 
certain of one thing: Demand for their several lines of well established architectural products 
would far surpass anything the company had ever known. Four years of building depreciation 
across the country took care of that.”200 While the war was underway, aluminum manufacturers 
dreamed of a return to the consumer market, their potential sales emboldened by what they had 
learned and enabled by the dozens of new plants funded by the US government. Alcoa 
envisioned new ways of using aluminum, an activity they dubbed “Imagineering.”201 Aluminum 
manufacturers like Alcoa, Reynolds and Kawneer hoped users would define new uses, but they 
were ready, facilitated by robust research and design staffs, to either develop new uses or 
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collaborate with outside designers.202 Kawneer forecasted a burgeoning market: “Kawneer 
experience and ability in the fabrication of rustless metal is now contributing developments that 
speed up certain war work tremendously. Your Kawneer distributor has Kawneer Store Front 
Construction in his stock. Check with him for materials available. Look for improved Kawneer 
products when the war is over.”203 Reflecting from the vantage point of 1960 on Billy Reynolds’ 
influence on utilizing knowledge gained during the war, Reynolds Review stated: “When the war 
ended, the aircraft parts division had a vast array of fabricating equipment and a cadre of people 
with aluminum know-how. Since Reynolds also had, for the first time, great amounts of metal to 
sell to a peacetime economy, Billy Reynolds quickly began pointing the fabricating operations 
toward products that held the promise of volume consumption.”204 
 
Beyond World War II: The Korean War 
After a brief return to the commercial sphere, producers once again were subject to 
government mandates on price, supply and manufacturing. The Korean War became a new outlet 
for aluminum war components. This engagement shows how, like World War II, wartime policy 
decisions shaped the aluminum industry. The activities of aluminum producers during the 
Korean War also demonstrate a reciprocal transfer of knowledge: war benefitted peacetime 
aluminum production through the creation of new knowledge and techniques, and new 
knowledge and techniques developed in peacetime benefitted war production.  
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In the wake of World War II, new producers emerged from government action to divest Alcoa of 
factories the government had built for war production and transferred these assets into the hands 
of new competitors — namely, Reynolds Metals and Kaiser Aluminum. The government 
retained some plants at varying levels of operation. Companies that did not obtain these plants 
petitioned the government to take over the assets to diversify the aluminum market and produce 
aluminum for the Korean War. Newcomers Harvey and Apex were granted assets, with Harvey 
gaining a site at Grand River Dam in Oklahoma and Harvey gaining smelting equipment in 
California, unused since World War II, that they transported for use near Hungry Horse Dam in 
Montana.205 These firms, along with industry leader Alcoa, were the major producers of the 
postwar period. To further aid private industry with production for the Korean War, 1.5 million 
tons of scrap and virgin aluminum were released by the government to Reynolds and Kaiser 
from the 1945 stockpile.206 Beyond the direct transfer of assets, the government also provided tax 
benefits and allowed purchase contracts with inbuilt risk protection.207 Corporate taxes were 
reduced for the first few years of an aluminum producer’s investment.208 
While the Korean War did not completely preclude sales and manufacturing of 
Kawneer’s storefront products, it did reduce the company’s capacity for consumer production, 
due to restrictions placed on aluminum by the government. After the Korean War, the restrictions 
of access to and use of aluminum were loosened by the government, and manufacturers were 
once again free to focus on the consumer market. Kawneer’s Berkeley, California, factory moved 
from aircraft parts to storefront products, but Kawneer also leveraged knowledge gained about 
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aluminum and procedures developed for its manufacture during peacetime and directed these 
insights to war production. Mass-production techniques developed for the manufacture of 
storefront systems combined with techniques of manufacture developed in previous wars were 
employed in new plants Kawneer built specifically for national defense products. Kawneer 
resigned to the belief that defense manufacture would be ongoing. 209 They built a factory in the 
company’s home town of Niles, Michigan, specifically to manufacture aircraft. 
Despite the severe restrictions placed upon producers’ access to labor, infrastructure and 
material, they were often adept at leveraging war production to their advantage. Prior to World 
War II, Reynolds justified arguments for government loans to build their production capacity 
upon fears that Germany might attain a strategic war-fighting advantage by pointing out 
Germany’s mass production of aluminum aircraft components. After World War II, Reynold’s 
again evoked fear in arguing for access to material, this time citing the Russians. First, in 1947 
Reynolds Vice President C. M. Cashie requested that the government release its stockpile of 
aluminum to enable Reynolds to continue production. Later in 1949 Reynolds wrote to the 
President of the United States requesting that the government rebuild a stockpile, with the help of 
Reynolds production lines, for use in a potential war with Russia.210 
 
War shaped the industry 
War was a catalyst for aluminum production, enabling the physical infrastructure for a 
greatly expanded production capacity and enabling new knowledge of aluminum to develop new 
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techniques and expertise for wartime and postwar aluminum building products. 211   Through 
government action, the aluminum industry was shaped by war policy, facilitating the formation 
of new industry competitors and regulating supply, price and demand for the metal. As the 1944 
publication Aluminum: An Industrial Marketing Appraisal noted, “War, has been the ‘ill wind’ 
which has ‘blown good’ to the aluminum industry.”212 Reflecting the hopes of aluminum 
manufacturers, this assessment of the aluminum industry as the war concluded predicted a bright 
future for aluminum: “The economic significance of the war to aluminum lies in the wide 
acquaintance with its use which has been created by war orders. Thousands of business men, 
engineers, purchasing agents, production men, and workmen have become familiar with its 
properties and uses. Thus it well may be that the postwar trend of aluminum production will 
continue for some years at a sharper upward pitch than the general business index or than the 
production of older materials.”213  
War was such a visible and significant accelerant of aluminum production that it easily 
can be seen as original cause of the use of aluminum in architecture. Yet products such as 
aluminum architectural components were already an expanding share of the total aluminum 
market before both world wars. A survey of window sash manufacturers’ trade literature reveals 
that aluminum was promoted and sold as superior to steel for window frames in the 1920s214 and 
Kawneer adapted 75 percent of its product line to aluminum by 1937.215 Beyond the world wars, 
armed conflict continued to shape the aluminum market. Reflecting fears of the Cold War and 
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planning for perpetual war, manufacturers built facilities dedicated to war production and 
repositioned their manufacturing operations to accommodate simultaneous production of defense 
and commercial products. War, through government policies mandating and incentivizing 
aluminum industry participation, temporarily halted but later facilitated the expansion of 
commercial aluminum cladding. 
 
Standards and Codes Regulate Aluminum Cladding 
Both standards organizations and building codes formed the regulatory framework by 
which aluminum cladding was physically configured for the building-products market. 
Participation in organizations invested in the creation of standards presented an opportunity for 
producers to control regulations imposed on the design of aluminum architectural products. 
These organizations were often non-governmental confederations of tradesmen and leaders of 
industry with an articulated aim to define common standards agreed upon by participants to 
establish a common mode of understanding, or language, between producers, manufacturers and 
consumers. If standards defined by a particular manufacturer were adopted by other industry 
participants, they could profit through standardizing production, knowing their standardized parts 
had increased interoperability and acceptance. Manufacturers were incentivized to participate in 
defining the standards because they were consequently presented with the opportunity to align 
more widely accepted standards with production techniques with which they were already adept 
and through which they held an advantage. Building codes, on the other hand, were controlled by 
regulatory bodies with regional or national jurisdictions. Producers and designers attempted to 
meet the prescriptive measures of building codes, but they also conducted tests to demonstrate 
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how alternatives to the code might meet prescriptive goals. Building codes were a persistent 
challenge to fabricator’s plans to sell aluminum cladding. 
 
Standards organizations  
Standards organizations ranged from international regulatory bodies to regional groups. 
The largest organization not only defined standards but also acted as a regulatory body with the 
endorsement of national governments, controlling distribution of resources and defining market 
territories. This organization, the Aluminum Association, formed in 1901 primarily by European 
aluminum producers, was more commonly known as the international aluminum cartel. A 
smaller organization with the same name was formed in the United States with many of the same 
goals, but it focused not on regulating supply and demand but on promoting aluminum. The 
European Aluminum Association focused on increasing the profits of its members, aimed to 
establish standards to reduce the “unsuitable” use of aluminum, and “assist the present 
manufacturers to eliminate unreasonable competition.216 Carr, in Alcoa: An American Enterprise, 
quotes one manufacturer: “Too many are at present trying to benefit by the few pioneers who 
strike out into new fields, and the newcomers, by infringing on the original makers’ goods and 
machinery, hang like a crying kid on the apron of mother who provides food and 
nourishment.”217 Although the Aluminum Association aimed to protect the dominant positions of 
its members from outside competitors, it did not mandate conformance to set standards for its 
members. The Aluminum Association articulated at its second meeting that although standards 
were an aspiration, it was not mandating standardization of designs, grades and quality.218 This 
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position was shared by the US-based Aluminum Association, formed in 1933 and persisting into 
the postwar period.219 An Aluminum Association publication outlined this position, stating: “The 
use of these Standards by any member or non-member of The Aluminum Association is 
voluntary, and the issuance or existence of these Standards does not in any respect prevent or 
restrict any member or non-member from manufacturing or supplying products not in 
conformance with these Standards.”220 
Despite the voluntary nature of the standards, they were increasingly adopted on an 
industry-wide basis. The cartel’s International Research and Development Office was tasked 
with the “standardization of commercial alloys.”221 As the types of alloys proliferated with new 
processes and uses, these trade groups sought to standardize their designations. In 1954, the 
Aluminum Association published a new system of classification for alloys, replacing the 
competing standards of many other organizations, including the American Section of the 
International Association for Testing Materials (ASTM), the Society of Automotive Engineers 
and federal and military designations.222 Other agencies organized in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries also formulated standards, including the American Electroplaters 
Society, National Association of Metal Finishers, American Society of Testing and Materials, 
National Bureau of Standards. These organizations worked with producers to develop standards. 
For instance, in the late 1930s Alcoa designated aluminum finishes as mechanical, chemical, 
electrolytic oxide, electroplating and paint/laquer/enamel. After the founding of the National 
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Association of Architectural Metal Manufacturers in 1938, the leading producers in the 
aluminum industry adopted their designations as mechanical (M), chemical (C), anodic (A), 
electroplated (E), vitreous (V), organic (O), and laminated (L).223 Standards agencies also acted 
as information distribution mechanisms, dispensing data about aluminum to potential and current 
buyers and users. Producers used these as sources of marketing. In the United Kingdom, the 
Aluminum Development Association was a clearing house for information on aluminum,224 
while Alcoa assisted in organizing the Aluminum Window Manufacturers Association, which 
incentivized the increase in quality of manufacturers’ aluminum products by demanding 
standards be met to attain a quality-approved label and be listed in brochures distributed to 
architects.225  
Labels as such served as a mark of standards met but also could become a marketing tool. 
As E. Raymond Corey explains in the publication The Development of Markets for New 
Materials, “sometimes end-product manufacturers associated with the producers label for 
promotion and association with quality.”226 The US-based Aluminum Association developed in 
the 1960s a logo that was designed as the “Mark of Aluminum” by the association’s Public 
Relations Committee. This logo was applied to end-user products to associate the label with 
proclaimed characteristics of aluminum, such as lightweight, durable, versatile, and rust-free. 
Outside of standards for aluminum itself, other standards emerged for the distribution of 
information about aluminum architectural products that could signal credibility when noted on 
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the cover of the trade literature. The American Institute of Architects developed a standard filing 
system in 1920 to facilitate the filing of trade literature in architecture offices.227 Literature was 
marked on the cover with the appropriate American Institute of Architects (AIA) file designation 
as recommended by the manufacturer. For instance, aluminum was classified into groups for 
Siding 12-C, or Architectural aluminum 15-J, among others.228 The AIA was careful to explain 
that it didn’t endorse the products contained in such literature nor did it maintain a central 
registry or library of literature. Instead, the institute maintained that its system was open to 
anyone to “premark their literature with the file designation.”229 
 
Building codes 
Over the course of aluminum-cladding development, building codes stood as a factor 
shaping the formal and functional characteristics of the cladding. Codes were understood as 
hurdles to overcome or barriers to the use of aluminum as cladding on buildings. While some 
architects chose alternative materials when confronted with the difficulties of applying aluminum 
to existing building codes, others sought to use aluminum in novel ways within the confines of 
the code. Producers worked with architects and testing agencies to demonstrate the applicability 
of aluminum to the goals of the code, proposing changes to the code where it did not 
accommodate aluminum for a particular set of goals.  
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A principle objection to aluminum cladding after its commercial development in the 
postwar period was its apparent incapability as an adequate fire barrier. For this reason, thin wall 
aluminum cladding, often in the form of non-load bearing curtain wall configurations, was 
prohibited on commercial structures without some sort of backup wall that met the requirements 
of the building code. Fire barriers at exterior walls were long a feature of municipal building 
codes. The 1892 New York City building code mandated a brick wall barrier at least 12 inches 
with more thickness in four inch increments depending on building height, while the Chicago 
code mandated 12 inches of masonry over the entire height of the exterior wall.230 While 
windows were permitted at the exterior wall, the portion of the wall under the window and 
extending to the floor line, the spandrel, was mandated as masonry. This seeming incongruity 
was pointed out by researchers and architects supporting the revision of codes to allow non-load 
bearing curtain walls of light metal cladding without masonry backup. Director of Research 
Robert L. Davison and architect Howard T. Fisher, conducting research on fireproof lightweight 
curtain wall systems recognized the challenge, writing in Architectural Record that codes in the 
late 1940s still required “not only masonry encasement of steel, where the need of protection is 
real, but heavy masonry spandrels, where the element of fire protection must be considered as 
wholly imaginary when one recalls that the fire resistance of the adjacent glass is virtually nil, so 
the total result can scarcely be improved by the fireproof masonry.”231 
Pietro Belluschi designed a notable early aluminum-clad building that reflects a reaction 
to the fire barrier provision of the Portland, Oregon, building code by negotiating a complete 
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alternative. What started out as a desire for a glass curtain wall was reconceived as an aluminum 
and glass fascia relying on its combination with concrete, a material that did satisfy requirements 
of the code.232 Belluschi practiced for a time in the Northwest, where abundant hydroelectric 
power was available to power aluminum smelters. Merideth Clausen suggests this environment, 
in which Belluschi met J. Paul Raver, the head of the Bonneville Dam Administration in the 
early war years, contributed to his attraction to aluminum as a cladding material.233 This dam 
provided the hydroelectric power for Kaiser Aluminum Company. Raver and Belluschi discussed 
the use of aluminum after the war when plants no longer produced the thousands of aircraft 
components currently produced.  Belluschi was later quoted in promotional material by 
Reynolds, predicting wide use for aluminum: “Everybody was worrying about what would 
happen to such expensive plants after the war and how we could expand the use of aluminum. 
Everybody was thinking at the time perhaps of windows and screens and lighting fixtures, but I 
could see even then, along with many other architects, the possibilities of using aluminum for its 
lightness and its durability, lack of maintenance and other properties in all kinds of other ways, 
such as exterior facing of a building, and structural members.”234  
During the interwar period, commissions were difficult to attain, and competitions and 
exhibitions gave exposure to architects’ ideas.235  In 1943 Belluschi was invited to submit a 
proposal to Architectural Forum for an office building, in which he proposed the use of 
aluminum for structural members and exterior cladding. Although this design did incorporate 
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“several layers of thin aluminum sheets with air space for insulation in between,” it otherwise 
enjoyed critical distance from oversight by code regulations.236 When Belluschi began designing 
the Equitable Building in 1944, however, his design confronted the intractability of the building 
code. An earlier scheme called for a visual effect in which glass constituted a vertical strip, 
continuing from floor to ceiling for each floor.237 The Portland building code, however, required 
four inches of concrete behind any spandrels.238 This code provision for spandrels was common 
amongst urban building regulations and would be a perennial challenge to the use of aluminum 
cladding, a subject that will be explored in discussing other projects in this study. Belluschi’s 
solution was to use cast aluminum over the spandrel instead of glass, with four inches of 
concrete behind it. This aluminum was dark green in color, contrasting with the aluminum sheet 
which clad the concrete frame of the building. The effect was to emphasize the frame of 
aluminum and deemphasize the spandrel with a darker, receding tone. Bellushi’s engagement 
with the building code foreshadows the negotiations in which other architects would engage in 
the goal of developing aluminum cladding. Architects like Bellushi were often concerned with 
design affects, but producers were primarily concerned with developing a cladding system that 
worked with building codes or proposed viable alternatives to sell more aluminum. 
Belluschi was a famous architect adept at harnessing media attention, which has 
contributed to his reputation as a “first.” He attracted an article about the Equitable Building in 
The Architectural Forum before the building was completed by explaining that the competition 
the magazine organized in which he was an invitee was a precursor to the Equitable Building.239 
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This building has been described variously by contemporary scholars as the first curtain wall,240 
or one of the first buildings constructed with an aluminum curtain wall,241 but to understand the 
development of aluminum cladding it is better to examine those canonical “firsts” as well as the 
lesser-known works that contributed to the development of aluminum cladding not as a linear 
pedigree but more as a web of interconnected influences, ranging from those canonical architects 
that are deservedly focused upon in history (like Belluschi) to cladding systems and deployments 
of aluminum by nonarchitects. The development of aluminum was marked by experimentation. 
The development of aluminum cladding was no different.  
To examine this web of contributions to aluminum cladding, it is useful to probe 
buildings that employed aluminum and, if not the “first,” constitute some of the earliest uses of 
aluminum cladding. Identifying the “first” is often a trap for historians, as evidence may not be 
available to determine primacy, given archives perhaps lost or never recorded. Also, what 
constitutes the first is contestable, entailing indefinite definitional boundaries. Yet a brief survey 
will show that “firsts” were sometimes not designed by celebrated architects but were instead 
developed through an atypical use of aluminum. A focus on such atypical uses also shows how 
producers’ negotiation of regulations to bring aluminum cladding to a wider market was an 
experimental endeavor. 
The earliest deployments of aluminum cladding can be grouped into two categories: 
spandrel and panel. Spandrels were easier to deploy because they were smaller individual units 
not reliant on adjacency to other aluminum panels. These spandrels can be surrounded by brick 
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or stone, for example, because they sit only beneath windows. A letter between the 
superintendent of the newly built Chrysler Building (1928-1930), by William Van Alen and 
Alcoa claims the structure to be the first use of aluminum spandrels, yet the claimed primacy was 
probably a function of the date of installment during construction, as other buildings with 
aluminum spandrels were under construction concurrently.242 On the Chrysler Building, the 
spandrels are cast aluminum, installed just below windows. While the Chrysler Building is 
notable for its use of stainless steel, especially on the ornamental, oversized  Chrysler radiator 
caps at the projecting corners of the thirtieth story, it also made extensive use of aluminum on 
window sills, explained by Van Alen as the first use of aluminum for this application, “having 
been developed by me.”243 Intriguingly, Van Alen wrote in 1929 that the “entire outer shell of 
(the crowning dome) will be of aluminum buffed to a brilliant polish.”244  This version of the 
design also called for the finial (the spire) to be aluminum, described as “polished aluminum and 
crystal.”245 If stainless steel had not been used instead, this design would have been a great 
spectacle of aluminum. Reflecting an eagerness amongst architects to use the material, Van Alen 
was accompanied by other architects in imagining its creative use. 
Turning now to a brief survey of the early use of aluminum panels, it seems clear that 
these designs are much more novel because paneling afforded the opportunity to envision the 
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entire façade covered in aluminum and required the technical prowess to interconnect the panels 
to other panels. In 1930 Bruce Goff designed but never built a fraternity house to use insulated 
aluminum panels. Wrote Goff, “At that time I was told that aluminum was for pots and pans, as 
any fool should know, and that it was not a building material.”246 Goff celebrated the novelty of 
aluminum, but architects Walker & Weeks designed a highly ornate aluminum cladding 
surrounding the penthouse of the Federal Reserve Bank, (1931–1933) in Pittsburgh, the 
hometown of Alcoa, no doubt aided by the culture and expertise of light metals in the city. As 
Myers describes, these aluminum sheets were attached directly to the steel frame, and backed up 
by a plaster wall on the interior.247 
Although this dissertation focuses on the commercial realm of aluminum, I will briefly 
discuss the Aluminaire House (1931) by Albert Frey and Lawrence Kocher, because its use of 
aluminum contrasts sharply with the regulatory requirements of commercial aluminum cladding. 
Although designed by architects, the Aluminaire House was a project of material manufacturers 
and industrial contractors.248 They funded it to display their building products to the patrons of 
the 1931 New York Architectural Exhibition. H. Ward Jandl’s research found that Trucson 
Corporation provided steel floor decking, projecting steel windows, and steel stairs, while Alcoa 
provided aluminum floor joists and pipe columns.249 Some dispute exists amongst researchers, as 
the aluminum panels are variously claimed to have originated from Alcoa or Beschel-
Duralton.250 Despite the disputed provenance of the panels, they were not designed to the 
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exacting standards of, for instance, the New York City building code precisely because the 
Aluminaire House was an exhibition piece, and it was envisioned as a prototype home, not a 
commercial structure. This key distinction guided the development of aluminum curtain wall 
cladding. Any mass production of cladding had to adhere to regulations or it would not find 
distribution beyond exhibitions or the domestic sphere. 
To conclude a survey of early aluminum cladding applications in architecture, I turn to a 
discussion of the Department of Public Works building (1930-1931) in Richmond, Virginia. 
Alcoa found intriguing the design of this aluminum-clad building, designed not by architects but 
by the department staff, with plans prepared by W. A. Childrey of the Bureau of Surveys and 
Design.251 Alcoa promoted it to show how aluminum could be used well before aluminum was 
deployed as cladding beyond decorative adornments or its more widespread variant, as a 
spandrel panel.252 Faced with the prospect of a building that may need to be moved in the future, 
the staff concluded that the building should be lightweight and easy to tear down and rebuild 
with minimal waste of materials. The staff identified the following criteria, which led them to 
select aluminum as the curtain wall and cladding material. “1. Low cost of construction. 2. 
Occupancy of 5 to 10 years. 3. High salvage value of materials.”253 The structure built was a 
two-story building, 116’ x 50’ in length and depth. Attached to a steel structure were interior 
walls of aluminum sheet and a separate construction of exterior wall of aluminm sheet. Between 
these was insulation. Aluminum was used in many other applications, including doors and for 
interior walls of aluminum sheet over wood frame. However, the most notable use was the 
aforementioned interior and exterior wall assembly. The lack of four-inch concrete or masonry as 
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part of the wall assembly precluded any application under more stringent urban building codes. 
Yet Alcoa was intrigued by this building, and at least one former Alcoa promoter, Myers, 
understood it as “the forerunner(s) of later prefabricated insulated aluminum panels for 
residential, industrial and commercial buildings.” Alcoa executive H. F. Johnson believed the 
building to be “probably the first American office building to use insulated metal walls just a few 
inches thick.”254 Its status as a forerunner is notable because it did not meet stringent city codes 
nor was it a unit wall system. Alcoa must have recognized its limited applicability but was 
interested enough to understand it as forerunner. What gave it this status was the thin-wall 
characteristic of the wall assembly. Alcoa aimed to develop a wall that could be deployed as a 
sandwich, wherein interior, exterior and insulation were a single unit. Although the public works 
building was not an assembly of sandwich units, it did approximate the outcome. Alcoa saw this 
as an experiment to learn from, because the wall assembly induced condensation within the 
cavity, yielding ineffective insulation over time — a condition that would certainly limit sales. 
Yet the biggest impediment remained its inapplicability to urban building codes — a project 
Alcoa sought to address using their own funds on projects in the 1940s. 
Alcoa was especially interested in selling aluminum sheet to be fabricated by others into 
aluminum cladding, and instituted a pilot project — a demonstration building — to advertise 
aluminum as a cladding product while meeting stringent urban building codes. Alcoa hired the 
New York City architecture firm of Harrison & Abramovitz to design the administration building 
for the Davenport, Iowa, Alcoa plant in 1949. Aluminum panels had been widely used as a 
cladding material in spandrels before the war and as a part of a larger “sandwich” of components 
after war restrictions were lifted.  Notably, H. H. Robertson Company, a steel-siding 
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manufacturer, sold “Q-Panels” in which metal siding formed the exterior surface of a sandwich 
wall or roof panel with insulation inside sheets of steel or, after the war, aluminum.255 On the 
Davenport plant, H. H. Robertson supplied these aluminum-clad insulation panels for the 
exterior of the plant walls.256 However, such panels were not devised to meet the code 
requirements of urban markets like Pittsburgh or New York. For this reason, the administration 
building did not comprise premanufactured panels. Instead, Harrison Abramovitz collaborated 
with Alcoa designers and engineers to develop a wall system that would meet such codes, 
comprising exterior cast aluminum corrugated panels bolted to the building’s steel frame with 
four-inch precast panels of lightweight concrete attached inside the steel frame.257 To discover 
the fire resistance rating of this assembly, Alcoa employed Underwriters Laboratories (UL) to 
oversee tests.258 The wall passed the test for a four-hour fire rating, allowing a theoretical 
protection from a fire for a duration of four hours. An article about the facility in Architecture 
Forum explained its relevance to building codes: “this wall was designed almost masochistically 
to conform with the tough building code of New York City, 1,414 miles away.”259 Alcoa had 
plans to develop this wall assembly and hoped to expand its use to the lucrative markets in 
America’s large cities. Davenport was an experiment. Alcoa reflected on this endeavor in a 
conference concerning the development of metal curtain walls: “…without fanfare or publicity, 
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we built a small four-story administration building for our Davenport Works. While this work 
was going on, we tried to determine what our problems were and what we would ultimately have 
to solve.”260 Alcoa described it as a “revolutionary type of aluminum curtain wall.”261 Alcoa 
found an application for this assembly in the Bradford, Pennsylvania, Hospital designed by 
Thomas K. Hendryx (and constructed in 1951)262 and, more significantly, a wall assembly 
inspired by the experiment — Alcoa’s own headquarters tower in Pittsburgh, designed by 
Harrison and Abramovitz (1953).263 Alcoa declared the Davenport Administration Building as 
the immediate predecessor to the Alcoa Building: “The Davenport Works administration 
building was, in effect, a “pilot” skyscraper—built to prove beyond further doubt the economy, 
durability and architectural versatility of aluminum.”264 The Alcoa Building built upon 
experiments at Davenport, for in the Alcoa Building, the fire barrier backup wall, a sprayed 
perlite concrete—like material was described as having “…more than twice the requirements of 
Pittsburgh’s notably stringent building code.265 
Codes were sometimes portrayed by architects and end-users of aluminum as barriers, but 
building codes did not completely halt aluminum-cladding development. At the Building 
Research Institute Metal Curtain Wall conference of 1955, 18.3% of respondent architects to a 
poll cited code restrictions as a reason metal curtain walls were not specified.266 One architect at 
the conference cited as an example the City of Buffalo, New York code, which was suggested for 
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amendment to accept “non-load-bearing panel walls.”267 Another account at the conference 
attributed codes as a deterrent on a wide scale: “We know that acceptance of this type of 
construction in many instances is inhibited by this reason alone.”268 Noteworthy architects in 
venues beyond the conference also criticized the positions of building codes concerning 
aluminum cladding. Commenting on why no Americans had won the $25,000 R.S. Reynolds 
Memorial Award by 1960, juror Walter Gropius cited, among other problems, excessively 
restrictive building codes, which he determined necessitated a subsequently promoted student 
award for aluminum architecture that could propose designs free of code restrictions.269 
Reynolds Aluminum also directly criticized building codes in their widely promoted book 
Aluminum in Modern Architecture ‘58, writing: “The most difficult hurdle which the developers 
of curtain walls had to pass was and still is, our building code requirement regarding fire 
resistance of exterior non-bearing walls.” Alcoa did find success in selling aluminum cladding 
for commercial high rises in the 1950s and 1960s, but rarely were the systems able to shed the 
separate masonry or concrete backup wall. Declaring at the Building Research Institute Metal 
Curtain Wall conference that accommodation of the code had been achieved, the Market 
Development Director of Alcoa said: “For the most part we have Code approval.”270 Such 
approval was often achieved by retaining the four-inch backup wall for fire resistance. 
Significant installations in large American cities such as 99 Park Avenue in New York (1954)271 
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and the Texas National Bank Building in Houston272 employed cinder block and four inches of 
lightweight concrete, respectively. However, Alcoa did publicize one “progressive” variation 
that allowed an alternative. After selling aluminum for the exterior surface on Republic National 
Bank in Dallas, (1954), once again collaborating with Harrison Abramovitz, Alcoa publicized it 
as taking “full advantage of a modern building code with what are possibly the thinnest curtain 
walls ever employed for a structure of this size.”273 The Dallas building code required the typical 
concrete (perlite) backup wall on the street side, but other walls were allowed to exclude this, 
thus permitting aluminum clad curtain wall sandwich panels 1-1/2” thick, without fire-rated 
concrete backup. 
 
Standardization of aluminum cladding components  
In the 1950s Kawneer publicized a slogan that captured its philosophy surrounding 
standardization of architectural components. “Find out what you can do best, then do it in 
volume. Keep it simple. Keep it in aluminum.”274 Like many architectural product 
manufacturers, Kawneer had adopted a stance of standardization in the production, and even the 
distribution, of its products. As a storefront manufacturer Kawneer had standardized much of its 
production line well before World War I, producing products consisting of components in 
standardized members.275 Its products were advertised in brochures and magazines as 
customizable by the architect, but in actuality this customization was within limits defined by the 
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manufacturer. Standardization was a strategy and practice of capital accumulation which 
extended from the standardized shapes to the way they were distributed to the market. 
Furthermore, the practice of standardization defined the structure of Kawneer and even shaped 
its marketing messages. Architects were often beholden to these standardized components, with 
only partial latitude for custom design. Architects were caught between, on the one hand, 
acquiescing to the predefined designs to specify less expensive components, and on the other 
hand, producing custom designs using components supplied by manufacturers and built to their 
specifications. Similarly, manufacturers were caught in the middle: In the case of Kawneer, they 
sometimes pandered to architects, careful not to claim design primacy, while simultaneously 
promoting the advantages of standardization to architects. Manufacturers sought standardization 
to increase profit, while architects were confronted with clients who were concerned with the 
bottom line but also concerned with aesthetics and image. 
The production of standardized parts at Kawneer was core to its founding invention — a 
molding, or frame for windows on street front façades. An advertisement for Kawneer in 1907 
places its business in terms of standardized parts, defining their business as “Manufacturers of 
“Kawneer” System of Store Fronts; “Kawneer” Wall;…Drawn Mouldings; and Metal 
Finishes.”276 Kawneer was founded in 1905277 by Francis Plym, an architect who patented278 a 
metal frame grip around glass that avoided the problems of wood rot, and allowed “give” and 
displacement of the window in reaction to lateral loads and differential settlement.279 As a 
Kawneer sales catalog from 1912 describes it, “Kawneer was the first — the Original 
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Construction by which a Store Front Glass could be set directly between two metal bearing 
surfaces, without the assistance of putty, cork, wood or any other cushion substance.”280 This 
solution did not invent the metal frame, (often called metal sash) around the storefront window, 
but instead improved it to reduce window breakage as the window moved in the wind against a 
metal frame, and improved it such that a material affixing the window to the frame that might rot 
or quickly wear thin, like wood or putty, could be avoided. Kawneer described it as offering “a 
construction which diverges from the old-time wood construction and its attending evils at every 
point.”281 The first material employed for this window frame system was copper. The first copper 
sash products it sold were “cold rolled and drawn mouldings,” a product of a standardized, 
industrial process of drawing the metal through a die at room temperature into elongated shapes. 
These resultant shapes were given numeric designations, such as “Improved Metal Sash No. 
30”282 or “Metal Sash No. 60,”283 each with a different shape in section. 
Kawneer was not the only US corporation engaged in sash manufacturing, as the British 
firm Crittal Manufacturing Company, Limited, had been manufacturing steel sashes as 
standardized components, through a licensing agreement with a US company, having used such 
components on the Ford Highland Park Plant (1908-1910).284 New techniques for extrusion of 
metals though a die (a small opening that “squeezes” metal into a smaller section) was broadened 
to brass in 1894 and later to other metals by the early 1900s.285 In the wider industrial market of 
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metals, Wrought products such as those produced by metal fabricators by the 1920s included 
sheet, plate, foil, rod, bar, wire, pipe and structural forms.286 
Kawneer developed storefront systems initially, claiming to have “founded the metal 
Store Front business,”287 selling not only the metal molding but an entire systematized product 
for storefronts. Its product line proceeded from molding to windows288 and doors, then the 
manufacture of whole façade systems for schools and commercial structures.289 By 1917 it had 
sold systems for over 50,000 storefronts.290 All along, its catalogs and brochures stressed the 
advantages of standardized components, and Kawneer claimed its standardized components had 
marked an era of store fronts: “This whole era has been fathered by Kawneer. It is the standard 
metal Store Front Construction…”291 Yet they also confronted the peculiar conditions of each 
store renovation project: no two storefronts to be renovated were exactly the same; therefore, the 
application of standardized components was necessarily a negotiation between the prescribed 
design and physical dimension of the storefront system components, such as Improved Sash no. 
30 and the tangible variability presented by each store site. While Kawneer’s sales catalog in 
1917 exclaimed, “We believe from 60% to 75% of all the Store Fronts in this country are of the 
same style — look alike and possess absolutely no individuality. Is that consistent with good 
business — is that all which should have been accomplished? No!”292 Kawneer’s approach to 
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modernizing the commercial landscape was the utilization of standardized components deployed 
in a uniquely tailored, customized configuration for each application. Kawneer operated within 
this unstable relationship by approaching design as an expertise held by the company and as a 
collaborative juncture between their own design staff and outside architects. Yet,  Kawneer’s 
attempts to placate any sense of territorial intrusion into the architect’s domain did not temper 
their increasing embrace of standardization of manufactured components.293 
Kawneer articulated standardization of manufactured components as a way to facilitate 
capital accumulation and consequently reorganized its product line, manufacturing process, and 
product sales and distribution processes to align with this practice. For much of the company’s 
history, business was strong and opportunities were plentiful. Employment grew from 18 in 1907 
to 80 in 1911, then to 250 in 1914. By 1956, when the company began reorganization to focus on 
standardization of complete wall systems, it employed over 2,500.294  An initial growth spurt 
came in response to the San Francisco earthquake and the subsequent rebuilding opportunities 
presented to Kawneer salesmen. This territory was far from the home office in Niles, Michigan. 
Consequently, Kawneer built a factory in Berkeley, California, and by 1912, had 15 sales offices 
around the country.295 As the company grew in size, and was driven by an optimistic belief that 
postwar sales would far surpass prewar sales,296 it implemented a strategic reassessment after 
World War II and again in the mid-1950s of its manufacturing and corporate management 
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operations. Knowledge gained about manufacturing practices during World War II,297 combined 
with the company’s experience in manufacturing standardized components since 1907, 
positioned the company favorably to move toward greater standardization of components. As 
Modern Metals stated, “the new Kawneer was born in 1945. The war was over.”298 This was a 
reflection on the radical changes the company experienced in the wake of the war. The 
company’s management, under the direction of Francis Plym’s son, Lawrence,299 and executive 
vice president Henry W. Zimmer, developed a plan for the company that included: “Design a 
complete new line of store fronts and entrances…Eliminate low-volume, low-profit products.”300 
In response to this plan, Kawneer developed a new line of store fronts and constituent aluminum 
sash, called K-47.301 This product line was meant to move toward increasing standardization, but 
Kawneer was careful to couch it in terms of customization. In an article reflecting on this new 
product, Modern Metals wrote, “The emphasis was on big volume, adaptability to architects’ 
plans, and crisp, modern design in aluminum. Gone was the idea of custom making anything the 
architect could draw up. In its place came the concept of mass producing versatile shapes that 
still enabled the architect to individualize his creations.”302 Kawneer’s new line was also 
purposed with simplifying installation. Announcing the K-47 line in a company newsletter, the 
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company wrote, “The line is designed to obtain a wide variety of custom-styled effects with 
stock shaped and engineered for modern construction needs to save time of installation.”303 
Kawneer experienced explosive growth in the 1950s, with 1957 second only to 1959 as 
the most successful years in its history.304 In 1956 Kawneer introduced an even more 
standardized component: the Unit Wall. Shortly after its release, Plym stated, “Our whole 
concept of the building products industry is different from most others[.]…We are striving to 
promote greater acceptance of standardized components — more factory fabrication, less job-site 
fabrication[.]…We welcome the big custom curtain wall jobs, but our research and development 
work is based on standard units that are ready for installation when they leave our plant.”305 This 
move toward even greater standardization was echoed by other executives in the company, 
envisioning specific building typologies that could be standardized. Irv Seely, the vice president 
of the Architectural Division in 1956 stated, “There’s no reason in the world why every school 
building must be custom engineered.”306 Seeley’s program for the built environment was a 
prefabricated one of pre-engineered, standardized components that were equally applicable on a 
school or a high-rise. 
Kawneer envisioned standardization as a means to reduce labor costs on site, thus 
reducing the cost of the building to the owner in hopes it would be made more advantageous for 
specification by an architect in consultation with his client. The Director of Research and 
Development explained, “It is conceived as a total wall[.]…Installation will be accomplished 
with a few tools — a screwdriver, a power drill and perhaps a saw.”307  
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Kawneer also aimed to create a new, vastly expanded sales network, for which this new 
Unit Wall was a key enabler of its development. Fred L. Church, reporting on Kawneer’s 
activities for Modern Metals, wrote, “A second aim is to place limitations on sizes, shapes, etc. 
so that unit walls can be sold through dealers. ‘This way,’ explains Seely, ‘we would multiply by 
many times the number of salesmen soliciting business for the unit wall.’ When the product is 
ready to roll, Kawneer will start with a few selected dealers and broaden the distribution as the 
demand grows.”308 
While Kawneer is just one manufacturer out of dozens that embraced the logics of 
standardization, because it developed a robust sales mechanism, it exemplifies the way 
standardization played a role in the spread of aluminum cladding. Kawneer expressed several 
main goals as outcomes of standardization. They aimed to attain economies of scale by 
simplifying the production process and reducing the amount of customization work they 
accepted. Plym noted that they did, indeed, perform custom curtain-wall production, but the aim 
of the K-47 line and later the Unit Wall was to move away from this line of work. Yet, at the 
same time, the company was careful not to alienate architects by forcing them into a prescriptive 
system without room for design agency. Kawneer also sought to reduce jobsite labor. By 
prefabricating entire walls in the factory, Kawneer argued that labor costs to the builder, and by 
extension the project owner, could be reduced. This argument was posed in advertisements 
targeted toward architects and building owners. Finally, Kawneer recognized the importance of 
marketing and salesmanship in driving the spread of their product. Kawneer’s postwar product 
line was accompanied by a robust marketing drive with advertisements in architectural journals 
and publications directed to architects, builders and owners. While the company continued to 
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develop the Unit Wall in 1956, it was accompanied by a reorganization of the sales distribution 
network. This radical overhaul moved to an entirely different sales mechanism based on a 
distributed, rather than centralized, model of control. Kawneer devised a role for the dealer as a 
quasi-employee but with the advantages offered by their independence. Kawneer did not pay 
them as salesmen and was not obliged to provide an office for their work. Instead, dealers could 
be contracted to work with Kawneer around the United States, forming a vast sales network that 
Kawneer envisioned would multiply the reach of their product from the backwaters of small 
towns to large projects in major cities. Kawneer’s drive toward standardization was facilitated by 
knowledge they gained during wartime production and the years of storefront and window sash-
manufacturing expertise they had gained since the company’s founding in 1906. As a private 
company until 1926, and as a public company thereafter, Kawneer was motivated by capital 
accumulation driven by the expectations of investors and shareholders. Despite the strictures of a 
command economy during wartime production, and to a lesser degree during the Korean War, 
Kawneer operated according to the networks of capitalism, engaged in competition with many 
other manufacturers vying for the same customers.  
 
The price of aluminum cladding 
While free-market competition was more mythological than real, the ability to set prices 
was not entirely in the control of producers. A given producer or manufacturer of aluminum 
cladding competed with a host of alternatives, including other metals, materials other than metal, 
and other producers and manufacturers. The price of aluminum panels, beyond the external 
factors of economics and manufacturing techniques already discussed, was also contingent upon 
human factors, such as cost of labor and corporate practice. This competitive landscape shaped 
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the way panels were marketed, underpinning arguments about the advantages of the cladding 
system and the advantages of aluminum over other alternatives.  
Producers and manufacturers of aluminum products were in competition not only with 
each other but also with other metals in the assembly of aluminum as a cladding product. The 
price of aluminum positioned it at a disadvantage that marketing material would squarely 
address. The market price of aluminum was higher in the price of steel for the entire duration of 
the twentieth century, often by a factor of ten,309 and this fact weighed on decision makers from 
building owners to architects when choosing an exterior wall material. To inform decision 
makers internal and external to the company about their competitors, Alcoa published a series of 
feature articles discussing competition in Alcoa News, identifying the metals it maintained were 
leading competitors.310 A list of metals it argued were competitors included “scrap aluminum, 
imported aluminum, zinc, lead, copper, steel, tin...[.]”311 For structure, aluminum was rarely 
used, widely known as both more expensive, but also weaker on measures of structural 
characteristics. On measures of cubic volume, twice as much steel could be bought for the same 
price as aluminum.312 While this was true, Reynolds was quick to point out that the cost of 
aluminum rose much slower since 1939 than did the prices of steel and other materials.313  
Aluminum, as a metal among others often deployed as a metal curtain wall, frequently 
competed with other material assemblies in the building industry. Aluminum was understood by 
Alcoa as competing with “glass, and even just paper,”314 where, for instance, in place of a 
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potential wall of aluminum might be specified a frame of aluminum with glass spandrels and 
windows. These alternatives were considered based upon function, availability or client 
preference, among other reasons, but price was also a determining factor in specification. Metal 
curtain walls were often understood as expensive, and were cited by 44.8 percent of respondent 
architects in a 1954 survey as a reason to avoid their use on building designs.315 One steel 
curtain-wall manufacturer explained, “Although we have been able to devise a panel which is 
reasonable in cost we have not been able to lick high cost of frame. When this latter is 
accomplished, we feel sure that panel-wall construction can be universally used.”316 This 
assessment held true for aluminum, as it was more expensive than steel. 
Although metal curtain walls were said to be too expensive, in comparison with other 
assemblies, some saw advantages, especially in terms of labor cost. At the Building Research 
Institute Metal Curtain Wall conference of 1955 architect D. Kenneth Sargent said, “Daily we 
are finding it necessary to develop and design new construction methods to reduce high costs of 
labor at the site, and this the cost of buildings to our clients. Certainly metal curtain walls can be 
and will be developed to provide a solution to this problem for even the low-cost structure.”317 
Especially in comparison with masonry, metal curtain walls were seen as beneficial because of 
labor cost advantages: “Masonry bearing walls have been pushed aside in the press for economy 
and for a shorter work day for building tradesmen.”318 Alcoa believed that this was advantageous 
but strove to attain a more competitive position. At the conference, the Manager of Market 
Development said, “…of prime importance, while metal-clad buildings are today economical in 
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comparison to many other types of construction, our constant aim should be to improve this 
economy.”319 
The cost of aluminum panel assemblies was also influenced by processes involved in 
manufacturing aluminum fabrications and metal curtain-wall systems. At the conference, one 
attendee discussed the high cost of dies used to produce metal fabrications: “If we do not solve 
this problem we will force curtain wall construction into a high price bracket.”320 An Alcoa 
executive explained that bringing the cost of curtain wall systems down was more than a 
function of possessing the right tools or knowhow; it also took financing: “you’ve got to be on 
good terms with your banker, as this sort of thing takes money.”321 This Alcoa executive’s 
statement was a recognition that pricing aluminum was a human endeavor that involved the 
prejudices of people linked to the making, selling and buying of metal-cladding products. Each 
of these groups made decisions that altered their perception of the value of aluminum in relation 
to a given price. Internal to the operations of producers were corporate procedures and practices 
that influenced the development and cost of aluminum cladding. Management theory regulated 
and organized decisions that could lead to change in operations and influence a company’s 
position in relation to other competitors, especially when such decisions were made at the 
executive level. In 1960, Frank L. Magee, Chairman at Alcoa believed that the competitive 
nature of the market, with the addition of new post-World War II producers Reynolds and 
Kaiser, necessitated the internal reorganization of departments. Centered on this reorganization 
was the belief that the executive office must have more control over the Research and 
Development branch, and that the marketing department should be more closely tied to the 
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Research and Development branch to make operations more profitable and quicker. He 
explained: “There is no thought of reducing research effort…but emphasis should be placed on 
confining efforts to projects of major importance that promise to produce dividends in a 
reasonably short time.”322 The way aluminum-clad components were designed by manufacturer 
designers also figured into the price. Francis Plym, founder of Kawneer, was trained as an 
architect and was known to have placed exacting requirements on the design of components the 
company sold. But design came with a price, in the minds of his sales staff, perhaps justified by 
their experience in a market competing with similar components from other manufacturers. 
“He’s pricing them out of the market,” complained salesmen in response to Plym’s design 
obsession.323 They drew a correlation between design exactitude and price. 
Producers and manufacturers maintained complicated but careful relationships with 
architects, knowing that architects were, in most cases, the direct point of contact with those who 
would give final approval for the building systems architects recommended for building designs. 
Producers and manufacturers also knew that architects often held sway over their client’s final 
decision. For this reason, producers and manufacturers developed specific marketing strategies to 
communicate with architects. Underlying much of this architect-target marketing material was 
the producers’ and manufacturers’ belief that architects, although they benefitted from 
standardized components such as metal curtain-wall systems, also hoped to retain a degree of 
design freedom.324 Alcoa did not believe, by the mid-1950s, that they had yet achieved a low-
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cost and low-maintenance aluminum-cladding product that granted complete freedom of design 
by architects.325 Architects believed that standardized components such as metal curtain walls 
were affordable on large projects but not on small ones.326 The extent of custom design that 
architects hoped for was not seen as attainable on small projects in a manner that would make 
them affordable for their clients. Max Abramovitz, an architect for many aluminum-clad high-
rises with Alcoa-supplied aluminum, found that custom-designed aluminum cladding was 
affordable on high-rises: “The slight charge for retooling or setting up jigs is so small compared 
to the entire cost that is infinitesimal.”327 He identified the machinery necessary to shape each 
aluminum panel was cost effective on large structures, but implied aluminum-cladding was 
questionable as an affordable material on smaller ones. 
Architects were typically much more in contact with clients than were producers and 
manufacturers. From this position, they recognized the price sensitivity of their clients and this 
influenced their outlook and design decisions. Felicity Scott reveals one example of an architect 
who came to realize his relationship with clients revolved around capital.  Scott recounts Arthur 
Drexler discussing Gordon Bunshaft’s realization when designing the New York City office 
tower at 140 Broadway. Drexler exclaimed: “It has to be cheap. The question is how to build this 
with the simplest, cheapest, smoothest, flattest skin.” Reflecting more widely on the architect’s 
position within a capitalist economy, he said, “The particular building problem that the architect 
was called on to solve was in fact to design a package — a package of rentable space — and he 
has done precisely that.”328 Architects considering the specification of aluminum cladding knew 
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that many clients were price sensitive. Yet, price was not always the determining factor. 
Abramovitz worked directly for bankers, developers and industrialists, including Alcoa, on 
aluminum-clad high-rises. Abramovitz found that cost as the primary factor can be overruled by 
the ego of the owner: “I believe that costs and economies, although they are quite a governing 
factor in this economic world we live in, are not always the prime considerations behind building 
a building. As long as we have human beings and egos and personalities, and as long as a great 
number of buildings are built as monuments to people, we will have people in our society — and 
I hope they continue to exist — who want something done personally and creatively and 
completely new.”329 Abramovitz recognized that the price of aluminum cladding was but one of 
many factors determining whether it was specified. 
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CHAPTER 3: LOGICS OF RESEARCH AND DESIGN 
 
 
  “A company without research is dead.” With these words, Reynolds began the first 
paragraph of an issue of its magazine, Reynolds Review, solely dedicated to explicating the 
company’s reverence for the practice of research.330 Research, as a conscious practice and 
funded endeavor in departments of aluminum producers and manufacturers was utilized as a 
justification for decisions made by executives about the way aluminum should be sold. This 
connection between research and selling was not strictly linear. Instead, research was 
systematized as a conceptual overlap of disciplines that extended to other departments in the 
organization both up and down the line of industrial integration — from bauxite to finished 
product. Research was understood, and sometimes mythologized, as holding a central, 
foundational position in the corporate apparatus — the sine qua non of the industrial economy. 
As Avigail Sachs reveals, in the postwar period, research was more widely practiced, and was  
“associated with a multitude of desirable outcomes including security, progress, prosperity, and 
democracy.”331  Producers sometimes understood research as a secret weapon, facilitating the 
development of patents to control the legal space of the industry and serving as the origination 
point for cladding design. Alcoa, for example, gave research and development credit for a 
successful new aluminum-clad tower in New York: “It was largely through the research and 
development work Alcoa had done in perfecting aluminum applications for building construction 
which made the Tishman building possible.”332 Sometimes what researchers were investigating 
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was marketed as “hush hush,”333 only to be revealed at the opportune time. Other times 
researchers were a behind-the-curtain334 entity that was carefully guarded but also viewed as 
necessitating oversight by management in which, as William Rankin notes, the goal was 
enablement and autonomy but “could only be the product of adequate direction.”335 Research 
held an important role in relation to design. The terms were sometimes used interchangeably 
with conceptual overlap. These relations influenced how the practice of design was conceived — 
either as a separate act or a unified, mutually co-constitutive endeavor. 
Producers ran operations that spanned markets and produced an array of fabrications 
leading to countless products. Because of the size of the firms, research was often conceptually 
combined with development and also subdivided. Architectural product design departments were 
just one division. Sometimes called product development departments, they held a tenuous 
position in relation to outside designers and architects. Designers were employed by producers 
and manufacturers to create finished products, but producers and manufacturers sought out 
relationships with designers and architects outside the organization to develop applications for 
aluminum. As discussed previously, aluminum product manufacturers had an impulse to 
standardize components, precluding a certain degree of design agency by architects. While 
designers were employed by producers and manufacturers from their founding, they increasingly 
sought out collaborations with outside designers to publicize their association as a form of 
marketing. Producers and manufacturers did not collaborate with just any architect. Instead, they 
sought out well-known architects with reputations already developed in their fields. Within the 
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producers’ corporate structure, however, research and design was not marketing. It was often at 
odds with marketing, competing for resources. As practices, research and development were 
deployed by the firms as offensive tools in competition with other producers, with particular 
markets, such as construction, as the prize. 
 
Conceiving research as the beginning of end-products 
Aluminum has been portrayed as a material borne of science and practices of 
methodological research. As a Review of Review magazine profile of aluminum claimed, “Of the 
eight chief metals which support this so-called Age of Metals only one is the product of scientific 
research. This one is aluminum. All the other seven — iron copper lead, tin, zinc, silver, and 
gold were known in ancient times.”336  Early experimenters with aluminum were often trained as 
chemists or metallurgists — training attained through formal institutions of education. For 
instance, Robert von Bunsen discovered how to isolate aluminum by employing sodium,337 and 
Alcoa cofounder Alfred Hunt was educated at Massachusetts of Institute of Technology, 
graduating with a degree in metallurgy.338 An equally strong argument can be made, however, 
about aluminum as rooted not in science, but in the knowledge derived from experimentation 
outside formal institutional structures.339 It was not the institutional laboratory, but the “Immortal 
Woodshed” where Hall made his discoveries, “…with the aid of borrowed and homemade 
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apparatus.”340 Even Alcoa characterizes its seed of origin in quotes, not as a laboratory, but as a 
“laboratory.”341 In A History of Metallography Cyril Stanley Smith argues that knowledge of 
metals started with artists and craftsmen, only later to be studied under structures of, and 
understood as, experimental and theoretical science.342  
 
Alloys by research 
Whether conceived as craft or science, research as undertaken by producers yielded 
changes to the characteristics of the material and changes to the way it was made. Alloys were an 
especially important outcome of research. Because of their structural characteristics, research 
and development of alloys played a crucial role in war fighting and in architectural applications. 
In the same way that the additive of one percent of carbon to iron yields characteristics of 
strength that allow its deployment as steel in structural applications, so too does the addition of 
other metals to aluminum make it applicable to a wider range of uses.  
Just as war has been misunderstood as the primary cause of the commercial aluminum 
industry,343 it is also important to understand that the development of alloys took place both 
outside of, and as part of, the strictures of war. Although it is true that research departments were 
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expanded after World War II,344 research and development activities and departments had been 
established by aluminum-industry firms well before World War II.345 Alcoa, as the leading 
producer and virtual monopolist in the industry, already had established a research department in 
1918, as will be explored in more detail below. Because war looms large on the horizon of 
Western history, it can overshadow other important prior developments in architectural 
production.  Donald H. Wallace, author of Market Control in the Aluminum Industry, referenced 
the influence of World War I and offered a constructive assessment: “Aluminum had rapidly 
extended its field of usefulness prior to the war, but that event was the cause of unprecedented 
interest in its properties, uses, and alloys, principally because of its application in aircraft.”346  
Duralumin is an example of an alloy developed before World War II and subsequently employed 
in that war. Duralumin was an alloy developed by the German Alfred Wilm consisting of copper 
and aluminum which yielded a heat-treated aluminum alloy widely used by Germany in World 
War II for aircraft, and which was also produced widely by the industry thereafter. Another pre–
World War II alloy was developed in the twenties by Alcoa. As Carr notes, Alloy 25S was the 
“first strong, heat-treatable aluminum alloy that proved practical for forging, an art which made 
the aluminum propeller standard equipment for aircraft.”347 Alloy development also took place 
much earlier in the nineteenth century. Recall the Cowles brothers’ inability to attain pure 
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aluminum, developing instead an aluminum-copper alloy.348 Alloys, placed in temporal 
perspective in relationship with the two world wars, reveals that research was not solely an 
outcome of war,349 but was an organized effort well before World War II and was often 
employed to develop war-fighting capability.350  
The US government asserted that alloys developed in the 1920s and 1930s were causal in 
opening up markets to aluminum.351 Alloys became important in the architectural products 
market because they could be employed in applications that privileged material strength or 
provided specific aesthetic effects. Some alloys are more adaptable to methods of working, such 
as drawing, forging or rolling. Others are more conducive to castings.352 Architectural products 
developed from research that produced alloys, such as Alcoa’s Alclad 17S sheet, were used 
extensively in architectural-cladding applications in the postwar period.353 Other examples 
include a specific alloy used on Kawneer’s 1929 “B” Store Front,354 and an alloy with 
designation 6061 for Kawneer’s Zourite brand aluminum facing for slipcovers.355 In addition to 
material strength, alloys afforded aesthetic affects in a range of grey tones and even colors, 
which were more or less conducive to accepting particular finishes. As Flandro and Thomas-
Haneys’ A Survey of Historic Finishes for Architectural Aluminum reveals, myriad finishes can 
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be attained from reflective to vibrant or subtle, depending upon the underlying alloy. The cover 
of the 1947 Architectural Metal Handbook declared the aesthetic importance of alloys in terms 
of freedom: “Freedom of expression is the cornerstone of progress in architecture. The metals of 
old, supplemented by the alloys of today, provide the strength, utility and permanence, dignity 
and beauty to make possible that freedom.”356  
 
Anodizing and research 
In addition to the creation of alloys, another research outcome at aluminum companies 
that was subsequently widely employed in architectural applications was the process of 
anodizing. This process produced a finish that allowed subtle, reflective or bold color effects. 
This research directly facilitated colorful metal façades on schools and commercial structures. 
Anodizing was first used in 1923 as a coating on British Duralumin sea plane components, after 
which Alcoa in the same year patented a color-anodizing process. Products employing this 
process were marketed as Alumilite, first commercially produced in 1928.357 The process 
involved passing electric current through, typically, an electrolytic solution, yielding an 
aluminum oxide coating on the surface of aluminum. Reynolds likewise conducted research into 
“new processes of applying protective coating and color anodizing to aluminum” in 1942,358 and 
developed a color-finish product, albeit much later in 1955, employed first on automotive 
radiator grills.359 Reynolds described the process for attaining color finishes: “When bright 
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surfaces are desired, the parts are chemically brightened in solutions containing various mixtures 
of hot acids which attack the projections, thus leveling the surface and producing a smoother and 
more lustrous appearance.”360 Color is an important consideration in the history of aluminum 
cladding when considering how it fits into an understanding of market demand. Reynolds and 
Alcoa held a fundamental philosophy that markets are made, and that they must make the market 
for products. The introduction of color into architectural products was not a one-way function of 
customers demanding color and industry providing it. Instead, deliberate marketing was 
undertaken to introduce, and induce, color to the architectural products market, while at the same 
time architects expressed a desire to employ color as an aesthetic effect. Producers maintained 
that research, however, was the starting point for the deployment of architectural-cladding 
products to the market. 
If Alcoa, Reynolds and Kawneer understood the route to the architectural products 
market as a linear path, research was imagined as the origin point. Kawneer explained at their 
second-annual architectural products sales meeting in 1956 that research and the development of 
those discoveries created new products: “It took two hours to parade the stream of new products 
from our super-charged research and development program across the stage. Some are not of a 
revolutionary nature, but all are highly significant to future trends in the industry.”361 Likewise, 
Alcoa explained that the endeavors of research were purposed with making “Alcoa’s products 
increasingly acceptable to its customers.”362 Furthermore, Alcoa sought to shorten this line 
between research and deployment to customers, summarizing their endeavors in 1960 as, “A 
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noteworthy aspect of Alcoa’s activities in 1960 was the company’s continued effort to shorten 
the time between development of research findings and their profitable application.”363 Reynolds 
was the most forthright in proclaiming the link between research and markets. Echoing a bold 
headline “Research Creates New Markets,”364 David P. Reynolds, executive vice president in 
charge of sales, said in 1960, “The creation of new markets almost always requires research and 
development.”365 A journalist writing about Alcoa’s approach to research in 1931 asserted, 
“Nearly all of the present great uses of the metal have needed to be nursed and nourished by the 
research laboratory before they could be sent out to stand alone in the industrial world…in 
skyscrapers … in houses …. How the industry believes in research is attested sufficiently by the 
new Research Laboratory which the Aluminum Company of America dedicated only a year ago 
near Pittsburgh.”366 
Insofar as research was understood as a formal, regimented, institutional practice, Alcoa, 
Reynolds and Kawneer subscribed to the formation of knowledge in such formalized regimes. 
Alcoa claimed, “The aluminum industry was founded upon research; and research has remained 
the cornerstone of its progress ever since.”367 Reynolds claimed two types of research informed 
the discourse of knowledge: “fundamental research, the creation of new knowledge” and 
“applied research, the utilization of basic information… “368 The physical and intellectual capital 
of research at Alcoa was described as “A large group of skilled scientists and technicians, 
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working in well-equipped laboratories…”369 Reynolds in particular clearly articulated an 
exacting definition of research on the cover of its magazine  Reynolds Review, read by industry 
subscribers. “Research: Studious inquiry; usually critical and exhaustive investigation or 
experimentation having for its aim the revision of accepted conclusions, in the light of newly 
discovered facts.”370 While not necessarily indicative of deeply critical reflection on this 
definition, as it was lifted from the Merriam-Webster Dictionary, publication on the cover of the 
magazine indicates the reverence held by Reynolds for the practice of research and its important 
place in the corporate structure of the firm. Each of these firms, at points in their history, had 
well-funded departments dedicated to methodical investigation of the properties of aluminum. 
Although Alcoa claimed that “The aluminum industry was founded upon research”371 the 
company organized a formal research organization in 1918, the Aluminum Research 
Laboratories. This operation was initially granted a facility at New Kensington, Pennsylvania, 
but by 1953, with staff growing to 625 men and women, the laboratory branched out to four 
locations in the United States.372 Alcoa’s research endeavors were focused on four fields: “alloy 
and product development; process development; investigation of the properties and 
characteristics of aluminum and chemical products; and development of techniques for 
inspection and quality control.”373 Alcoa claimed the dominant position in aluminum research: 
“The company does more than three-quarters of all the research conducted today in the 
aluminum industry, even though it has less than one-half of total production.”374  Likewise, 
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Reynolds also maintained a robust research operation. They combined the notion of “Research” 
with “Development” into a conceptually unified “Research and Development,” which was 
divided into (1) Packaging research operation center. This division serviced Reynolds’ original 
foray into aluminum: providing aluminum foil for cigarette containers. In 1960 it continued to 
hold the position of “world’s leading producer of aluminum packaging.”375 (2) Metallurgical 
Research Laboratories. Reynolds asserted the main purpose of this division was to “know what 
aluminum can and cannot do.”376 This division conducted tests and devised new alloys, (3) 
Alumina Research Department. Confronted with limited high-grade ore deposits in the United 
States, this division was tasked mainly with “the development of methods which will make 
possible the use of lower-grade ores.”377 (4) Reduction Research Laboratory. This division was 
charged with finding ways to improve the reduction process, or develop more efficient and less 
costly alternatives to it.378 (5) Product Development Department. The primary mission of this 
department was the “creation of new aluminum products.”379 
Executives — especially marketing-oriented executives — could also, at times, hold 
research in suspicion. Where marketing was seen as the important driver in generating income, 
research and design were made subservient to marketing endeavors — these practices were at the 
service of marketing, rather than the reciprocal. This orientation reveals one of the fundamental 
ideologies of the two biggest producers — Alcoa and Reynolds. They believed that markets must 
be made. To make markets, they employed the researchers and designers to generate new ideas 
and develop new potential uses of aluminum that could then be forged into use. This is not to say 
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that they, as producers, never responded to the articulated desires of customers. Yet Reynolds 
and Alcoa believed that aluminum held such great potential; if only they could educate and 
inspire the public and potential customers to its applications, the metal could spread in use. For 
this to happen, the firms had to first facilitate the development new products to sell, either by 
themselves or aiding others to do so, then engage in a purposeful marketing campaign to push it 
to the market. As producers engaged in product design, they sometimes were positioned in 
potential conflict with architects, given that architects protected as endemic to their profession 
creative agency as design originators. 
Executives at Alcoa and Reynolds held the research department in great reverence, 
lending an urgent, self-assured quality to their communications with investors, employees and in 
marketing publications: “A company without research is dead.”380 “Research and development 
are the key to survival.”381 “Reynolds research and development: Men and Brains.”382 An 
advertisement staged serious men in white lab coats, ostensibly finalizing with exactitude the 
details of corrugated Alumalure siding.383 Hyperbole of this magnitude was perhaps warranted, 
as Alcoa and Reynolds were fierce rivals. After the war, they were the number one and number 
two producers in the United States, each vying for the same markets in a rapidly expanding 
market for all types of aluminum products. The year 1954 was said to be a “golden age of 
architectural expression,” for metal curtain walls,384 Alcoa, Reynolds and Kawneer were all three 
optimistic about the future with record sales in the 1950s, but more and more competitors began 
entering the aluminum markets, with 20 new significant firms entering from 1955 to 1970.385 
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Alcoa and Reynolds were keenly aware of each other’s desire for market dominance, and they 
treated their research operations as their most crucial center of activity: W. G. “Billy” Reynolds, 
executive vice president of Research and Development stated, “The company that doesn’t keep 
up is doomed. Research and development are the key to survival, not only for a business firm, 
but for the nation.”386 Alcoa framed research in terms of competition: “Alcoa’s research and 
development program is regarded as one of the company’s chief sources of competitive 
strength”387 Alcoa also expressed an urgency: “Research…must be advanced and enlarged to 
keep pace with, and indeed, ahead of the times.”388 Finally, Reynolds understood competition as 
a battle: “Our research and development people continually provide our salesmen with the right 
kind of weapon.”389 
In addition to the urgency of competition, research was seen as an engine of progress. 
This concept was a fundamental ideology held by Alcoa, Reynolds and Kawneer. Furthermore, 
this idea of progress was explicitly linked to the architectural products as a strategy of marketing 
them as modern. But for the producers, the beating heart of progress was research. Stated Alcoa: 
“It is a basic Alcoa tradition that without research there can be no progress.”390 Reynolds echoed 
the position: “Reynolds is geared for progress. Led by imaginative, competent research and 
development men, it is continually moving aluminum into new uses.”391 Progress was promoted 
as the driving force of research as a practice: “These men believe that the key to progress, both 
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for the company and for civilization, lies in obtaining knowledge…and them putting it to 
work.”392 Likewise, Kawneer understood their own Research and Development department as 
the reason for the company’s postwar “Progress:” The company conveyed to a reporter that the 
Research and Development group “can take a good deal of credit for Kawneer’s remarkable 
postwar progress.”393 The idea of progress was a trope more widely shared across industries and 
across domains of intellect and cultural practice.394 Actors in the aluminum industry imagined 
their research departments as the vanguard of progress — an idea no doubt made more urgent 
after the emergence of the industry, and the world, from the ravages of World War II. From the 
vantage point of fifteen years after the war, Reynolds reflected on the importance of research to 
enact “progress” beyond destruction. In an article headlined “Reynolds research and 
development: Men and Brains,” Reynolds wrote, “With his brain, man has changed the face of 
the world…and discovered the means with which to destroy it. When not contriving to destroy 
himself, man has used his brain to improve his lot….These are the men Reynolds has assembled 
in its research and development groups.”395 
 
Conceptual slippage between research and design 
While these firms had formal, robust departments for research, a degree of slippage 
characterized the terminology surrounding their terms used to describe the practice. Terms for 
research, development, design, architecture and engineering were sometimes used 
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interchangeably, or differently, depending upon the firm. This interchangeability reflects the 
inexact disciplinary boundaries between the processes of aluminum product production from 
research for product delivery to the end user. The boundaries among many of these processes 
were nebulous. Furthermore, the boundaries between designers internal and external to the firm 
were similarly indefinite. This merging of design practices internal and external to the companies 
will be explored in the following section. The work of external designers, such as architects, 
sometimes overlapped with the work of designers internal to the company. Many aluminum-
cladding products were the result of collaboration between departments internal to the firm and 
external to the firm.  
This conceptual overlap between boundaries of practice is exemplified by the Reynolds 
Product Development Department, because it was descried as a “twin-barreled” organization. 
Some of its sections are oriented toward particular industries. Other sections focus their attention 
on the characteristics of the metal.”396 This department was at once a design practice and a 
research practice. Reynolds adopted this overlap as a strategy: “The fruits of these two realms of 
effort are combined in creating new ways in which aluminum can be used.” This unapologetic 
stance in which product development was simultaneously a conceptually singular practice and a 
combined effort with research differed significantly from the approach taken by its rival Alcoa 
immediately after the war. Alcoa had the larger, more established research apparatus. But 
Reynolds had a different strategy. Unlike Alcoa, which had long attempted to define a boundary 
between producing end-products itself and producing only, for instance, aluminum sheet to then 
sell to fabricators who would manufacture the end-product, Reynolds was much more embracing 
of an end-product manufacturing role. The company clearly articulated its position: “Reynolds 
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realized very early that to be successful it could not merely produce its aluminum pig, put it on 
the counter and say, in effect, ‘Here it is; buy it!’”397 This approach, Reynolds maintained, was a 
“new product consciousness”: “Starting immediately after World War II, Reynolds initiated, 
developed and perfected new ways of using aluminum. Scores of new products, from Reynolds 
Wrap and roofing to bumpers and boats, came from research and development groups. The entire 
organization, from manufacturing to sales, became new-product conscious.”398 It’s important to 
realize that Reynolds, like Alcoa, produced aluminum for an array of markets, from building 
products to automobiles to consumer goods. Reynolds found great success in selling Reynold’s 
Wrap, starting in 1947, while Alcoa’s product, “Alcoa Wrap,” as a second-to-market competitor, 
never achieved the market penetration that Reynolds Wrap did, and Alcoa withdrew the product.  
Reynolds’ embrace of departmental, disciplinary overlap extended to other domains: the 
conceptual merging of marketing and design. Shortly after the war, the company established a 
package design department to demonstrate appealing ways products could be wrapped or labeled 
in printed foil, an expertise that company founder R. S. Reynolds had long held.399 In 1950 the 
mission of the package design department was expanded to “cover the visual aspect of all 
aluminum product applications” from advertising and display material to architectural design.400 
In 1956 architectural design specialists were transferred to the Building Products Division, “to 
make possible more direct coordination between architectural design and architectural products.” 
This combined approach was led by Billy Reynolds, Executive Vice President of Research and 
Development. He gained experience in the production of finished aluminum products for the 
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war. Reynolds, from its inception as a vertically integrated producer, concerned itself with both 
fabrication and the manufacture of finish products, in marked contrast with Alcoa’s prewar 
position — less focused on the production of finished products that could be sold directly to 
consumers. Before World War II, Alcoa concentrated on producing aluminum fabrications like 
sheet or extrusions, and then selling those to middle-men manufacturers, like Kawneer, which 
would make an architectural component to sell to end-users. Reynolds, on the other hand, took 
the experience it gained making finished products for the war and transferred that technique to 
the consumer market. Reynolds reflected on Billy’s management of wartime production: “When 
the war ended, the aircraft parts division had a vast array of fabricating equipment and a cadre of 
people with know-how in aluminum. Since Reynolds also had, for the first time, great amounts 
of metal to sell to a peacetime economy, Billy quickly began pointing the fabricating operations 
toward products that held promise of volume consumption. He had two purposes: First, to help 
sell the company’s aluminum capacity, and second, to demonstrate on an actual production basis 
the practical advantages of aluminum for a wide variety of applications.”401 
Billy Reynolds positioned the company for a burgeoning consumer economy. This 
strategy of not only producing aluminum but also manufacturing end products fostered “stamped 
boats, gutters, ribbed siding for commercial buildings, refrigerator components, oil well drilling 
rigs and automotive trim and grills.”402 For Reynolds, those who were involved in product 
development  “conceived, designed, developed or helped produce…”403 Product development, in 
turn, was under the aegis of Research and Development.404 Styling and design, or “‘the art 
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department,’ as people outside the department itself are wont to call it,”405 from 1950 to 1956, 
included specialists in architectural design, after which these specialists were moved to the 
Building Products Division “to make possible more direct coordination between architectural 
design and architectural products.”406 
Alcoa had long preferred to produce aluminum fabrications rather than engage in the 
manufacture of end-products. In the 1940s Alcoa boldly proclaimed, “We make pigs, not potato 
mashers.”407 At times throughout its history, however, it did engage in product manufacture, 
believing that doing so for a time might demonstrate uses of aluminum. Their first mass-
produced consumer product, for example, was a tea kettle that, according to the lore of a movie 
produced about the history of Alcoa, was made to inspire manufacturers to produce their own tea 
kettles with Alcoa supplying the aluminum. According to the portrayal in the film, after an Alcoa 
salesman entered Mr. Eli Griswold’s office, of the Griswold Manufacturing Company,408 
displaying a one-off aluminum tea kettle and hoping Griswold might be inspired to buy 
aluminum and manufacture them himself, Griswold said, “Put me down for 2000 kettles.” “Wait 
a minute,” replied the Alcoa salesman, “we just sell aluminum, we don’t make kettles!” 
Griswold replied that he would buy only the finished product, “You’ve got to take the grief in 
making them.” Indeed, Alcoa did enter into the manufacture of kettles, selling them to Griswold. 
He saw how well they sold, and changed his tune: “Listen…you fella’s don’t want to monkey 
with the manufacturing end! Suppose I just buy the raw material from you and make my own 
aluminum ware….I know that’s what you wanted me to buy in the beginning, but I wanted to 
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make sure all the bugs were out of it, and I’d rather you be the exterminator than me.”409 This 
dramatization promoted the image of Alcoa as a producer and a reluctant end-product 
manufacturer which was just the image they hoped manufacturers, like Kawneer, would see. 
They wanted manufacturers to buy from them, while at the same time, reserve the right to sell 
end products. This reserved right they exercised much less before the war than after.  
Alcoa increasingly embraced the manufacture of end-products after the war, with vast 
new infrastructures of management processes, skilled workers, plants, machinery and stocks of 
aluminum to draw upon. For instance, it manufactured cast aluminum exterior wall panels, 
derived, as it stated in a 1948 advertisement, “By coordinating design specification and 
production facilities.”410 It should be noted that Alcoa did produce some end-products before the 
war, yet it was largely engaged in a support role of outside designers and product developers. In 
the realm of architecture, it was quick to work with famous architects, such as Harrison & 
Abramovitz, to demonstrate end-use products so that it could sell more aluminum to end-product 
manufacturers.411 This was an approach aimed more toward process development than product 
development.  This approach persisted into the postwar period, even while the company also 
began limited manufacturing of their own products. While product development entails 
designing and manufacturing the end-product itself, process development entails, as a mid-
century recruitment brochure explains, helping “industry to work out solutions to their problems 
in welding, brazing, finishing and forming — in fact, all phases of making products from 
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aluminum.”412 Alcoa saw process development as a crucial strategy, because “The tremendous 
growth of the aluminum market has been the result of finding new uses for aluminum mill 
products.”413 Despite accusations of monopoly, part of Alcoa’s enterprise was enabling 
manufacturers to discover and develop uses for its aluminum produced.414 Competition and 
collaboration characterized the firm’s approach to capital accumulation. 
Through the 1950s and 1960s, Alcoa increasingly embraced product development in-
house, stating, “Though Alcoa always has stressed the importance of innovation in products and 
processes, this entire sphere of exploration is being given much greater emphasis than ever 
before.”415 Alcoa established the Development Department, which was subdivided into three 
major areas: Product Development, Equipment Development and Process Development. In the 
same way Reynolds envisioned nebulous boundaries between research, development and design 
domains, so too did Alcoa envision these three development domains as conjoined: “The names 
of these three areas suggest three separate but interrelated concerns of Alcoa: to develop new 
products for the market place; to develop equipment that will enable us to make those products 
economically; and to develop new processes for the continued improvement of those 
products.”416 While the Development Department did not utilize the moniker “Research,” there 
did exist an executive position that combined these domains: the Vice President in Charge of 
Research and Development.417 
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Kawneer, as a manufacturer, had much less physical capital to dedicate toward research 
and development endeavors. It did share with both Alcoa and Reynolds, however, the legacy of 
wartime physical and intellectual capital available for exploitation after the war. Like the 
producers, Kawneer conceptually overlapped these domains, referring to staff engaged in such 
endeavors as “research and development engineers and architects.”418 Groups organized at 
Kawneer in the postwar 1940s included Product Engineering, Industrial Engineering and 
Research & Development.419 Like Reynolds and Alcoa, research and development were 
conceptually combined.  
The manufacturing orientation of Kawneer placed organizational emphasis on the 
connection between engineering, research and development. Developing an end-product 
involved myriad details that, at Kawneer, the engineer addressed — from preparing engineering 
drawings of product configuration to selecting the best alloy for a given end-product. 
Engineering was articulated as subservient, playing a support role to the designers in the 
development domain: “Product Engineering basically serves production which represents a 
difference between this and Research & Development people.”420 Kawneer indicated that while 
engineering was a supportive role, Research and Development “people” were equals. This 
relationship reveals the way the wider structure of aluminum manufacturing operated not as a 
strictly linear development, but as an overlapping lines of professional and disciplinary domains. 
Kawneer characterized professional overlap: “Frequently Product Engineering, Industrial 
Engineering and Research & Development  people are required to work very closely on many 
projects and problems.”421  
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Industry relationship with the architectural profession 
One of the transversal relationships examined in this study is that between designers 
inside of the manufacturer’s enterprise and those on the outside. Inside the organizations, Alcoa, 
Reynolds and Kawneer developed a complex managerial apparatus that coordinated the work of 
researchers and designers. They also sought out designers outside the organization, such as 
Harrison & Abramovitz (Alcoa), Minoru Yamasaki (Reynolds) and Morris Ketchum (Kawneer). 
These architects lent crucial expertise, designing components that became the prototype for 
future products, but they were also part of a marketing strategy. For instance, association with 
these firms provided an entry into magazines, helping to develop showpiece works of 
architecture that could garner media attention. Alcoa and Reynolds and Kawneer developed 
architecture awards chaired by famous architects, serving as yet another medium for 
proselytizing aluminum.  
The conceptualization of “development” as a conjunction of overlapping disciplines 
extended outside the boundary of the corporate domain into spheres of private architectural 
practice. In the same way that producers’ activities sometimes overlapped with manufacturers’, 
whereby they entered into competition in the manufacture of end-products while simultaneously 
providing fabricated aluminum, the design activity of producers and manufacturers overlapped 
with the design activity of architects. Producers and manufacturers were aware of disciplinary 
boundaries, knowing that architects were a crucial connection to potential customers. As this 
section explains, Kawneer overtly attempted to exhibit respect for boundaries and not appear to 
take away the design agency of the architect, lest he seek out a competitor’s product that would 
allow creative freedom. Outside designers were given a degree of latitude to produce custom 
designs but wider design agency was inhibited by the manufacturer’s ambitions for standardized 
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components that could be replicated. Because minimization of production cost was a leading 
consideration, designers were embraced, but kept at arm’s length. 
  An underlying outcome of the marketing projects by Alcoa, Reynolds and Kawneer was 
the appropriation of the architect as a medium of marketing. By collaborating with architects, 
aluminum-component manufacturers were able to spread awareness and use of the product. 
Manufacturers selected well-known architects with whom to collaborate. In answering the 
question, “Who designed the aluminum cladding components?” the act must be understood as a 
collaborative effort, with designers inside and outside the company overlapping, thus challenging 
the notion of sole authorship of a building by an architect. Designers inside the company often 
played a significant role in the design of architectural cladding. 
 
Kawneer’s designers and disciplinary boundaries 
In 1945 Kawneer published the pictures of eight men under the banner headline 
“Introducing our Designers” to the company in its monthly magazine, The Kawneer Front.422 In 
this first revelation of a new organizational structure — the Kawneer Design Department — the 
company took pains to stress in the first two paragraphs that the architect was not being replaced. 
Explaining that the “chief functions of this department is to create and develop, through research 
and design, modern ideas in stores,” the article continued, “these ideas are guides to architects, 
distributors, and designers and increase the public interest in good design and good materials.” 
To further assuage misunderstanding, the article asserted that “the Design Department is not 
primarily a service department, but rather a creative and suggestive organization.”423 
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Central to Kawneer’s skirting of the issue of creative agency was the debate about 
standardization. As explained earlier in this study, standardization was a mode of expanding the 
firm’s capital accumulation through economies of scale and the repetition of expertise, 
exemplified by Lawrence Plym’s slogan, “Find out what you can do best, then do it in volume. 
Keep it simple. Keep it in aluminum.” Although standardization of production and design at 
Kawneer increased in intensity in the 1950s, Kawneer had long engaged standardization through 
components it manufactured for storefront systems after it was incorporated as a company in 
1906. Kawneer’s marketing endeavors for these components initially were exclusively targeted 
toward architects: “His [Plym’s] first instinct was to sell architects….They resulted in sales, for 
progressive architects liked the new approach to store fronts….But an architect serves a client, 
and in time Plym found the best results came from going directly to the client….The results were 
astonishing. Selling the merchants directly, along with the architects and contractors, became the 
cornerstone of Kawneer sales policy. Thus began that change of the face of Main Street, U.S.A. 
that Kawneer pioneered.”424 From the start of Kawneer’s sales policy, the architect was not 
excluded from consultation, but a backchannel persisted, direct to the end-user. This dual 
approach allowed Kawneer to work with architects to produce a storefront design, and also gave 
them the opportunity to initiate design, if they chose to exercise that route, before consulting an 
architect. Kawneer exploited both paths.  
 
Kawneer promotes architects’ design leadership 
Some publications were directed toward architects, or “the Technical Man.” A 1912 
catalog reminded the “Technical Man” that Kawneer’s product was a comprehensive approach: 
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“… please take particular note that Kawneer is complete — not simply a Corner and Division 
Bar, but complete from side walk to I-beam.”425 The catalog continued, “… each part designed in 
harmony with every other.”426 Kawneer stood ready to supply a complete street-level façade. 
Such a reminder was surely meant to aid selling more product but was also meant to explain that 
the entire storefront could be designed by this “Technical Man” in close coordination with 
Kawneer. This document explained Kawneer as an assistant to design, not necessarily the lead: 
“We … sincerely believe we are in a position to serve and co-operate with you on all matters…. 
It has been our object from the beginning to produce a construction that fulfills your every 
requirement …”427 Kawneer’s position articulated as an assistant to design continued in the 
interwar period, with Kawneer’s business advantaged by the interwar Modernize Main Street 
initiative of the Federal Housing Authority, in which “low-interest loans (were) made for the 
modernization of existing residential and nonresidential buildings.”428 Exposed to this slogan, 
merchants seeking to “modernize” their storefronts were suggested by Kawneer to seek out the 
expertise of an architect: “Here the architect creates the design,” after which “plants are 
completed, specifications drawn up” by the architect, working with Kawneer.429  
In the same way Kawneer recommended to merchants that they seek out the expertise of 
architects, so too did Kawneer make overtures to architects directly when preparing to launch 
their new K-47 line in 1945-1946. When Kawneer announced the new product to architects and 
engineers, it stressed that architects themselves aided in the design of this standardized storefront 
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framing component: “It was pointed out to the architects and builders that the new K-47 line is 
the result of research conducted among them, plus Kawneer’s specialized experience and ‘know 
how’ in the store front industry.”430 In the company’s newsletter, architects were reported by 
Kawneer to love it: “The architects’ and distributors’ reactions are all that we could want…. The 
only complaint we have had from the architects so far is that they would have liked to have had it 
a year earlier.”431 After launch of the line, in 1946 Kawneer exhibited it at the Architecture 
League in New York City in an exhibition, “The Trend of Modern Store Architecture.”432 
Characterizing the response, Kawneer maintained it was received with “great interest” by New 
York architects. 
Many architects in the profession had expressed an interest in the standardized 
components being offered by manufacturers, but also maintained that architects still had 
something to offer in terms of design. Pencil Points magazine in 1931 issued a study titled, “A 
Symposium on Better Cooperation Between the Architectural Profession and the Manufacturer 
of Building Materials,” that sought to address what was understood as a problem: how to 
exchange information between the eight thousand architects “who must select the various 
materials and items of equipment going into their buildings from this army of approximately 
seven thousand producers.” 433 One architect addressed the professional boundaries between 
architects and producers: “…the manufacturer knows a lot of things about his material which he 
wants to tell to the architect. Sometimes, however, the architect knows something about that 
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material that the manufacturer does not know …. If they can get these two sets of information 
together in some way, we will be on our way towards the ideal.”434 
Following up on their earlier efforts to reach out to architects when designing the K-47 
line, Kawneer’s launch of The Unit Wall also incorporated architects in an advisory role. The 
catch-phrase “Demand-Designed” was promoted as an encapsulation of the practice in which 
Kawneer hired architects on their staff, worked with architect-advisors on the development of 
new products, and distributed a survey to architects to solicit their opinions. A two-page 
article/advertisement written by Kawneer appeared in the February 1956 issue of Architectural 
Record, stressing that Kawneer has involved architects in product design since their founding.435 
The article, “The Kawneer touch…The Result of 50 Years of Architectural Cooperation” begins 
by stressing that the founder himself was an architect. It then recounts the ways the “consultant 
architect and the Kawneer staff” worked together: They first eliminated “useless ornamentation, 
or “rococo” ornamentation from façades in favor of “simple functional metal design.” 
Collaboration on the K-47 line yielded a “professional character, yet can be purchased out of 
stock.” After World War II, architects designed the profile of aluminum “slipcover” cladding, 
while the Kawneer engineers devised the finishes. For the production of Kawneer’s postwar line 
of metal wall systems, Kawneer publicized architects’ role as “formal working agreements with 
architectural firms. They help in specifying the desired features, functions, size and modular 
requirements. Throughout the development period, the solutions to these requirements are 
reviewed by practicing architects.” Lastly, Kawneer distributed surveys to architects around the 
country. From these surveys, Kawneer claimed that any products they produced were “Demand-
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Driven,” the design sourced in the demands of architects themselves. “After 50 years of close 
cooperation with architects, Kawneer can truthfully claim to have always been in ‘touch’ with 
the profession and construction industry.”436 By transforming architects into consultants, and 
publicizing their role as such in publications from 1917 to the postwar period, Kawneer 
attempted to advance ahead of potential objections architects might raise against standardization. 
After all, standardized components were sourced in the architects themselves, claimed Kawneer. 
Simultaneously, Kawneer directed publications straight to the merchants and to architects in 
architectural journals, publicizing Kawneer’s expertise in design as a “Kawneer Touch.” 
 
The Kawneer “Touch” of design 
Here was an industrially produced architecture of standardized components being 
produced, led by a manufacturer, promoted as developed in consultation with architects. 
Kawneer would consistently embrace the term “modern” to market the outcome of this 
relationship. While Kawneer stressed collaboration with architects, written into marketing 
material, and discussed in company newsletters, Kawneer also stressed the agency of their own 
designers as underlying the spread of modern storefronts. 
Because Kawneer found success in approaching merchants directly, rather than strictly 
marketing to architects in hopes they would then approach end-users, Kawneer appealed to 
merchants in a 1917 Kawneer publication, Portfolio of Designs, inviting them to send their own 
hand sketches directly to Kawneer. Instructions were: “It will be necessary for you to give us as 
much information as possible regarding your old front, together with the height of the present 
front measured from the sidewalk to the I-beam, also the total width between the brick walls. In 
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order to make us more familiar with the existent conditions, please draw a rough sketch — don’t 
be afraid we won’t understand it — we will.”437 Kawneer claimed in this publication to be 
specialists in the “designing of up-to-date, sales-producing Kawneer Store Fronts.”438 The 
publication included detailed plates of what the company titled, “Kawneer Designs” and invited 
store owners to work directly with Kawneer on developing a design for their store: “…call up 
our nearest branch office…and ask them to develop a store front for you along that line.439 
“Modern” as a marketing term appeared in a 1920 publication to describe the storefronts 
Kawneer claimed to “father.”440 Claiming design origination of the “era” of “standard Store 
Front Construction,”441 Kawneer wrote, “every new idea that has developed in the construction 
of modern Store Fronts, since Kawneer was conceived, has originated with Kawneer.” Although 
the publication did, in fact, assert that architects would appreciate the ideas presented by 
Kawneer in the catalog, thus paying homage to the architect in some capacity, the company 
amply claimed design primacy for the entire era of modern storefronts. Kawneer did not 
advocate complete removal of the architect from the design act. As the previous section has 
shown, architects were praised by Kawneer. A 1916 publication especially reified the profession: 
“much credit is due to the Architects and Contractors for the finished Kawneer Store Fronts that 
now stand.” However, their relationship with architects was couched in terms of helping them by 
standardizing design. “Yearly we spend thousands of dollars in raising the standard of Store 
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Fronts…and that this results in a great good for the Architects and Contractors cannot be 
contradicted.”442  
Immediately after World War II, designers at Kawneer took on an increasingly important 
role with the establishment of the Kawneer Design Department. While this department was 
articulated as a “creative and suggestive organization,”443 its initial task included complete 
example designs of example storefronts employing Kawneer aluminum framing and facing 
products.444 Kawneer declared these designers “the best in the business,” and wrote an exposé of 
their inner workings in an article, “Behind the Aluminum Curtain” in the August 1950 issue of 
The Kawneer Front. “Have you ever wondered what goes on behind the locked doors of the 
Product Design and Development Lab?” asked the article. Pulling back the curtain revealed that 
the designers were intimately involved with creation: “Actually, the work of the men and women 
in this department can be summed up in three words—creation, development, and 
application.”445 Kawneer attempted to portray the relationship of designers internal to the 
company and external to the company in overlapping roles: architects were described as 
“consultants” to the company designers, while company designers were described as a 
“suggestive organization.”  
These company designers were marketed as the design prowess of the company — “The 
Kawneer Touch.”446 The touch extended to collaboration with architects, “in constant touch with 
Architects,” and a touch of design excellence when developing new Kawneer products. Both the 
overlapping roles of designers internal and external to the company, and the double-definition of 
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“the Kawneer touch” are perhaps exemplified in the most comprehensive design project 
Kawneer had undertaken: entire exterior walls in which architects were given a limited range of 
design choice to exercise within the framework of a larger assemblage designed by Kawneer. 
 
Boxing in the Architect 
With the introduction of the Kawneer Unit Wall, a comprehensive wall and window 
system that could be factory-built and rapidly erected in the field, Kawneer was in a leading 
design position regarding the total façade of a building. While the system was still being 
designed, Director of Research and Development Jack Roehm explained, “It is conceived as a 
total wall.”447 Debuted at a meeting for Kawneer salesmen, its rapid erection was stressed, as it 
was “assembled on the stage by three mechanics in less than three minutes in a convincing 
presentation of Unit Wall construction.”448 Yet, Kawneer was aware still that the architect was an 
important point of contact with the end-user, and the strategy with the Unit Wall was to allow the 
architect a degree of design freedom, still within the limits of a standardized system: “Using 
standardized components, we can achieve great flexibility of design, including color, for a 
complete wall system.” The architect could specify the spacing of the supports, the color of the 
infill panels, the anodized color of the supports, and, within a limited palette, select the material 
of the infill panels. The Unit Wall was thus a framework regulating the architects design — 
marrying a standardized system of production with a degree of design agency by the architect. 
Standardization was a means of capital accumulation. An article in Modern Metals discussed 
Kawneer’s forecast of profit: “A brand new product that will bolster sales and earnings is a new 
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type of metal wall created by Kawneer’s Research and Development Department.”449 The Unit 
Wall put the architects’ influence in a box confined to the infill panel. Kawneer promoted this as 
creativity and flexibility: “The Kawneer Unit Wall is a creative tool for the architect…. Yes, 
gentlemen, the new Kawneer Unit Wall is a system offering complete flexibility of design 
treatment through a wide selection of color, unit types, unit sizes and a choice of proportions 
within the units themselves.”450 
Following the Unit Wall launch in 1956, the company expanded the concept into four 
price categories — from fully standardized walls to custom-built curtain wall units, particularly 
on larger buildings. Kawneer representatives explained the company preferred full 
standardization but could accommodate, in some cases, the desire for custom walls: “We are 
striving to promote greater acceptance of standardized components, more factory fabrication, 
less job-site fabrication…. We welcome the big custom curtain wall jobs, but our research and 
development work is based on standard units that are ready for installation when they leave our 
plant.” Plym announced that the standardized walls can still accommodate the architect: “He can 
still juggle them around, and regardless of the design he comes up with, he will benefit by basic 
engineering principles embodied in them.”451 
Kawneer framed the architect’s design agency within a predefined panel, then framed the 
message about that agency as offering the architect as a creative tool and complete flexibility. 
This suited Kawneer’s drive for increasing standardization of design and production — an 
endeavor they could control because the company’s primary business was the manufacture of 
aluminum end-products. This fact was a main differentiator between Kawneer and Alcoa.  
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Alcoa collaborates with architects  
While Kawneer’s profit potential depended on manufacture, Alcoa’s did not. Alcoa was 
focused primarily on fabricating aluminum that could be sold to manufacturers like Kawneer. 
While Alcoa did engage in limited production of end-products after World War II,452 given 
greatly expanded production capacity and in response to competition with Reynolds, their 
articulated position was a support role, perhaps best encapsulated by Alcoa’s memorable slogan, 
“We make pigs, not potato mashers.”453 In 1955, Alcoa’s manager of market development said 
the architect should lead: “I believe that the aesthetics of metal-clad buildings must be left to the 
architect and I have every confidence that he will solve this problem if we furnish the tools. 
These tools must come from good, sound engineering….They must come from the research 
laboratories and the development divisions of the many companies who are to participate in the 
progressiveness of this industry.454 Reflecting on the development of aluminum cladding from 
the vantage point of 1955, Alcoa payed homage to collaborators: “I would be remiss if I didn’t 
pay tribute to the architectural metal fabricators and to the manufacturers of sandwich panels, as 
well as a number of progressive architects, all of whom have worked closely with our industry 
and many of whom contributed generously of their time and money.”455 
Alcoa’s relationship with the architecture firm Harrison Abramovitz reveals the way the 
company collaborated with design expertise but also utilized them as an advertising medium. 
This is not to say that Harrison Abramovitz did not benefit greatly, for they did, with a long 
relationship over many decades. The firm benefited from the commission and from the status of 
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working with an international client. Engaging in research and design in conjunction with the 
research arm of Alcoa boosted the firm’s credentials, not unlike the status conferred, as Abigail 
Sachs shows, on architecture firms in the postwar period who worked not under aesthetic 
preconceptions, but instead claimed to work from first principles rooted in their theories of 
environmental behavior.456 Yet, the relationship with Harrison and Abramovitz facilitated 
Alcoa’s very identity, where the architect’s designs helped Alcoa develop a new category of 
aluminum product — the aluminum-clad curtain wall, and the transfer into a celebrated new, 
gleaming aluminum tower in Pittsburgh, designed by the architects. Harrison Abramovitz 
became virtual salesmen for Alcoa, designing a “silent salesman” — the Alcoa Building (1953).  
Alcoa held the goal of developing a thin, aluminum wall at least since 1932. In their publication 
of that year, Aluminum in Architecture, Alcoa forecasted that one day, a 10-inch wall might be 
built as a 3-1/2-inch wall with the help of an aluminum exterior wall. A potential benefit 
achieved, Alcoa speculated, was increased rental income for a building owner due to increased 
floor space afforded by the thinner wall.457 Inspired by an early application of thin-wall cladding 
of aluminum on the Department of Public Works Building in Richmond, Virginia (designed by 
W. A. Childrey of the Department’s staff and constructed during 1930–1931)458 and aware that 
an engineering firm conducted tests of the façade and determined the wall to possess favorable 
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“sound, light, and heat properties,” Alcoa was inspired by the potentials of “all-metal wall 
construction.”459 
Wallace Harrison was considered an ideal candidate to assist Alcoa in the development of 
such a thin-aluminum wall when an architectural sales meeting in 1945 at Seaview Country Club 
in Absecon, New Jersey was held to consider ways of promoting the sales of spandrels and 
metal-clad curtain walls.460 Minutes before the meeting stated, “The opinion of all present was 
that Alcoa should select two outstanding architects to study and develop details as to how such 
an idea as cast aluminum panels backed up with “Vermiculite” or other back up materials would 
be applicable to multi-story building, not only for spandrels but for the entire façade. Mr. 
Wallace Harrison of New York, who incidentally is the Rockefeller architect, and Mr. Albert 
Shaw of Chicago, both well-known, highly respected architects were suggested. The Pittsburgh 
Architectural Division proposed to take this matter up with Management and encourage such a 
procedure to go ahead immediately…. If Mr. Harrison and Mr. Shaw were retained to do the 
work on this metal clad building, we would expect that they would have the close cooperation of 
the Research Laboratories, the Development Division and the Engineering Division here at 
Pittsburgh in the designing of the wall panels, anchorage, joining, etc.”461 
Perhaps Harrison’s name emerged because he was well known by Alcoa as a leading 
architect on the Rockefeller Center Building, constructed between 1930 and 1939, with 
Raymond Hood as principal architect. The architects specified 4488 cast aluminum spandrels for 
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this building.462 Victoria Newhouse writes of Alcoa’s first encounter with Harrison, recounting 
Alcoa’s New York City salesman Fritz Close’s successful sale for Alcoa of aluminum for this 
project. The co-founder of Alcoa, Arthur Vining Davis Jr. had approached John D. Rockefeller 
Jr. about the prospect for using aluminum on the proposed high-rise. Davis was rebuffed, and 
ordered Fritz Close to try another way. Newhouse interviewed Close, who explained that he went 
to Harrison’s waiting room and waited for his opportunity to approach Harrison as he walked 
through the lobby on his way to work in the morning.463 Close got his meeting with Harrison, 
and after the owner’s representatives approved, he sold 3 million pounds of aluminum for the 
Rockefeller Center Project.464 
Soon after the sales meeting at Seaview Country Club, it was announced that Alcoa hired 
Harrison for a dramatic new project. Wallace Harrison, by 1941 working with Max Abramovitz, 
produced designs for a project that was never built — a new aluminum-clad sales office building 
in New York City. The New York-Herald Tribune announced in April 1946 that it “will be the 
first building in the world…to employ a new type of construction embodying an aluminum-faced 
curtain wall….Plans announced for the structure, designed as a dramatic demonstration of all the 
proved architectural applications of aluminum, have already stirred considerable comment in 
architectural circles, which believe it may exert a profound influence on future construction.”465  
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While the New York City tower was squarely in the spotlight of publicity, another 
opportunity emerged in the 1940s for Alcoa to “work out the bugs”466 of an exterior aluminum-
cladding system that was applicable to use on a high-rise. In 1955, at a symposium on metal 
curtain walls, an Alcoa executive reflected on a such an opportunity: “…without fanfare or 
publicity, we built a small four-story administration building for our Davenport Works. While 
this work was going on, we tried to determine what our problems were and what we would 
ultimately have to solve.”467 Well before construction commenced on the Davenport Works 
Administration Building (1949), Alcoa had tested an aluminum wall assembly with Underwriters 
Laboratories (UL), anticipating full approval on February 8, 1945, for a cast aluminum wall 
panel assembly with Vermiculite backup, granting approval for a four-hour fire rating.468 As 
discussed in the previous section, Standards and Codes Regulate Aluminum Cladding, this was a 
crucial milestone on the route to employing aluminum cladding on high rises in the context of 
strict fire barrier code regulations in US cities. While Alcoa knew that the use of Vermiculite 
behind an aluminum panel would pass the UL test, it was not deemed ready for use on buildings. 
This was an experimental assembly, not a deployable system.469 The firm of Harrison & 
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Abramovitz was hired in 1946470 to study this problem and commissioned in 1948471 to design 
the Davenport Works Administration building — part of a larger rolling mill complex covering 
47 acres,472 to roll large plates of flattened aluminum.473 
Reflecting on his involvement with the project, Max Abramovitz, in a speech to the 
Detroit Chapter of the American Institute of Architects, acknowledged that the aluminum wall on 
Davenport’s administration building was not the first use of aluminum in this form, referencing 
iron and steel predecessors, as well as “the more recent use of metal panels in shop fronts.”474 
Undertaking a study of these past uses, “of metal in buildings, airplanes, ships and railroad cars” 
Abramovitz said, “Our research was extensive.”475 In effect, the firm of Harrison & Abramovitz 
became a research and development arm of Alcoa. But, it was research and development 
undertaken by an outside design firm, exemplifying the disciplinary overlap that characterized 
the enterprise of aluminum product development.  
The panels were not solely devised by the architects. As noted in the minutes of the 1945 
sales meeting at Seaview Country Club, Alcoa planned to work with the architects, who “would 
have the close cooperation of the Research Laboratories, the Development Division and the 
Engineering Division…in the designing of the wall panels, anchorage, joining, etc.”476 Alcoa had 
expertise in the casting process in which aluminum is poured into a mould of sand, preshaped to 
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the corrugated pattern that would be employed on the wall panel. Harrison & Abramovitz 
explained that they had several goals for the panels: “(1) it was dry, (2) it was light, (3) it was a 
large unit (4) it contained fewer joints, (5) it was prefabricated, and (6) it eliminated scaffolds.” 
Abramovitz reported that all the goal were met by “a large panel two men could handle with all 
connecting flanges cast thereon which could be anchored to the wall from inside the building 
without any exterior scaffolding and need only be bolted in place.”477 Installed on the building 
were 962 cast aluminum panels, with a dimension of 4’x7’ and “weighing a mere 162 pounds 
each.”478 Summarized Abramovitz, “The solution was simple. . . . The building was successful 
and functions well.”479 Following the UL test of a previous iteration, these panels, as 
prefabricated, mass-producible products conducive to selling, were subject to a UL test,480 and 
found to exceed the four-hour fire barrier test as was the requirement for most city building 
codes — the market Alcoa aimed to penetrate for aluminum cladding. 
 
Harrison & Abramovitz as a vector to the marketing of aluminum cladding 
The architects brought to the collaboration not only their research and design expertise, 
both functional and aesthetic, but also knowledge of the architectural process and important 
social and professional connections to advertising mediums and potential clients. Harrison & 
Abramovitz became a vector of aluminum cladding development for Alcoa, by which the firm 
gained commissions in which they specified aluminum cladding derived from Alcoa’s smelters. 
In addition to functional characteristics, the architecture firm and Alcoa had aesthetic 
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requirements. Abramovitz said that the aluminum panels provided “limitless possibilities for 
aesthetic treatment.”481 Architecture journals, always keen to report the activities of well-known 
architects, but also keen on reporting new developments in building technology, wrote articles 
bringing the “Davenport Story” to the broader community of architects and builders. Photos of 
the finished building commissioned by Harrison & Abramovitz appeared in an Architectural 
Forum article in 1949 in which the title of the article cast the project in aesthetic terms: “New 
ALCOA administration building at the Davenport plant is a gleaming package of the many 
mature uses of this metal in building.”482 The article described the technical and functional 
details of the panels as well as the aesthetic qualities: “These cast panels were ball-burnished, 
then the protruding faces were highlighted on a polishing belt, so when the recessed portions do 
weather to a darker tone, the outstanding strips will be in some contrast.”483 An attractive 
aesthetic was important to Alcoa as a benefit of aluminum, reflected in the company’s publicity 
statement about the wall, describing the panels as “a highly decorative, curtain wall.”484 As with 
many publications that covered Alcoa, the company purchased reprint and distribution rights to 
the article. Combined with public releases by the Public Relations Department, in which the 
project was promoted as a “new and revolutionary type of aluminum curtain wall construction 
for office and institutional buildings,”485 publicity about the building was spread to a wider 
audience. 
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Both the architect and Alcoa benefitted from the publicity. Yet exactly who devised the 
wall was portrayed in different terms. Alcoa’s direct publicity declared it was a project 
“Developed by Alcoa in collaboration with leading architects and builders,”486 while 
Architectural Forum placed design agency squarely with the architect, declaring, “This wall is 
Harrison & Abramovitz’s venture into prophecy.” The prophecy that Harrison & Abramovitz 
were hired by Alcoa to fulfill was the use of aluminum cladding on high-rise office towers, 
“hailed as the forerunner of a new and economical building trend,”487 as promoted by Alcoa, 
hoping for an outlet to sell aluminum measured in tons. As the Davenport project was nearing 
completion, Alcoa began publicizing its collaboration with architects on the production of 
aluminum cladding. A 1948 advertisement frames the introduction of Alcoa’s Wall Panels in 
terms of aesthetics and economy: “Now you can improve appearance and reduce construction 
costs…”488 A 1949 advertisement in Architectural record states, “It (an illustrated aluminum 
wall) was designed with the assistance of one of America’s leading architects.”489  Alcoa 
portrayed this design collaboration as their research project: “This is one of many Alcoa research 
projects now under way in the building field.”490 As far as Max Abramovitz was concerned, 
however, Alcoa approached his firm to do the research: “But with the end of World War II we 
were asked to make a study of the potential of metal buildings by the Aluminum Company of 
America.”491 Abramovitz explained in 1955 at the metal curtain walls conference why he was 
open to engaging in collaborative research with manufacturers: “The architect has been an ally in 
this research because he cannot shut his eyes to the world around him. We are all different. We 
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do the kinds of things we do because we enjoy them. Some of us like to build, some like to do 
new things, and some of us like to express our own personalities. I think the architect in this 
picture is probably just another egoists (sic) who wants to express himself in some satisfying 
way.”492 Abramovitz was an advocate for the influence of the architect over the increasing 
standardization of architectural components. He was well aware of the fabrication processes that 
produced standardized components and the debate at the symposium about the prohibitive cost of 
producing custom dies to stamp out panels on smaller jobs, while larger jobs, because of the 
number of panels and the amount of aluminum used, found the manufacture of metal panels 
more affordable. But he was also optimistic that the architect could influence the manufacturers: 
“I think there is opportunity here for someone to give those companies a shaking up so that we 
can get more than we have today. We architects will always be looking for something better and 
more attractive with which we can do our work.”493  Neither Alcoa nor Harrison & Abramovitz 
exhibited any skirmishes over research territory. The casting of research in different manners 
without conflict over territory by both sides reveals how both benefitted from the relationship. 
 
Aluminum cladding conceived as a linear evolution 
Alcoa’s connection to the architects bore fruit when Harrison leveraged his social and 
professional connections to the Rockefeller family, who bequeathed the land to New York City 
upon which the headquarters for the United Nations Secretariat (1948-52) would be built. Max 
Abramovitz described the UN building as constituent with a linear evolution of the aluminum 
curtain wall, in which, as a collaborator with Alcoa, “they wanted us to do a compatible solution 
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with less metal,”494 exploring how aluminum could be deployed in the more popular glass and 
metal-frame curtain wall. Abramovitz described the discoveries made on the Davenport project 
informed the curtain wall of the UN building: “We used some of our previous knowledge — (1) 
we minimized scaffolding and worked from inside the steel skeleton, (2) we pushed the size of 
the panel,” as he described, to span from floor to floor, rather than as a wall-spandrel, as it had 
been deployed in Davenport. Once again, speed was stressed. Abramovitz wrote, “Speed of 
erection was remarkable. We closed in the building 3 months ahead of schedule.”495  
 
Pushing further: The Alcoa Building and stamped-aluminum 
Alcoa soon found an outlet upon which to deploy the Davenport wall on the Bradford 
Hospital (1951), designed by Thomas K. Hendryx, transferring the wall assembly details that 
enabled fire resistance, but publicizing its selection by the hospital board “because of its modern 
beauty and easy maintenance.”496 This theme, aesthetics and economy, was intimately tied to 
aluminum as constituent to its properties in much of the widely distributed marketing materials 
in many domains by both Alcoa and Reynolds. Abramovitz described the linear evolution of 
aluminum cladding as moving to fulfill these two purposes. He first discussed economy: “Now, 
ALCOA came back to us and satisfied with their first experiment in a low office building, we 
were asked to push further in the panel construction field on a tall office building they were 
planning for their own use….This time we settled on the thin sheet and the stamping idea. This 
naturally received the encouragement of ALCOA for it would certainly be a more economical 
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use of the metal and this might lead to a more economical method of producing the final wall.”497 
He then described aesthetics: “We treated the aluminum for tone value, we shaped the stampings 
with an inverted pyramid pattern for strength and appearance…”498 It should be noted that 
aesthetics were often paired with functional outcomes in marketing material. Abramovitz 
certainly made the excuse for aesthetics in terms of function — the panels’ structural 
characteristics. 
While the Davenport building and the Bradford Hospital had employed cast aluminum 
panels, for purposes of aesthetics and economy, Alcoa and Harrison & Abramovitz sought use of 
stamped-aluminum sheets in the design for a new tower headquarters Alcoa planed for 
downtown Pittsburgh. Less aluminum would be consumed per panel, while covering the same 
amount of area. To develop the structural and tonal value, as with cast aluminum, engineering 
and technical expertise was led by Alcoa staff. The diamond pattern as it was called, but actually 
resembling an X shape, however, seems to have originated in the architect’s office. In an 
interview conducted by Victoria Newhouse, author of Wallace K. Harrison, Architect, Harrison 
explained that an architect of his office, Oscar Nitzchke had designed it. Interviewing Nitzchke, 
Newhouse writes, “Nitzchke recalled that the diamond design he developed for the Alcoa 
Building came from a drawing he had done while he was enrolled as a student at the Ecole des 
Beaux-Arts in the 1920s. It was to be executed in panels roughly six feet wide and twelve feet 
high (one floor), stamped from aluminum sheets one-eighth of an inch thick.”499 Explaining the 
pattern, Harrison & Abramovitz once again justified aesthetics in terms of functional needs: “The 
panels, anodized gray, are stamped with an inverted diamond pattern which gives them added 
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strength and also makes them self-cleaning. The pattern makes for a rich, textured wall, an 
overall visual effect which changes as the observer or the sun does.”500 
Who exactly designed what element of the overall panels seems to be lost in the 
collaborative mix of the architects and engineers assigned to the task by Alcoa. Yet, many 
collaborators had a hand in the development of the panel. While the architects designed the 
pattern, mindful of structural characteristics and applying to the panel previous knowledge 
gained from experience working with aluminum, Abramovitz wrote that Alcoa “developed”501 
the panel into mechanically stamped sheets.  
Harrison & Abramovitz were not the only collaborators with Alcoa in the development of 
the panels. Promotional material for the Alcoa Building explained that such panels, spanning 
from floor to floor as one stamped sheet, were larger than had been previously attempted. 
Alcoa’s “designers talked with production men” employed at the Pullman Standard Car 
Manufacturing Company, in Hammond, Indiana.502 Pullman developed customized equipment 
and produced prototypes. Alcoa summarizes, “Alcoa’s distinctive lightweight curtain wall was 
the result.”503 Another collaborator was the Stolle Corporation, of Sidney, Ohio. Added to the 
stamped panels was an electrochemical finish, to develop a protective, oxide coating over the 
surface. Added to this was a “silicone bearing alloy liner in the sheet itself,” combined with the 
electrochemical finish (anodizing) yielded the “tone value” as described by Abramovitz, or the 
                                                 
500 Description of significant firm projects, p. 10, folder 3, box 1, Abramovitz Architectural Records and Papers 
Collection.  
501 Abramovitz, “Of UN, Alcoa Bldg. and Davenport,” 9. 
502 Aluminum on the Skyline, 9. 
503 Ibid. 
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“permanently iridescent gray color,” in the words of Alcoa.504 Alcoa would later market this 
color as “Alcoa Architectural Gray 2020.”505 
Alcoa’s collaboration with Harrison & Abramovitz to design panels for the Alcoa tower 
led to standardization of design into a derivative panel that could be selected out of a catalog and 
which underpinned future designs by Harrison & Abramovitz. These architects went on to design 
several panels with the ornamental, creased-aluminum treatment. They envisioned the panels as a 
standardized component, where design creativity was boxed inside a particular panel, but the 
panel itself was one of hundreds to cloak a building.  
Probing deeply the development process of the Alcoa Building panels reveals that their 
distinctive appearance was undoubtedly the outcome of a collaborative effort. Design agency did 
not lie primarily with the architect. The standardized components that gained widespread use in 
the postwar period, as exemplified by the development of the panels on the Alcoa Building, were 
a result of transversal relationships entailing overlapping fields of expertise, indeterminate 
boundaries between disciplinary domains such as research and design, and often the input of 
multiple collaborators.  
The question of who designed panels is important because it challenges the conventional 
notion of authorship of a building. Certainly, the architect has historically taken the lead on 
building design in the twentieth century. Architects are often given wide latitude in setting the 
overall design scheme, and are sometimes given the opportunity to design details down to the 
furniture and doorknobs. But architects, in practice, widely select building systems, cladding 
systems, predefined finishes and colors out of a catalog.  
                                                 
504 Ibid. 
505 Architectural Achievements: Alcoa Building (Pittsburgh: Aluminum Company of America, 1954), folder 1, box 
126, Records of the Aluminum Company of America. 
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The marketing initiatives of aluminum producers and manufacturers were multifaceted, 
spanning from simple ads in magazines to more complex initiatives deploying salesmen and 
dealer networks. The collaboration between producers or manufacturers like Kawneer and Alcoa 
show that they were eager to publicize these collaborations as yet another marketing initiative. 
Examining the history of aluminum cladding shows that manufacturers and their design and 
development teams have had great influence on twentieth-century architecture and played a 
crucial role in the development of architectural modernism. 
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CHAPTER 4: MARKETING PROPERTIES AS ADVANTAGES 
 
 
Alcoa, Reynolds and Kawneer all believed that aluminum possessed immensely 
advantageous properties bestowing utility to the material, therefore granting it great profit 
potential. As companies responsible to stockholders, they were driven by capital accumulation. 
Within a context of capitalism, and, after World War II, an increasingly consumer-based 
economy in the United States, these companies marketed the properties of aluminum in terms 
resonant with a capitalism. “Lightweight,” as a declared property of aluminum, was for instance 
translated into a benefit: easier to handle, therefore cheaper and faster to erect as cladding. 
“Resistance to corrosion,” for example, was translated to longer-lasting, therefore, although more 
expensive than steel, cheaper over the long-term because it does not rust. The term used in the 
previous sentence — “although” — is important because aluminum did have disadvantages in 
the context of capitalism. Pound for pound it was more expensive than steel, often by a factor of 
ten, throughout much of the twentieth century. Aluminum also has the “disadvantage” of being 
gray — and only gray. Or, perhaps it was an advantage. Marketing and manufacturing 
manipulated the aesthetics of aluminum into an advantage in the context of a consumer-oriented, 
postwar society — sometimes by anodizing or painting color over the top of an aluminum 
surface, and sometimes by simply reframing gray-as-beautiful.  
Underpinning these company’s belief that aluminum had advantages was the belief that 
aluminum possessed agency, or the ability to “do.”506 Architects commenting on this new 
material available to them often took a mystical approach, claiming aluminum as holding an 
ability to “speak,” that it has a “spirit,” or “behaviors.” Alcoa, Reynolds and Kawneer, on the 
                                                 
506 Reynolds Aluminum and the People Who Make It, 2. As an example, Reynolds stated that aluminum held 
“potential applications” due to its inherent properties. Also see Scarlott, “The Bright Picture of Aluminum,” 5. 
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other hand, persistently articulated that aluminum possessed the ability to modernize — that 
through its very properties, it could modernize the commercial landscape at large. Underpinned 
by these beliefs, Alcoa, Reynolds and Kawneer devised marketing programs that promoted 
aluminum as modern, progressive and portending a great future, while characterizing the age 
from which aluminum emerged, and the material itself, as modern. 
 
The properties of aluminum 
When producers declared aluminum as lightweight, they understood it in relationship to 
other metals. By their measurements, steel was heavy, aluminum was light. Scholars and 
reporters writing about aluminum, and promotional materials explaining the properties of 
aluminum, working within the epistemological regimes of material science, have attempted to 
escape the value-judgement conundrum by describing it in terms of specific gravity. Aluminum 
has a specific gravity of 2.7. This becomes meaningful when understood in relationship with the 
specific gravity of steel, for instance, which is 7.8.507 One of the first descriptions of the metal 
was recorded by Frederick Wohler in 1845. While working at the University of Gottingen, he 
measured the aluminum he had succeeded in producing as, “big as pinheads.” He further 
described the metal as “light, stable in air, and can be melted with heat from a laboratory 
blowpipe.”508 
In literature published about aluminum or by aluminum producers, the metal is variously 
described most often using the terms “properties,” “qualities,” or “characteristics.” For instance, 
a 1938 report from the Statistical Department of a brokerage firm analyzing Alcoa used the word 
                                                 
507 For comparison, the specific gravtity of the following metals: 7.1 for zinc, 8.9 for copper, and 11.3 for lead. 
Bowley, Innovations in Building Materials, 308. 
508 Aluminum: How It’s Made and Where It’s Used, 9. 
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“properties,”509 while Reynolds conceived of aluminum having “qualities.”510 Walter Gropius 
also used this descriptor, saying the architect “should be made familiar also with the specific 
qualities of aluminum."511 Choosing a form of “characteristics,” combined with “properties,”  the 
US government explained that “aluminum is characterized by lightness, corrosion resistance, 
good thermal and electrical conductivity, good reflection of light and radiant energy, and 
nontoxicity, and by nonmagnetic and nonsparking properties.”512  
Other bodies of literature have described aluminum in terms of its microscopic 
configuration. In A History of Metallography, Cyril Stanley Smith describes metals in general as 
“polycrystalline in nature, that is, they consist of hosts of very tiny crystals packed together to fill 
space.” 513 An article in Review of Reviews examining the role of research in the aluminum 
industry explains the microscopic structure of aluminum in analogous terms, “Like virtually all 
metals, pure aluminum consists of a great mass of microscopic crystals matted together and 
interwoven like wool fibers in field or like the grains of minerals in granite.”514 Whether 
understood as crystals, or fibers or grains, through comparison with other metals or through the 
rhetorical device of analogy, aluminum was understood and communicated to readers in 
publications about aluminum always in relationship to a referent. Producers understood such 
referents as underlying a more-marketable construct — advantages. 
 
                                                 
509 Statistical Department, A Study of Aluminum and the Aluminum Industry, (New York: Shearson, Hammill & 
Co.), p. 7, folder 5, box 51, Records of the Aluminum Company of America. 
510 Reynolds Aluminum and the People Who Make, 2. 
511 Peter, Aluminum in Modern Architecture Volume I, 228. 
512 Materials Survey: Aluminum, VI-11. 
513 Cyril Stanley Smith, “Texture of Matter,” quoted in Bennett, Vibrant Matter, 58. Bennett understands the 
polycrystalline topology wherein “a metallic vitality…can be seen in the quivering of these free atoms at the edges 
between the grains of the polycrystalline edifice.” 
514 Free, “How Research Created the Aluminum Industry,” 5. 
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The claimed advantages of aluminum 
While Reynolds promoted aluminum as holding qualities, they also promoted aluminum 
as possessing a marketable condition which they called “advantages.” Reynolds understood the 
epistemology of aluminum in terms of layers.515 At the bottom was the material itself, locked 
away in the earth, simultaneously more abundant than any other metal, but inaccessible to man 
“throughout all the centuries.”516 After “scientists” isolated the metal from its position bound to 
the earth, the next layer of the epistemology, its “remarkable qualities” were revealed. These 
qualities were listed: Lightweight, strong, non-toxic, waterproof, resistant to corrosion, highly 
conductive and non-magnetic, malleable, and “permanent natural beauty.”517  
The next layer in the hierarchy consists of aluminum’s advantages. Here is where the 
material, formerly locked away in clay, meets “reality.” Aluminum held “potentials” and 
Reynold’s brought them forth: “The imagination and foresight of research teams at Reynolds and 
other companies have consistently turned potential application of aluminum into reality.” 
Emerging into reality, these “remarkable qualities” became advantages only when combined 
with “the drive, innovation and determination of men in the industry,” making “the mid-
Twentieth Century the ‘Age of Aluminum.’”518 The advantages of aluminum cladding were 
promoted as (1) Weight saving. (2) Floor space saving, because of thinner walls. (3) Speed of 
erection.519 
Finally, the top layer in the hierarchy is aluminum’s value. “It may be modern man’s 
most valuable metal.”520 Thus, from qualities, to advantages, to value, aluminum was understood 
                                                 
515 Reynolds Aluminum and the People Who Make It, 2. Reynolds employed the layer metaphor in the statement, 
“Behind these advantages lie the remarkable qualities of the metal itself.” 
516 Ibid. 
517 Ibid., 3. 
518 Ibid., 2. 
519 Peter, Aluminum in Modern Architecture ’58, 72. 
520 Reynolds Aluminum and the People Who Make It, 3. 
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as important, and valuable because it was useful in the context of capitalism, and especially, as 
Reynolds understood, “in the highly competitive world of consumer marketing,” the world of an 
expanding consumer-oriented economy in the postwar United States. 
 
Value derived from advantages in the context of capitalism 
Producers such as Reynolds understood that aluminum must be made appealing and that 
in the context of capitalism, such appeal rested on its perceived value. Value, as Georg Simmel 
has noted, is not an inherent property of objects, it is instead a judgement made about them.521 
Value was an idea they could attempt to portray, and they claimed aluminum had value in three 
main ways. They promoted aluminum in terms of (1) up-front cost relative to other competing 
materials and aluminum assemblages, such as aluminum cladding, (2) long term cost of 
aluminum cladding when accounting for other variables, (3) “intangible benefits,” such as 
aesthetics. The arguments they posed to support each of these value propositions were then 
aligned with ideologies producers held about the agentic capacity of aluminum.  
 
Value derived from short-term costs 
Producers, manufacturers as well as third parties asserted that aluminum could be, under 
given circumstances, advantageous in reducing immediate costs expended on the construction of 
a building. These are variously known as up-front costs or short-term costs. Arguments about the 
virtues of prefabrication entered into the calculus of the value perceived from costs immediately 
reduced in comparison with alternative modes of construction. Max Abramovitz defended 
prefabrication of metal wall panel systems, saying, “We will get more construction for our 
                                                 
521 Georg Simmel, The Philosophy of Money (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978), 73. 
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money,”522 while the US Government identified the conductivity of aluminum to being 
fabricated off-site as one if its virtues.523 Kawneer claimed to dominate the store front market 
because cheaper cost of components afforded by prefabrication and standardization was valued, 
“because architects and builders have discovered that our door gives them a quality installation at 
a lower cost.”524 Prefabrication also shifted some of the labor to other sites, or, being replaced by 
mechanical processes, eliminated it altogether, thus precluding payment of wage labor in those 
instances. Scaffolding was precluded in the Davenport wall and replicated as a process in all 
aluminum clad high rises following. Eliminating scaffolding meant eliminating the labor 
required for its erection and disassembly. In comparison with other metals such as steel, 
aluminum was also promoted by Reynolds as easily workable allowing ease of bending, neater 
sheet metal work, less wear on tools, and better operation in applications.525 all functions that 
were endorsed as labor-saving. Metal curtain walls were compared with masonry, pointing out 
the labor required by masons as a disadvantage. With metal curtain walls, "No time is lost 
because of cumbersome procedures, such as usually prevail in elevating heavy materials in small 
units. It is not necessary to allow time out for mortar to set; nor is it necessary to protect from 
freezing the metal and glass the gaskets and putty."526 
Another argument posed about its advantages centered on speed of erection. Industry 
promoters as well as architects and builders maintained metal curtain wall systems were faster to 
erect than other cladding systems, even on entire building façades.527 Promoting this speed was a 
                                                 
522 Metal Curtain Walls, 45. 
523 Materials Survey: Aluminum, VIII-9. 
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staple of promotional material in 1953: “Modern Miracle: New York Skyscraper Covered With 
Aluminum Skin in 6-1/2 Days.”528 This feat was dramatically surpassed in 1954: “Building 
Completely Sheathed With Aluminum Panels in 9-1/2 Hours”529 This speed was enacted by forty 
men, aided by the elimination of scaffolding, the use of a lifting system to raise each panel, and 
the attachment mechanisms devised for each prefabricated panel that allowed each panel to be 
bolted to the building frame. Alcoa summarized it thusly, “It was all possible because of Alcoa 
aluminum.”530 
In addition to speed, the relative light weight of aluminum in comparison with other 
materials such as steel, masonry walls or stone walls was promoted as an advantage. 
Advertisements and promotional brochures exclaimed the virtues of aluminum in place of an 
imagined alternative: “"If the Alcoa Building had used conventional construction, it would have 
weighed in at an additional 10,340 tons!"531 Reynolds echoed the assessment, explaining that 
because it is light, it cuts structural steel requirements by as much as 40 to 50 percent in 
comparison with heavier cladding systems that might put a heavier burden on the frame, thus 
necessitating larger steel members.532 Such weight savings was translated directly in to economic 
terms, as Bowley writes, “It is claimed, for instance, that the use of aluminum cladding instead of 
stone for the Laurentien Hotel in Montreal resulted in a saving of $30 thousand, owing to 
reduction in weight of the structure."533 
                                                 
528 “Modern Miracle.” Building referenced is the 99 Park Avenue Building (1954), New York, Emery Roth & Sons, 
architect. 
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530 Ibid., 5. 
531 Aluminum on the Skyline, 16. 
532 Peter, Aluminum in Modern Architecture Volume I, 136. 
533 Bowley, Innovations in Building Materials, 309. 
 
169 
 
It wasn’t just economic advantages that were admired, for architects saw potential for 
new design effects. Bruce Goff, Richard Neutra, Carl Koch and Welton Becket, in a series of 
interviews funded and facilitated by Reynolds, lauded the opportunities for expression afforded 
by the lightness of aluminum. They anticipated freedom from the burden of heavy materials. 
Neutra believed lightness was “descriptive of our endeavor in architecture,”534 echoed by Goff 
who said, “I think it is much the same difference between an elephant and a dragonfly where we 
think of architecture of the past being more of a weighty matter and today's as being light."535 
Welton Becket analyzed the virtues of aluminum in more ephemeral terms, stating that the 
elimination of weight “permits the architect to design with a more airy feeling and gives him an 
opportunity to vary building faces and spandrels."536 
 
Value based on long-term costs 
An economic reality confronted by producers was the relative expense of aluminum in 
comparison with alternatives, whether they be steel, wood or masonry. For this reason, producers 
were quick to focus less on the cost of aluminum, but more on how it yielded savings over time. 
They argued for its virtues, given enough time, by claiming it required less maintenance, and 
allowed more rental income because the exterior wall could be thinner. Each of these arguments 
were positioned relative to the economic conditions that set masonry, despite its weight 
disadvantage, and despite yielding a thicker wall, as the wall of cheaper initial cost than 
aluminum cladding. Wrote the author of a Reynolds-funded retrospective of aluminum 
architecture of the 1950s, “It is clear that all the…advantages…must express themselves in terms 
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of lower costs, in order to justify the application of these metal walls. The fact is, that at the 
present time metal curtain walls are costlier than masonry walls.”537 In response, producers 
promoted the lower maintenance costs of aluminum, no matter the material. In comparison with 
wood walls, Reynolds declared, “The first cost of the installation is the last cost…because 
aluminum requires no protective coating, it is fireproof, rustproof and impervious to rot, vermin 
and termites.”538 Reynolds and Alcoa put forth another argument which focused less on saving 
money, and more on making money. This was the prospect of increased rental income for a 
building owner who installs aluminum cladding, rather than masonry. Alcoa devised an equation 
to claim empirical proof of this prospect, providing an example:  
“I = (A).33x(P)400x(N)30x(R)$5.00 = $19,800.00 Additional rental income.”539 This 
was, of course, a hypothetical scenario, which was echoed in claims associated with a proposed 
apartment tower profiled in a 1930 Architectural Record article, “The First All-Metal Apartment 
Building,” which claimed, if it were built, aluminum sheathing would yield savings of “14% of 
the net rentable area” in comparison with brick walls.540 
 
Value based on aesthetics 
Aesthetic consideration was given, as a priority, to the diamond X pattern on panels 
cladding the Alcoa Building, where careful consideration was given to the resultant tone of gray: 
An “iridescent gray color”541 in which the oxidized surface contributes to the opinion of many 
                                                 
537 Peter, Aluminum in Modern Architecture ’58, 72. 
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architects, according to Alcoa, of being “one of the most beautiful” office buildings.542 Alcoa 
marketed this as a product: “Alcoa Architectural Gray 2020.”543 Paul Weidlinger, a contributing 
author in the Reynolds-sponsored Aluminum in Modern Architecture ’58, maintained that the 
aesthetics of aluminum yield publicity value for the owner. If the building is attractive enough, 
employing aluminum, it can become a “silent salesman” for the owner — a representative selling 
the product or ideology of the owner or occupants, without uttering a word. Weidlinger wrote, 
“In the American economy a considerable dollar value is assigned to the intangible benefits 
which arise out of the favorable publicity gained by the pleasing and in a few instances 
aesthetically highly satisfactory appearance of these new types of construction.”544 Such 
intangible benefits in the form of aesthetics were a leading characteristic promoted by Alcoa, 
Reynolds and Kawneer. Elaborate marketing schemes were developed to promote the aesthetic 
qualities of aluminum and aluminum cladding products, even while they promoted the products 
as imminently modern. For these companies, aesthetic quality, even decorative treatment, were 
not at odds with modernism. Where gray was exposed, it was promoted as beautiful. Reynolds 
wrote that it held an “inherent beauty” with a “sheen-like surface texture…it is the metal 
itself.”545  In addition, anodizing and ceramic coatings allowed bright, vivid colors to be applied 
over the aluminum, which, after the process was understood to hold potential for mass-
production, Alcoa, Reynolds and Kawneer began at once to market the advantages of color. As 
an advantage, color was described as easy to apply, durable and beautiful.546 
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Beauty in particular was persistently hailed as an advantage in aluminum cladding 
applications. An aluminum modernism did not eschew ornamental treatment as is often claimed 
about postwar commercial modern architecture. Instead, “beauty” was promoted as an advantage 
of the metal in the way that it could attract customers and provide a public face for the merchant 
or corporation. Gabriel Esperdy, in her study of government funded “Main Street 
Modernization” programs during the 1930s, reveals the way store front renovation marketers 
adopted beauty regime n terminology to analogize the face of store fronts as a “face lift,” among 
other terms.547 These analogies were continued by marketers in the postwar period, revealing a 
modernism that emerged from Main Street that was marketed in aesthetic terms as an argument 
to sell aluminum – an appeal in which beauty was believed to be profitable. 
 
Ornament justified in terms of function 
Producers promoted aluminum as simultaneously modern and holding an aesthetic 
quality. Sometimes this aesthetic quality was explained as beauty, and sometimes it was 
explained as being carried by decoration or ornament. They promoted this confluence as a 
condition of aluminum screens, cladding, and store front products. However, aesthetic value in 
aluminum was consistently justified in terms of function. 
Any aesthetic value of aluminum screens was justified in terms of its potential to serve a 
function. The South Bay Bank was clad with a screen of aluminum, described as “decorative 
grilles” which “gives the building an air of lightness both during the day and at night.” The 
architect rationalized the decorative nature by asserting it allows “the imaginative control of 
illumination, both natural and artificial.”548 The Calcasieu Marine Bank, another building clad in 
                                                 
547 Esperdy “Modernizing Main Street: Everyday Architecture and the New Deal,” 362. 
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aluminum screen aimed for an aesthetic treatment and was justified, again, in terms of sun 
control, but an ancillary functional role was allowed for analogy: “"He chose gold anodized 
aluminum…because it would sparkle in the sunlight and bring to mind the associations of gold 
and silver with banking…By careful arrangement of the overhangs over the roof and use of 
porcelain aluminum panels, tinted glass and aluminum sunscreens, the sun is eliminated from all 
working areas during all working hours."549 The design jury for an R.S. Reynolds Memorial 
Award was careful to bracket praise for the ornamental quality of an award-winning building in 
terms of function. The jury commented that “aluminum was not used as an ornament ‘but as an 
intrinsic element of shelter and acoustic reinforcement.’”550  
 
Decorative joints and patterns  
When referring to joints or patterns on aluminum cladding, any claimed aesthetic value of 
aluminum was likewise consistently justified in terms of function. The promotional emphasis on 
the Alcoa Building, however, was placed more on its aesthetic qualities than functional qualities. 
The Alcoa Building diamond X pattern  was promoted as holding an aesthetic quality, but only 
in association with function. As Alcoa described it, “While providing some rigidity to the 
aluminum skin, the pyramid design was mainly specified for aesthetic reasons, since the panel, if 
desired, could have been fabricated in almost flat form to save six or more inches of wall 
thickness.”551 Alcoa didn’t only think of the patterns in aluminum in terms of a more neutral 
description of aesthetics, implied as open to interpretation. Alcoa understood aluminum as 
holding potential for a decorative quality. Describing the simple striated pattern on the 
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Davenport building, the panels were understood as part of a “highly decorative, curtain wall 
principle.”552 As designer, Abramovitz agreed, declaring “"this type of casting provides limitless 
possibilities for aesthetic treatment."553 In the same way Alcoa praised the decorative qualities of 
simple, striated aluminum, so too did Kawneer describe five variations on simple, linear patterns 
of extruded aluminum facing material. A magazine advertisement announced, “You can create 
new decorative effects with these new Kawneer interchangeable mouldings.”554 
Predictably, Max Abramovitz, as architect for the Alcoa Building, expressed admiration 
for decoration in service to the building joint. Commenting at the Metal Curtain Wall 
Proceedings, he stated, "I feel that the joint can and will and should, in many cases, become very 
decorative. I don't see why it isn't as much an element of decoration and expression as the 
deformation of a panel. It can do many things that we, ourselves, have made it do purposely. We 
have exaggerated the joint, played with it to catch light and shadow. It can give you horizontal, 
vertical, or variable patterns. It should not be ignored as a possible element for improving or 
enhancing the appearance of a building. It has many, many possibilities."555  
Kawneer also promoted aluminum in terms of aesthetics. Commenting on the San 
Francisco Equitable building, the panels, designed by W.B. Glynn and A.J. Loubet, successors to 
W.D. Peugh, architect, the building, “Making prominent use of stainless steel and aluminum,” 
provided “a refreshing dignity of design of design …. Offering the ultimate in aesthetic 
treatment.”556 
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Not all in attendance at the proceedings, however, agreed. Victor Gruen criticized 
patterns, which he defined as ornamentation: "We have recently witnessed the introduction of 
ornamentation into metal curtain walls. This happens usually when the desire for more rigidity of 
metal plate can be met by stamping the metal into patterns. The results are buildings which give 
the appearance that they suffer from a skin disease, with large pimples, or structures which 
resemble sardine cans. It is, as if the old pressed sheet metal ceiling of the 5 & 10 cent store were 
moved into a vertical position and applies to the outside of structures. This utilitarian approach 
will not lead to a revival of richer building surfaces. Only if enrichment is the result of creative 
process, only if it has a spiritual basis, only if it is organically conceived will it celebrate its 
rightful return.557  
 
Art as marketing medium for aluminum 
Aluminum was promoted as possessing inherent properties, which were marketed as 
advantages.558 One of these advantages were promoted as the aesthetic qualities of aluminum, 
often qualified as “beauty.”559 The aesthetic project of aluminum producers was a mode of 
controlling the image of aluminum in marketing material. One way in which aluminum 
producers marketed aluminum was by associating it with art. Art was associated with aluminum 
in advertising and marketing campaigns, to promote the aesthetic dimension of aluminum. Art 
was used to convey messages about corporate identity, and artists were commissioned to produce 
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176 
 
original works to be directly associated with aluminum products and works of architecture made 
with aluminum. Art was also conjoined with landscape, where landscapes were appropriated as 
marketing landscapes for aluminum. 
 
Associating art with aluminum and architecture at Reynolds headquarters 
With the opening of the Reynolds Executive Office Building (1958), Reynolds published 
a brochure that included references to the extensive art collection the executives had selected, 
starting soon after completion of the building with works such as “The Faun” by Picasso, along 
with “14 original paintings in (the) executive office collection.”560 The collection grew to 82 
painting with a fair-market value of 4.6 million (in 2016 dollars.) As an art assessors report from 
1990 stated, Picasso "Le Faune (1946)  "hangs in the private office of R.S. Reynolds, Jr., 
Chairman of the Board of the company;" Taureau I (Bull #1) by Charles Edouard Jeanneret Le 
Corbusier (1952) "hangs in the Board of Directors meeting room;” Homage to the Square: Star 
Blue, Josef Albers (1958) "hangs in the hallway near the entrance to the company's dining 
area."561 Although the most valuable works hung in the executive suite, (Picasso "Le Faun” was 
appraised for $844,000 in 2016 dollars) paintings were hung throughout the building from the 
Executive Board Room to the Employee Lobby. These works of art were not just expressions of 
personal taste. By hanging on the wall of a “silent salesman,” the Executive Office Building, 
they were sales tools, explicitly associated with aluminum in photographs, group tours, a 
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promotional brochure, and photographs including the paintings were included in messages to 
investors. 
The Reynolds Headquarters was described as, “an important sales tool,”562 and the 
paintings were a part of the building as a marketing platform. The executive offices favored 
modernist works, in alignment with the company’s project to market aluminum and its 
deployment in architecture as modern. Imagery of the paintings was replicated in brochures 
promoting the headquarters building.563 The modernist paintings formed the background to 
portraits of the executives that were widely distributed to shareholders in the company’s Annual 
Reports. Corbusier’s “Le Faune” (1946) framed Jos. H. McConnell, president,564 while in 
another portrait he sat with “Composition 3182” (1954) by Jean-Paul Riopelle to his immediate 
right.565 
 
Sculpture carries the message of aluminum to architecture 
Echoing the persistently promoted advantages of aluminum as beautiful and modern, 
Reynolds employed works of art as a vehicle to carry the message of beauty and modernity for 
aluminum, from 1957 to 1991 through an annual architecture award. When Reynolds 
inaugurated the R.S. Reynolds Memorial Award for architecture in 1957, each winner was to 
receive a $25,000 award and an original work of sculpture in aluminum. Each year from 1957 
until 1991, a different sculptor was selected to produce a new work. After promotional material 
was generated about the sculpture that visually paired the sculpture with the award-winning work 
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of aluminum architecture, it was gifted to the architect who won the corresponding year’s award. 
Promotional material photographed the sculpture and profiled the artist, often revealing his 
creative impulses and their relationship with the materiality of aluminum. When the architecture 
award was retired in 1991, Reynolds summarized the body of work proclaiming, “Each probes, 
in a unique and personal way, the meaning of the human spirit.”566 The sculptures often were 
photographed for the Annual Reports, such as “Cube” by Jarry Bertoia, (1962) for the cover of 
the 1965 report. 
The sculptors were invited to make statements for the promotional material and 
sometimes they were then appropriated by Reynolds to align with messages about the advantages 
of aluminum. The future was eluded to, and the advantageous properties of aluminum were 
hinted at by the statement of Theodore Roszak, the first sculptor, who said, “"We haven't really 
tapped the resources of aluminum…the potential of the metal has not yet been realized."567 
Reynolds aligned this statement with their goals of growth for the aluminum market. Explaining 
the sculptor’s work, Reynolds wrote, "The essence of Roszak's entire body of sculpture is that of 
transition and change, of metamorphosis as the only enduring reality."568 
 
Art to forecast the future for Alcoa 
Eager to control the image of aluminum, Alcoa instituted a three-year marketing initiative 
called Alcoa Forecast in 1956. The stated purpose was, “to project a new image for aluminum, 
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both to their colleagues and to the public at large.”569 “Colleagues” in this statement referred to 
the designers who were invited by Alcoa to craft a new, functional570 object. Alcoa believed a 
marketing initiative was necessary because “the average consumer and many designers were still 
likely to picture aluminum as a light, white metal that's good for pots and airplanes."571 Alcoa 
marshalled their enormous resources and spent 3 million dollars on a management program that 
was ""designed” from the concept of the product to its appearance in a full page ad in the nation's 
slickest magazines."572 
The Forecast initiative hired designers and artists to produce a range of designed objects 
and works of art, hoping to stimulate “original design in aluminum by making these great 
designers aware of the metal’s unique properties.” Most of the designed objects were home-
consumer focused, “in the fields of home planning and building, home furnishings, recreation, 
and children’s toys.” However, the company’s manager of market development, Fritz (F.J.) 
Close, who had been a key decision maker on the design of the Alcoa Tower and a salesman in 
the architectural products realm ever since pursuing Harrison to sell aluminum to the Rockefeller 
Center,573 hoped to find that the Forecast initiative would stimulate awareness of aluminum’s 
potential for aesthetic effect in architecture. He stated, “Emphasis of the designer’s work will be 
on the creations for comfortable living and aesthetic design.”574 
Designers commissioned to produce objects in the initiative were charged with 
conjoining aesthetics and function, in the same way aluminum building products were widely 
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marketed as embodying these two “advantages.” Ilonka Karasz produced a wall mosaic of 
aluminum. Similarly, decoration was often justified by producers if paired with a function, 
Karasz’s wall mosaic was foreseen as a “foil wall that will heat the home of tomorrow.”575 Isamu 
Noguchi devised an interlocking set of hexagonal tables which utilized the same color coating 
treatment Alcoa developed for architectural cladding applications, whereby each table unit could 
“be colored by anodizing or enameling…”576 
 
The Forecast initiative claims landscape as a marketing space 
The Forecast marketing initiative intersected with landscape architecture as well, through 
the commission of aluminum sculptures and landscape elements. Sculptor Keith Monroe 
designed “Reeds” to stand in a low pool of water, and Sculptor Robert B. Howard designed 
“Hydro-Gyro,” both at the International Business Machines Corporation, San Jose, California. 
Sculptor Gurdon Woods designed an aluminum sculpture, “Effervescence of Champaign,” a 67-
foot-tall sculpture to stand in a pool in front of the Paul Masson Champagne Cellars, Saratoga, 
California. A feature article in Alcoa Aluminum News-Letter exclaimed, “Aluminum is playing 
a starring role in traditionally appealing aspects of landscape design — water pools and ponds.” 
Always quick to pair function with aesthetics, the article continued, “Both practical and 
aesthetically pleasing, the metal appears in the form of fountains and sculptures.”577 
Alcoa pursued relationships with landscape architects as well to market the aesthetic and 
functional advantages of aluminum. Claiming landscape as a marketing space, Alcoa worked 
with Garrett Eckbo, who created “aluminum garden architecture designed for Alcoa from 
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standard warehouse stocks.” This garden appeared in an advertisement, ending with, “For a list 
of aluminum products in this garden, write to Aluminum Company of America, Pittsburgh, 
Pa.”578 Alcoa sought to stimulate new ideas and uses for aluminum by demonstrating its potential 
in many spheres, yet, chose specific scenarios to demonstrate potential applications.  A new 
screen device, designed by Herbert Bayer, was photographed in one ad as a wall element 
between interior spaces and also a wall element in the landscape, screening neighbors from a 
backyard pool. Screens, used widely in architectural applications, were being advertised to the 
domestic market, as the ad stated, “…where screens of aluminum as bright as a peacock will 
grace patio, pool, garden and store…enclose or divide space with the joyous beauty of an 
everlasting rainbow.”579 
 
Forecast series and architects 
The Forecast series, blending art, sculpture and landscape architecture, also sought to 
appeal directly to architects, inviting architects to design a structure for the series. Harrison & 
Abramovitz was commissioned by Alcoa to design a structure which the firm turned into an 
internal competition amongst its staff. The result was a “house” that resembled an “eight-point 
star.” Never to let an opportunity for promotion go to waste, Alcoa introduced the structure at the 
Macy’s store in a summer aluminum promotion utilizing a ¼ scale model. 580 Another small 
structure was designed by John Matthias. Called an “aluminum view box,” it was featured in a 
wooded setting, providing to the occupant views into the landscape, advertised as taking 
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advantage of the lightweight advantages of aluminum, “as portable as the tents of the Arabs.”581 
The Forecast series echoed wider associations between aluminum with the future, declaring, 
“Forecast: There’s a world of aluminum in the wonderful world of tomorrow.”582 
 
Producers alloy advantages with ideology 
Producers imagined aluminum in superlative terms, not as an ordinary metal, but as an 
extraordinary metal — a metal that possessed not only aesthetic qualities, but a host of 
characteristics that made it far superior to other metals and, furthermore, positioned the metal as 
uncannily belonging to a bright, prosperous future. This was a future that promoters believed 
aluminum could transport to the present, and this extraordinary ability was understood, and 
marketed, as inherent to the qualities of aluminum. The problem was, the metal was unknown to 
the wider world. Producers saw the potential and had the vision; if only the rest of the world 
could find out! Inherent to aluminum, they believed, were extraordinary abilities that, 
unactivated, were mere properties. But when activated, they became advantages and producers 
promoted aluminum as holding the agency to usher in the future, and modernize the world. 
Modernism, to the producers, was a marketing project.  
Alcoa, Reynolds and Kawneer held beliefs about aluminum in terms of its characteristics 
and its agency. Combined, these formed an ideology about aluminum that was deployed in 
marketing material. Through its characteristics, they argued, aluminum had the ability to 
modernize the landscape, move the world progressively forward and bring about a bright future. 
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The agency of aluminum 
Aluminum in the early to mid-twentieth century was understood by producers to hold 
agentic capacity, as though it held, as New Materialism scholar Jane Bennett has popularized, a 
“vital materiality.”583 Aluminum was said to be a “vital material;” it “needs of 
man…everything;” it has “unique behaviors,” and possesses a “sprightly spirit.” An article about 
the various dimensions of aluminum in The Westinghouse Engineer begins by stating, 
“Aluminum has spent most of its young life suffering from growing pains,” and continues a 
detailed reportage with the title, “What Aluminum Can Do.”584 Aluminum was written about and 
promoted as having a life of its own. In a publication funded by Reynolds, Buckminster Fuller 
was especially descriptive, stating, “…What you are then prone to look upon, when you ask me 
about aluminum, is its unique behaviors, to which there is no competition whatsoever.…Every 
element, even though it has unique behaviors, has those unique behaviors as part of a complex of 
behaviors, so there will also be associated behaviors. No one behavior can be separated out or 
isolated or really monopolized. Therefore you will always have to take its preferential behaviors 
along with its non-preferential behaviors."585  
Architects quoted in the Reynold’s funded publication were especially descriptive of 
aluminum as a quasi-living being. Echoing a common trope amongst architects — that one must 
let go of his or her own design will and follow what the site or material wants — architect Eliot 
Noyes said, “If you scrutinize the nature of the problem — the nature of the material — it 
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suggests ways of using it right. This is the area where the designer or architect has to be sensitive 
to these qualities and use it appropriately, and avoid the inappropriate uses."586 Likewise, 
architect Ralphael Soriano commented, “You must listen to the materials. You must always 
respect what the materials have to say.”587 These positions eluding to the life of aluminum were 
derived from a series of interviews commissioned by Reynolds to promote aluminum in the 
architectural, academic and scholarly communities. 
This life that aluminum was portrayed as having was described as though it was a young 
prodigy with great potential, destined for greatness and able to define the modern age.588 From 
“puny child to a strong young man” was the characterization given aluminum by an Alcoa 
Manager of Marketing Development at the 1955 Metal Curtain Walls conference held by the 
Building Research Institute.589 “It is a youthful metal,” said architect Donald Barthelme, “and it 
serves to set a sprightly spirit throughout the building.”590 As though it held  incipient potential, 
the book, Aluminum: How it’s Made and Where it’s Used explains the needs of aluminum: 
“"what does aluminum need of man? Everything." "it needs skilled geologists to track it 
down…it needs mining engineers to plan best…it needs ingenious mechanical engineers…it 
especially needs scientists and metallurgists to explore…it needs chemists…process 
engineers…industrial designers…product engineers…electrical engineers."591 This description 
suggests that to exercise its agency, aluminum needs interaction with humans.  
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Reynolds understood the agency of aluminum as rooted in its properties, as well as its 
very “nature,”592 but to realize its potential, and perhaps its destiny, it must be combined in force 
with men like the men of Reynolds: “The remarkable qualities of aluminum, and the drive, 
innovation and determination of men in the industry like R.S. Reynolds, Sr., founder of Reynolds 
Metals Company, have made the mid-Twentieth Century the “Age of Aluminum.”593 
Promoted as possessing agentic capacity, and also understood as being activated by 
humans, especially as it comes into being as an assemblage of components in a store front, for 
instance, aluminum was said to possess the capacity to boost sales for merchants, and modernize 
the commercial landscape. The 1936 Kawner Book of Store Fronts illustrated a truck arriving 
with “Kawneer Rustless Metal, captioned, “Materials arrive on the job,” followed by an 
illustration of a full aluminum-clad storefront, captioned, “The new front stimulates sales.”594 
The last sentence of the book leaves the reader with this message, “Decide now to stimulate your 
business with the most effective sales tool ever developed — the modern Kawneer Rustless 
Metal Store Front.”595 Yet, aluminum wasn’t promoted as being able to modernize by itself. For 
that, once again, it took human interaction with the “young” metal. 
 
Aluminum was promoted as modern 
Underlying the way aluminum was promoted as having the ability to modernize was its 
conception as a thoroughly modern material. The widely distributed two-volume Reynolds 
publication, Aluminum in Modern Architecture claimed it as a “modern metal,”596 because it was 
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derived of an electrolytic process developed only seventy years prior to publication (1886.) The 
very inclusion of a host of contemporary architects widely considered to practice modern 
architecture, such as Noyes, Fuller, and Yamasaki were an associative gesture with modernism. 
Reynolds believed the evidence of the modernity of aluminum was clear, but that interviews with 
modern architects would boost its credentials: “While this volume does provide incontrovertible 
evidence of the accelerated acceptance of aluminum as a material of modern building, it falls so 
short of demonstrating the full place of aluminum in modern architecture that the editors traveled 
some twelve thousand miles for the candid” interviews of important architects of the day.597 A 
video documentary about aluminum produced by Reynolds, Aluminum on the March, distributed 
Reynolds’ message about the modernity of aluminum to a wider audience, proclaiming, “In 
today's architecture, aluminum has become synonymous with modern design.”598 Reynolds 
leadership seemed not only to want to portray aluminum as modern, but to believe it themselves. 
R.S. Reynolds, Jr. positioned “aluminum as a basic fact in modern engineering and design.”599 
Alcoa’s proclamations and promotions suggested the producer believed aluminum was 
superior to the “old ways.” An Alcoa executive drew contrasts with the aluminum of today and 
the ways of the past, writing of their need to promote aluminum with the old guard, “…and 
expand our advertising and promotional efforts to achieve wider acceptance for this type of 
structure (aluminum curtain walls), particularly among the decision-making people who may 
have spent too many years in the gas light era.”600 “Traditional design limitation are no more,” 
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declared another Alcoa ad, making reference to a modern façade treatment.601 Myers describes 
Alcoa’s portrayal of aluminum as modern, writing that Alcoa’s ads, such as one claiming 
aluminum gave “full expression to the modern tempo” were an attempt to link the material with 
ideas associated with modernism, such as progressiveness and practicality.602 
 
Aluminum was promoted as progress 
Aluminum was portrayed as being both able to bring about progress, and as being a 
symbol of progress. Progress also was said to have characterized the aluminum industry. Its 
capacity to bring about progress was a function of the union between its properties and its 
activation by the producers. “Progress is being made more rapidly than at any other time in 
history,” exclaimed The Aluminum Association.603 Progress was implied by the analogy between 
aluminum and human development, as exemplified by the characterization of aluminum, and the 
metal wall cladding industry it was a part of, as moving “from puny child to a strong young 
man.”604 Users too believed aluminum could make progress. A flier distributed in the small 
Kansas town of Paola implored merchants to accept the complete cladding of every existing 
brick façade around the downtown square with colored aluminum by distributing a flier asking, 
“Progress? The horseless carriage and consumer are keeping up-to-date. Are we? The choice is 
yours.”605 
                                                 
601 Myers, “The Development of Mid-20th-Century American Metal-and-Glass Architecture in the Curtain Wall 
Style,” 148. 
602 Aluminum Company of America advertisement Architecture Forum, May 1936, p. 76, quoted in ibid., 160. 
603 Aluminum: How It’s Made and Where It’s Used, 29. 
604 Metal Curtain Walls, 162. 
605 Niles Chamber of Commerce, Progress? Aluminum façades file (Miami County Historical Museum, Paola, KS), 
unpaginated. 
 
188 
 
In addition to its capacity to bring about progress, aluminum was marketed as symbolic 
of progress. Alcoa captioned one aluminum-clad courthouse with the words, “…symbol of a 
progressive community,”606 while Reynolds Headquarters (), Richmond, Virginia, was explained 
as exemplifying progress: "The straight, clean lines of the exterior blend aluminum and glass to 
present a striking appearance that suggests efficiency and progress in an aesthetically pleasing 
way."607 Perhaps accustomed to the word, but also no doubt exposed to the association between 
progress and aluminum, the architecture journal Progressive Architecture reported on Pietro 
Belluschi’s 1939 design for a Northwest Airlines Ticket Office store front in Portland, Oregon, 
in which “a progressive image was needed,” which the aluminum cladding designed by Belluschi 
fulfilled.608 
 
The “Age of Aluminum” 
In 1939, Life Magazine wrote, “Light, strong and versatile, aluminum is by all odds the 
theme metal of the 20th Century.”609 Alcoa must have been pleased with the proclamation, 
because they included it in a promotional brochure produced about the “story” of aluminum. It 
also was a marketing theme they had advanced, and constituted a belief they held about the 
metal. Over and over, aluminum, and variously “light metals” was promoted as a metal for the 
age. One Alcoa publication was titled, “Aluminum, the twentieth century metal”610 R.S. 
Reynolds Jr. said “we are only on the threshold of the Age of Aluminum…”611 When those 
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words were uttered, it had apparently been the age of aluminum for quite some time, because 
magazines in the late nineteenth century had declared as such.612  
In addition to producers and magazines, even architects declared the age for aluminum: 
“…this relatively new material, if not about to herald an age that will be known by future 
generations by its metallurgical titles — and ranking in the history of the world with stone, iron, 
bronze, steel and concrete — has shown itself remarkably accommodating over a very wide field 
of building problems."613 Max Abramovitz summarized his beliefs about his involvement with 
aluminum at the Building Research Institute’s Metal Curtain Wall conference in 1955 , 
announcing, “…we are really in a Metal Age…”614 
Much of this talk about the age of aluminum was constituent to the framing of periods in 
time as a zeitgeist, or a “spirit of the age.”615 Reynolds believed in some form of the zeitgeist, 
writing, “Architecture expresses the way of life of an epoch in terms of materials and building 
methods….Similarly today, to be creative, we must express our way of life in terms of our 
advanced technology."616 For producers like Alcoa and Reynolds, linked to the present — this 
age of aluminum — was a vision that extended this age deep into the future. Reynolds wrote, 
"Certainly the age of light metals has only begun."617 There was a postwar optimism in the 
aluminum industry, bolstered by periods of record sales extending into the 1960s.618 
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Aluminum and the future 
Producers like Alcoa and Reynolds were optimistic about the future. They had much 
reason to be, with well-developed aluminum production capacity after the war and persistent 
periods of increasing sales. An Alcoa executive expressed this position, painting a picture of a 
world not only better for producers and consumers, but also better for America: "…our children's 
children are very likely going to look upon a far different type of America insofar as buildings 
are concerned, an America that will be a much more exciting place in which to live."619 Central 
to this vision of the future was an imagined position of aluminum as playing a leading role in 
effectuating this bright, shining future, with an Alcoa executive expressing that his company 
“dream(s) of the day when we have metalized the world…"620 Alcoa’s marketing strongly 
pushed this ideology that aluminum could bring about the future. The entire Alcoa Forecast 
marketing initiative “promises to give the world a glimpse of tomorrow.”621 
Kawneer promoted the belief that a radically improved future, brought about by 
aluminum and its assemblage in store front components, was merely a few years away, and with 
aluminum, the commercial sphere could bring the future to the present. It undertook a new 
marketing initiative in 1943 in preparation for the end of the war, hoping to shift immediately to 
the commercial market upon the end of hostilities. Part of the marketing initiative was a 
competition called the “Storefronts of Tomorrow” jointly administered by Pencil Points, with 
prominent architects serving as judges, such as Mies Van der Rohe and Morris Ketchum.622 The 
future was near.  
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Reynolds saw threads of the future in the present, as evidenced by the use of aluminum. 
Referencing the title of a book, Brave New World, Reynolds promoted the idea that it was 
researchers, letting “their imaginations roam” that, in conjunction with the properties of 
aluminum, would usher in a “Brave New (Aluminum) World.” Reynolds also promoted the idea 
that reflecting upon the many aluminum buildings profiled in their book series, Aluminum in 
Modern Architecture, a thread of the future existed in the present: “"The hundred and one 
buildings pictured on the preceding pages evidence an impressive start. As a matter of fact, they 
even provide some pretty clear clues to the architectural future.”623 
When Pietro Belluschi designed the Equitable Building in Portland, Oregon, (1946-48) 
he was no stranger to aluminum. Having previously designed aluminum cladding on the 
Northwest Airlines store front, engaged in discussions with Alcoa about aluminum upon learning 
of Harrison & Abramovitz’s unrealized New York Alcoa tower,624 and having proposed other 
aluminum-clad designs that never came to fruition,625 he believed aluminum was an important 
material for modern architecture. as Clausen reports, Belluschi held an “inner conviction” that 
the design of the building, clad in aluminum and glass, was about the future and a representative 
of the great characteristics of the modern era. Belluschi wrote that the design was 
“fundamentally an expression of faith in a great future for our civilization” reflecting a faith born 
out of a conviction that from our modern techniques, materials, and understanding of present-day 
architectural problems, we are able to create not only more useful buildings, but also a new kind 
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of beauty-a beauty which is not borrowed from the past but is our own-clean, strong, and 
straightforward."626 
These companies and architects portrayed aluminum as representative of the future, able 
to bring about the future…but also as the medium that brought the future to the present.627 Their 
marketing material often casts the present as moving so fast, that the future is not only right 
around the corner, it is practically here, now. Discussing the end of the war in a brochure titled, 
Aluminum…Its Story, Alcoa wrote, “all of a sudden, they were in the new age they had heard 
about. The Light Metal Age!”628 
All three manufacturers of aluminum cladding examined in this study associated 
aluminum with the future. “With an eye to the future,” wrote Alcoa, as a 1936 advertisement 
headline. “We haven’t really tapped the resources of aluminum,” said the first Reynolds 
Memorial Award sculptor, Theodore Roszak. “The potential of the metal has not yet been 
realized.” Kawneer titled an interwar marketing initiative “Storefronts of Tomorrow,” while 
Alcoa’s own marketing initiative was called “The Wonderful World of Tomorrow.” There was 
much “tomorrow-talk” in American culture before, during and after World War II. As Andrew 
Shankin notes in 194X: Architecture, Planning, and Consumer Culture on the American 
Homefront, such references to the future were, in part, bound up with a culture of planning – 
                                                 
626 Ibid., 117. 
627 Similarly to the producers’ belief that aluminum could bring the future to the present, architectural historian 
William Jordy maintains that when the early modernists of the 1920s denoted “the future” they actually meant now. 
“To the most important architects of the twenties, l'esprit nouveau was not in the future. Both buildings and 
propaganda proclaim that the future is now. The architect did not need to conjure the fantastic. He had only to open 
his eyes to the laconic facts of modern existence around him, as Le Corbusier admonished through three famous 
chapters of Vers une architecture. In Le Corbusier's phrase, 'These are things that move us.' They exist in our typical, 
everyday experience as techno- logical facts specifically pertinent to modern life. It is this urgent presentism of Le 
Corbusier's tract which makes it so much more exciting than the visionary futurism of Sant'Elia’s cities or of 
Mendelsohn's Observatory.” See William H. Jordy, “The Symbolic Essence of Modern European Architecture of the 
Twenties and Its Continuing Influence,” Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians 22, no. 3 (1963): 179-80. 
628 Aluminum:…Its Story, forward. 
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planning for postwar economic growth, the renewal of urban environments and planning as a 
practice for architects still underemployed from the depression years. Beyond associations with 
planning, the future had long been associated with modernism as an anticipation concerning the 
changes brought by industrialization, finding an overt voice, for example, in the “Futurists” art 
and architecture movement announced by the Manifesto of Futurism. (1909). The future was no 
stranger to modernism, and aluminum producers quickly seized upon the idea in marketing 
materials.  
In various reflections upon this association, the future has been written about as always 
promised, but never attained — a failure of aluminum to fulfill its promise. For instance, 
Business Week wrote in 1967 that aluminum had been “hailed as a metal of the future for 81 
years,” but according to the title of the article, “Metal of the Future is Getting There,” it still had 
not quite gotten there.629 Eric Shatzberg, writing about the image of aluminum, argues that the 
age of aluminum never came because statistics show that it lags in use behind other materials.630 
Statistically, this is true. Yet, for aluminum promoters, in claiming that aluminum was about the 
future, their argument never was actually about the future. Instead, promoters meant that 
aluminum could bring the future to the present — a virtual aluminum time machine. Promoters 
painted a picture of a prosperous future, out of the drudgery of the past, beyond the pain of 
World War II and previously, the Great Depression. Aluminum wasn’t about launching the buyer 
into the future, it was about bringing the future to the buyer in the here and now. This was a 
compelling, emotion laden argument to buyers who were impacted directly by war or its 
threatening menace. In every city, young men went off to war, never to return. Rations were 
imposed. Business was hampered. Consumption was reduced. Impact was felt far and wide. 
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Aluminum, it was implied, could liberate. Alcoa wrote, “Alcoa Aluminum is of today and for the 
future ... (it) gives full expression to the modern tempo.”631 Reflecting upon Belluschi’s claim 
that the aluminum-clad Equitable Building was “an expression of faith in a great future,” 
Belluschi conveyed the future as the present. 632  Kawneer’s “Storefronts of Tomorrow” implied 
the future, but upon the close of the war, promoted immediate implementation as a way of selling 
aluminum to street front merchants, modernizing the commercial landscape. 
The reciprocal of this claimed ability of aluminum to bring the future to the present was 
its ability to increase the sense of distance between the present and the past. This was the idea of 
progress that like the future, had been long associated with modernism. Promoters at Reynolds 
claimed that the new Reynolds Metals Company International Headquarters, (1955-1958, 
Gordon Bunshaft of Skidmore, Owings and Merrill) and even the company logo represented 
progress. The headquarters building “suggests efficiency and progress” and the logo “quickly 
became a familiar symbol of progress in aluminum … this spirit of progress remains a vital force 
at Reynolds …”633 The ideas that the future could be now and the past could be far away was 
compelling. It promised instant gratification — no need to wait. The future never had to arrive. 
Purchase aluminum and the prosperity of a world beyond war and of celebrated abundance was 
now. 
Superlatives about the position of aluminum as an age defining metal,634 as its ability to 
bring about a bright future and bring that idea of the future to the present,635 and about its agency 
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of Mid-20th-Century American Metal-and-Glass Architecture in the Curtain Wall Style,” 160. 
632 Pietro Belluschi, “Notes on the New Equitable Building,” typescript, January 10, 1946, in Meredith L. Clausen, 
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to effectuate these changes636 were the shared ideology of the aluminum industry and constituted 
leading messages in marketing initiatives undertaken by Alcoa, Reynolds and Kawneer to sell 
aluminum cladding in the twentieth century. Reynolds understood marketing as facilitating the 
proper expression of the age: "By educating its merchandisers as well as the public, the 
aluminum industry can speed up the simultaneous development of new methods and their proper 
expression."637 As Raymond Corey has asserted in The Development of Markets for New 
Materials, "a logical first step in 'market positioning' is the detailed listing of the new product's 
characteristics."638 
A persistently deployed message in marketing material combined the advantages of 
aluminum with the ideologies about aluminum previously discussed. These ideologies painted an 
optimistic view about the future, a future that could be had now and that promised prosperity for 
the businesses of those who bought aluminum, and also for their children and the nation. 
                                                 
636 Reynolds Aluminum and the People Who Make It, 2-3. 
637 Weidlinger,  Aluminum in Modern Architecture Volume II, 182. 
638 Corey, Development of Markets for New Materials, 245. 
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CHAPTER 5: MODERNISM AS A MARKETING PROJECT 
 
 
Alcoa, Reynolds and Kawneer understood aluminum as a new metal, for which its image 
must be controlled. Aluminum is a dynamic material, facilitating many uses, and indeed, it was 
used in many applications of varying success. Because aluminum was perceived as new, they 
sought to carefully craft its identity — to assign it an identity, because it was widely unknown. 
They also held fundamental beliefs about aluminum, including the belief that aluminum had a 
strong degree of agency that when combined with the expertise of research and development, 
had the ability to solve a great many of the pressing problems that producers articulated could be 
solved.  
As public companies, Alcoa, Reynolds and Kawneer were driven by capital 
accumulation, answerable to their shareholders. While the use of aluminum as architectural 
cladding emerged before World War II, production and manufacturing infrastructure, built with 
government subsidies, accelerated the production of aluminum cladding products after the war. 
These companies, driven by the potential of profit, set as a priority the turn again to commercial 
markets and crafted messages about aluminum which combined the claimed advantages, rooted 
in the characteristics of aluminum, with defined ideological advantages: The future: the agency 
of aluminum to provide immediate results by bringing the future to the present — the age of 
aluminum; Progress: the agency of aluminum to move the buyer from the dread of the 
depression and war to prosperity; Modernization: the agency of aluminum to boost sales and 
bring prosperity to business owners, their children and the nation.  
These messages were deployed by delivering them through communication mediums such as 
print, radio and television, and also by appropriating physical and intellectual capital, associating 
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these domains with their message. Architects and artists became conveyors of marketing through 
mutually beneficial arrangements, a cooperative model that, despite accusations of industrial 
monopoly, and despite fierce competition, actually permeated the marketing strategies of the 
industry. To sell, you must share. Producers shared with manufacturers, and they both openly 
shared their secrets of construction and assembly technique with architects, knowing full well 
competing producers and manufacturers were keeping watch.  
Buildings themselves became “silent salesmen,” whether they were the headquarters for 
the companies themselves, or were projects controlled by buyers of aluminum cladding, 
photographed and profiled by aluminum promoters through communications mediums as 
representative of the advantages yielded by aluminum. Buildings clad in aluminum were 
persistently hailed as modern. Art made from aluminum was hailed as modern. Architects 
designing with aluminum were hailed as modern. Labeled as modern, these domains constituted 
a modernity, marketed as modernism. For Alcoa, Reynolds and Kawneer, modernism was a 
marketing project that if successful, could lead to capital accumulation.  
This consumer economy forms the context for the spread of aluminum cladding. A 
popular understanding of consumer markets is that first the consumer develops a demand, a need 
or desire, and then a product developer responds with a solution. The economics of aluminum 
did not work this way. From its very beginning, marketing was required to convince buyers that 
aluminum was a worthy material for widespread use. 
 
Markets must be made 
Aluminum manufacturers were not alone in believing their role to be market makers. 
Historian David Hounshell has shown that concerning the earliest manufacturing enterprises, 
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including Singer Manufacturing Company and the McCormick Harvesting Machine Company, 
marketing more than their advanced production technology was a leading cause for their 
success.639 Daniel Pope, in The Making of Modern Advertising argues that it was manufacturers 
themselves which precipitated modern advertising.640 Reflecting on rising consumerism in the 
early twentieth century, the journalist Samuel Strauss (1870-1953), wrote in the Atlantic Monthly 
in 1924 about “consumptionism,” which he defined as “the science of compelling men to use 
more and more things.”641 As a subject of heavy marketing, aluminum cladding was much less a 
pull from buyers and much more a push into the market by promoters. Certainly, there had to be 
some demand for the product. Moreover, it has proven to be successful in many arenas of 
application. But aluminum producers backed up their belief that markets are made with robust 
marketing. A push into the market through marketing initiatives including publications, the 
appropriation of designers and of space itself as carriers of marketing messages shows that 
aluminum manufacturers played a dominant role in making architectural modernism.  
Two reasons aluminum was difficult to sell in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries was that it was unknown to most outside the aluminum-producing industry and it was 
perceived as expensive.642 For these reasons, producers believed they must engage in wide-
ranging, protracted and deliberate marketing to spread the word and induce consumption. Such 
an undertaking, combined with the expense of aluminum production, necessarily made the 
companies beholden to investors. Aluminum production and marketing was a capital-intensive 
                                                 
639 David A. Hounshell, From the American System to Mass Production, 1800-1932: The Development of 
Manufacturing Technology in The United States (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1983), 5. 
640 Daniel Pope, The Making of Modern Advertising (New York: Basic Books, 1983), 5. 
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642 A-B-C’s of Aluminum, 26. Reynolds Metals explains the reasons for the increasing spread of aluminum in the 
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has gone up; more people are becoming acquainted with the natural advantages of aluminum and are learning how 
to use it effectively.” 
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endeavor. The largest producers and manufacturers were well capitalized. The smaller ones, 
however, often were not able to market products they had developed with aluminum purchased 
from Alcoa or Reynolds. For this reason, the producers sometimes engaged in marketing on 
behalf of the whole industry, despite inadvertently advantaging competitors. It also should be 
noted that the aluminum products industry was, and is to this day, a vast collection of many 
markets. Most often, promotional efforts in these markets were separate marketing endeavors. 
However, in one instance, Reynolds undertook a design-as-marketing approach which aimed to 
produce residual benefits in the building products market by advertising, for instance, aluminum 
foil to housewives on television.  
These companies approached marketing as a mode teaching and inspiring. Teaching was 
directed to users of aluminum fabrications and end-products, such as technicians, builders and 
architects. Other marketing initiatives were directed towards inspiring users to believe the 
advantages of aluminum and purchase aluminum and assemblages for their building project. All 
of the marketing initiatives shared the foundational belief that aluminum was an exceptional 
metal, but even so, despite all its great advantages, it still required marketing, not only to spread 
the word, but also convince end-users it was superior to competing products. 
 
The unknown metal 
Henri St. Claire Deville, as the first man to produce quantities of aluminum which were 
promoted for commercial use in 1854,643 lamented the great difficulty in selling aluminum. He 
                                                 
643 For a more detailed description of Deville’s various experimental methods, see Wallace, Market Control in the 
Aluminum Industry, 505-6. Like others, Deville experimented with potassium and electrolysis techniques, but 
abandoned them due to the high cost in relation to the sodium technique. With the future development of the 
Dynamo, however, electrolytic techniques would come to supplant chemical processes. 
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began a chapter of his treatise, De L’Aluminum with these words: “Nothing is more difficult than 
to admit into the customs of life and introduce into the habits of men a new material, however 
great may be its utility.”644 Concomitant with this problem was the cost of the metal to produce, 
which Deville also understood as a barrier to acceptance: “As to the place aluminum may occupy 
in our daily life, that will depend on the public’s estimation of it and its commercial price….The 
introduction of a new metal into the usages of man’s life is an operation of extreme difficulty.”645 
While cost was understood as a barrier, DeVille also believed that even if the price to the buyer 
were low, there still might be difficulty in selling. Buyer’s might not believe it holds utility 
value, and just as importantly, buyers might have already formed opinions about it, made 
associations with it, that could prevent them from believing its utility value. Deville believed the 
image of aluminum as useful, but also accessible, was important. With a price set higher than 
gold, and Napoleon’s reported use of it for his important guests, it held potential to become 
understood as a precious metal. Wrote Deville, “At first aluminum was spoken of too highly in 
some publication which made it out to be a precious metal, but later these estimates have 
depreciated even to the point of considering it attackable by pure water.”646 Here is suggested the 
importance producers ascribed to controlling the image of aluminum. As a great unknown, it 
could be a marvel or an object of derision. 
Well into the late 1880’s aluminum was still not widely known as a potential building 
product.  A newspaper reporting on the first use of aluminum in an architectural application, the 
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cap of the Washington Monument (1884), called it a “strange metal.”647 Reflecting on the 
difficulty in selling aluminum in the early days of Alcoa, Arthur Vining Davis Jr., co-founder of 
Alcoa, said it “took a lot of selling to get anybody to use aluminum for anything.”648 Alcoa did 
engage in selling, necessitating the manufacture of end products, initially cooking utensils,649 in 
addition to continuing to develop its position as a leading producer on the world stage. Use of 
aluminum for the production of end products expanded, and was predicted, in an 1892 
Cosmopolitan Magazine article, “Aluminum — the metal of the future,” to “revolutionize the 
manufacture” of consumer products including field glasses, surgical instruments, cooking 
utensils and, “if aerial navigation ever attains practical success, these strong, light alloys will be 
the most important factors in solving the problem.”650 To spread the use of aluminum, producers 
believed they must engage the market directly, by selling. 
 
Return on investment urges marketing 
The need to forge a market for aluminum wasn’t only an innate desire for the enterprise 
of doing so, it was an activity demanded by investors who had provided the great sums of money 
necessary to fund the startup of industrial production. In the absence of a ready and willing 
buyer, producers sought to pay back investors and keep laborers employed. As Bertilorenzi 
noted, "Despite the necessity to run scale productions, there were no ready markets for this 
amount of metal. Furthermore, the electrolysis technology was (and is) very difficult to adapt to 
market conditions. When cells are stopped, new heavy investments are demanded before their re-
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starting. Consequently, the more rational choice in this industry is to reach a scale production 
and to keep it as much stable as possible."651 To maintain industrial scale production in a context 
of capitalism, a robust market of buyers was sought by producers. 
 
The necessity of desire 
Leaders of the aluminum industry did not have confidence that buyers would exercise 
extremes to select aluminum over a competing product, especially if it was a new metal that was 
less known than competing metals. The Aluminum Association, an American trade group 
established to represent the concerns of aluminum producers, exclaimed that to ameliorate 
ignorance of its advantages, aluminum must be marketed: "Despite all the good things that have 
been said about it here, aluminum still needs to be sold. It is new enough that many potential 
users still do not know how to handle it most profitably; and, frequently, it must be sold over the 
obstacles of customary usage, ingrained conservatism, or allegiance to older, more traditional 
materials."652 Reynolds envisioned their role, despite coming to the industry well after Alcoa was 
established, as a leader in creating demand. They sought to build a strong position in the postwar 
economy, and their publications were not reticent about declaring their hand in expanding the 
market for aluminum products. Reflecting on their role, Reynolds in 1960 wrote, “The 
underlying reason for the almost unbelievable acceptance of aluminum in the past two decades 
is, of course, the remarkable qualities of the light, bright metal. Just because aluminum has easy 
workability, light weight, strength, resistance to corrosion, a shiny surface and many other 
desirable qualities, however, is no guarantee it will be eagerly sought and put into use. People 
usually resist change. Someone must lead the way, create an awareness, and acceptance and a 
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203 
 
demand.”653 From the perspective of 1960, Reynolds believed it was they who were leaders in 
the aluminum industry in not merely responding to demand, but creating it. 
 
Masters of the market 
Exactly how much of the market for aluminum that Reynolds created, in comparison with 
the efforts of Alcoa and other enterprises inside and outside the aluminum industry, is disputable. 
Indeed, Reynolds did constitute a competitive force in the market, as a newly-minted competitor 
after World War II. Reynolds claimed to have influenced the reduction in price of aluminum, 
“30% below prewar,”654 but they also claimed to have made the market robust: “For the 
enterprise of Reynolds made aluminum competitive and abundant…thereby turning a new base 
metal into business gold.”655 Reynolds was nothing if not aggressive. The logo of the upstart 
company featured a sword-bearing Saint George, England’s patron saint, patterned after 
Raphael’s famous “Saint George and the Dragon,” riding a horse and bearing a shield with the 
letter “R,” slashing at a dragon below the horse’s hooves.656 Reynold’s was known for its 
aggressive marketing campaigns, with an article in Industrial Marketing declaring, “The 
intensive marketing and merchandising program of Reynolds, Metals Co., whose spectacular rise 
as one of the leading producers of aluminum in an astonishingly short period has made it the talk 
of the nation,”657 who’s leader, R.S. Reynolds, had a “flair for the dramatic, and the inherent 
belief in advertising and promotion…”658 
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“Aluminum Markets are Made, Not Born,” declared an article in the April 1959 issue of 
Reynolds Review. Reynolds believed that the process entailed producers making “known what 
aluminum has to offer. Nobody else is going to do it for them.”659 This is not to say that 
Reynolds ignored the endeavor of discovering customer needs. Wrote Reynolds, “The very first 
step towards creating a new market is discovering and understanding the need of the potential 
customer.”660 This suggests that Reynolds imagined a consumer landscape wherein customers 
held needs, that Reynolds then discovered, and subsequently organized them into a “market.” 
Yet, Reynolds maintained they held a strong degree of influence over the customers in the 
market: “All of these markets have similar beginnings: the industry planted and cultivated the 
idea that aluminum could satisfy a particular need better than the material which had been 
traditionally used for that purpose. Trace any major use of aluminum back to its birth and it 
becomes clear that there is no “chicken and egg” riddle about who came first, seller or buyer. 
The seller came first in almost every case and by a very wide margin.” Reynolds asserted it is 
clear that, despite beliefs that markets merely respond to customers, instead, they were in 
control; they made the market; they understood themselves as, in effect, masters over the 
consumer landscape of aluminum. 
Reynolds beliefs were in good company, as the wider sphere of metals production held 
similar positions. Making markets was a conscious effort by other material producers too, and it 
was a slow process. As E. Raymond Corey writes, "to develop the markets for materials, the 
materials producer has found it necessary to undertake marketing programs of great breadth and 
complexity at two market levels. He has had to work extensively with his immediate customers, 
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the end-product fabricators, to build an industry which will make and supply the new product to 
end users. In addition, he has had to undertake long-range promotional programs in the end-
product market to create demand for the product among consumers and industrial purchasers."661 
Within the aluminum industry itself, and in addition to Reynolds, this position held true. In 
Competition in the Aluminum Industry, Peck maintains, “products are not simply accepted on 
their merits, but must be merchandised aggressively."662 
Kawneer, as a manufacturer, not a producer, was in a more narrowly-defined market. 
They sold products primarily to the building industry, and — a legacy of war production — 
manufactured aluminum components for national defense. What they shared with producers, 
however, was the belief that markets were an entity they must create. When the company 
launched the K-47 line of aluminum store front components in 1946663 they did not forsee that it 
would find a ready market. Instead, a company biographer maintained, they believed “it would 
take some creative selling to get it going.”664 The launch of this new product was concurrent with 
a front end and a back end reformulation of selling at Kawnner. On the back end, the company 
reorganized their product lines, eliminating the nameplate of non-Kawneer-branded products 
(they had sold a product named after a former rival they had bought out, Zouri) and pitting 
multiple dealers who occupied a single city against each other, now all selling the K-47 line. On 
the front end, the company rolled out a unified marketing message in the postwar period, the 
“Machine for selling,” a nod to Le Corbusier’s “Machine for Living” in which Kawneer claimed 
the ability, through aluminum, to modernize the commercial landscape.665 
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Marketing through architectural competitions 
Although architectural competitions sponsored by Reynolds and Kawneer bestowed 
significant advantages to the architects who won, these competitions functioned as a mechanism 
to promote aluminum cladding to a wide audience of architects, builders, and potential buyers of 
aluminum cladding. Associating the name Kawneer or Reynolds with what was judged to be the 
best architecture or overseen by famous architects was a way of promoting aluminum cladding 
through a vector which held great respect. These competitions sought to control the image of 
aluminum, further solidifying its credentials as a modern material. Both Kawneer and Reynolds’ 
competitions yielded initiatives that claimed communities as a marketing landscape. 
Competitions held by Kawneer led to a company program to claim street fronts as a market for 
aluminum, while the Reynolds competition inspired a spin off to award significant community 
architecture. 
 
Kawneer competition as precursor to Main Street as a marketing landscape 
Corporate sponsored architecture competitions were held much earlier than those of 
Reynolds and Kawneer. In 1909 Brickbuilder held a terra cotta house competition, and the 
Pittsburgh Glass Institute in 1937 held a competition to spur innovative use of glass, just to name 
a few.666 The Kawneer company utilized competitions to directly develop new products which 
expanded to propositions to clad entire streetscapes in aluminum. Kawneer held a competition 
called the Store fronts of Tomorrow in 1943 in coordination with Pencil Points, the magazine 
that would help to spread the results of the competition to their audience. Kawneer explicitly 
stated it held “the purpose of keeping the name Kawneer before the profession, with an eye on 
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post-war work.” An eminent jury helped spread the publicity, too, consisting of Roland Wank, 
Morris Ketchum, Jr., (chairman), Samuel E. Lunden, Frederick Bigger, Mies Van Der Rohe, 
William Lescaze as professional advisor. This competition was titled, “Store Fronts of 
Tomorrow” and was singularly focused on the commercial sphere. This was a competition to 
envision what Kawneer said merchants wanted, “…they are anxious to secure a ‘functional 
architecture’ that will help them sell.”667  
As the end of the war approached, Kawneer anticipated the commencement once again of 
commercial aluminum cladding and store front products. The competition envisioned the store 
front of tomorrow, which Kawneer launched as “a machine for selling.” As is covered in more 
detail in the silent salesmen section, the “machine for selling” concept expanded to engulf entire 
street fronts. Kawneer launched “A Plan for Modernizing Main Street.” This plan sought to 
cover entire façades in aluminum, not one building at a time, but, “one block at a time.”668 This 
marketing campaign was bolstered by an ideology of planning that grew in influence after the 
war, and was argued as necessary because “group planning can solve many problems which are 
difficult to solve individually.”669 This was a marketing project that hoped to take the “store 
fronts of tomorrow” to a unified deployment on a community-wide scale. 
 
R.S. Reynolds Memorial Award 
In the same way Kawneer positioned the Store Fronts of Tomorrow competition as 
squarely a marketing initiative, so too did Reynolds envision an architectural competition, that 
was named in honor of the company founder who had recently passed away. In 1957, Reynolds 
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established the R.S. Reynolds Memorial Award to attempt to control the image of aluminum. 
Reflecting on the success of this endeavor, a Reynolds executive wrote in an internal company 
memo, “The image created by the Program for the Reynolds Organization is truly remarkable. 
Whenever the name ‘Reynolds’ is heard within the Architectural Profession it immediately 
indicates two things: First, aluminum. Second, the Reynolds Prize…”670 This memo reveals that 
company executives were first and foremost concerned with promoting the image of aluminum 
to the architectural community. To accomplish this, they established the largest monetary award 
for an architecture prize up to that point in history, an award of $25,000 in 1957, or an equivalent 
of approximately $214,000 in 2016 dollars. $25,000 was the price Reynolds was willing to pay 
for promotion in this capacity, on a yearly basis for the next thirty-four years, until the 
competition ceased in 1991. 
Outwardly, Reynolds was more altruistic in tone, stating that while the award was strictly 
for architecture that used aluminum, it was for the influence architecture could have on society. 
The flier distributed by the AIA, the administrator or the award, stated, “The Award is conferred 
annually on an architect who, in the judgement of his profession, has designed a significant work 
of architecture, in the creation of which aluminum has been an important contributing factor. 
Prime consideration is given to the creative value of the architect’s contribution to the use of 
aluminum, and its potential influence on the architecture of our times, rather than the size or type 
of structure.”671 
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Beauty and function: the persistent message for Reynolds 
Reflective of Reynolds persistent marketing message about the advantages of aluminum, 
the award was conferred for aesthetic quality and function: “The Award will be made annually to 
an architect who, in the judgement of his profession, has made a most significant contribution to 
the use of aluminum, aesthetically or structurally, in the building field.”672 The 1958 award was 
conferred for these reasons. The jury report stated, “We chose the Brussels World Fair 
Transportation Pavilion… esthetically because of its total conception and structurally because of 
its total dependence on aluminum as a chief construction material.”673 
Likewise, the second award was praised for its beauty and functional excellence. 
Yuncken, Freeman Brothers, Griffiths and Simpson of Melbourne designed the award-winning 
project, the Sidney Myer Music Bowl (1959). The AIA said of the project, “The Music Bowl is 
acoustically perfect and it is beautiful.” The jury was careful to couch its praise of beauty in 
terms of function, however. The jury emphasized, “aluminum was not used as an ornament ‘but 
as an intrinsic element of shelter and acoustic reinforcement.”674 While this assertion followed 
the popular “form follows function” trope, it also aligned with the marketing message so often 
repeated by Reynolds as constituent advantages of aluminum — its qualities making it eminently 
functional such as its light weight characteristics, and its “natural” beauty.675 
 
 
 
                                                 
672 Ibid. 
673 American Institute of Architects, News Release, May 20, 1958, p. 1, ibid. 
674 Ibid., 2. 
675 Reynolds Aluminum and the People Who Make It,  2. Reynolds denoted aluminum as possessing “permanent 
natural beauty.” 
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Critique of standardization 
For several years, the prize was awarded to architects, but none of them were American. 
This worried Reynolds and the AIA. Various theories were promoted as to why, but the leading 
theory was that Americans were ever prevented by overly restrictive building codes and 
regulations — conditions which, according to this belief, the Europeans and Australians were not 
subject to. Another theory put forth was that there was too much standardization of architectural 
components in the US, a condition Reynolds and manufacturers to whom they supplied 
aluminum must not have been happy to hear. Walter Gropius was a champion of these 
arguments. The jury he led stated, “the Jury assumes that the lack of imaginative use and 
sensitive detail in some U.S. entries may reflect the ready availability of standard and pre-
engineered building components in the United States and the restraints imposed by U.S. building 
codes and insurance requirements.”676 
In response, Reynolds established in 1961 the Reynolds Aluminum Prize for 
Architectural Students “to encourage creativity and inventiveness in architectural design, and to 
stimulate the interest of America’s future architects in the design potential of aluminum.”677 This 
prize was hoped to yield designs of a less standardized and less restrained configuration. While 
Reynolds played a role in standardization, here it found an opportunity to market aluminum as 
not only conducive to standardized production, but also, because of its “natural” properties, and 
its very abilities, could be combined with the creative agency of students who are not restricted 
by building codes and standardized components. 
 
                                                 
676 First Annual Reynolds Aluminum Prize for Architectural Students 1961 (New York: The American Institute of 
Architects), p. 3, folder 26, Reynolds Metals Company Collection, series 1.1. 
677 Ibid., 1. 
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The Silent Salesmen 
With arguments based on the instrumentality and image of aluminum, promoters built a 
message that aluminum could bring prosperity through progress and a future orientation. 
Aluminum was marketed as modernism. The way it was claimed to bring prosperity, however, 
was its ability to modernize old buildings or commercial landscapes, or create a condition of 
modernity for a new building. A building had modernized, or was modern, when it was efficient 
as a “machine for selling,” in the words of Kawneer, or could produce profit for the owner.678 
Sometimes, however, promoters claimed for aluminum a role in societal improvement. Yet, 
behind claims to improve society lay the corporate profit and growth project. These two projects, 
profit and social good were not understood as contradictory. Instead, it was through profit and 
growth that social good was believed to be enacted. 
Two main building typologies form the main subjects of study. These are the office 
building and the commercial store front. The office building is studied as new construction and 
the store front is studied as a renovation, or the more often-used term, revitalization. In each case 
aluminum was promoted as advantaging the buyer. Yet, the manufacturer also hoped to be 
advantaged. Promoters worked to define aluminum as an advertisement for aluminum itself. As 
will be explored in more detail, the efforts of Kawneer in their hometown of Niles, Michigan, 
shows that Kawneer aimed to modernize the landscape and simultaneously define a marketing 
landscape for their own products. Niles was the test, and the company hoped to replicate 
aluminum landscapes along street fronts all across the country. Building upon research by 
Gabrielle Esperdy, who examines the role of manufacturers of structural glass in the production 
of 1930s store fronts as a “fully-realized, everyday modernism,”679 this dissertation continues the 
                                                 
678 Machines for Selling: Modern Store Designs by Kawneer. 
679 Esperdy, “Modernizing Main Street: Everyday Architecture and the New Deal,” 12. 
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focus on this domain into the postwar period through Kawneer and aluminum, bolstering the 
argument that architectural modernism was not just a European import, a notion popularized by 
interpreters of the 1932 MOMA exhibition, Modern Architecture: International Exhibition. 
Extending this argument further, I maintain that the modernism of small town Main Streets was 
influential in the development of postwar, commercial modernism on high rises, countering the 
notion that a stylistic modernism merely trickled down from the architectural elite, finding its 
way to the backwaters of America. This is not to deny the influence of stylistic modernism, as 
the aluminum cladding in Niles should be understood in part as an emulation of dominant forms. 
However, what manufacturers learned about the use of aluminum and buyers’ acceptance of it 
was not specific to conceptions of “high” or “low.” They sought to sell aluminum cladding and 
framing components anywhere it could make a sale, from the small town to the big city. 
Accordingly, manufacturers were a vector of modernism as an agent independent of, but often 
entangled with architects and other practitioners of modernism. 
The second building type studied herein, the office building, was also the intended target 
for promoters of aluminum. The Alcoa Building (1953) will be analyzed because it stands as an 
exemplar of aluminum cladding with multiple uses of aluminum inside and outside. The 
implementation of cladding on this building, however, was informed by a purposeful effort of 
research and design by Alcoa in collaboration with the architecture firm Harrison & Abramovitz. 
Having worked with Alcoa beginning with the Rockefeller Center Building (1930-39) through 
Wallace Harrison, the firm had subsequently been hired soon after the war to aid in developing 
an aluminum cladding system for a precursor project, the Davenport Works factory 
Administration Building (1949). What was learned on this “pilot project,” as Alcoa termed it, 
was implemented on many other projects in the ensuing years.  
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Alcoa collaborated with Harrison & Abramovitz on several high rise towers for which the 
architects took the lead on the design of ornamental, patterned aluminum panels in the shape of 
stars or diamonds. Consonant with aluminum manufacturers’ promotion of aluminum as 
beautiful, these ornamental patterns did not shy away from purposeful aesthetic treatment. Yet, 
always accompanying a justification for ornamentation was function. The diamond shape was 
justified as an ameliorative to “oil canning,” wherein a flat sheet of metal warps in the sun, 
bulging like an oil can in the heat and ever so slightly changing shape in cooler temperatures. An 
aluminum panel creased into a pattern could minimize this effect. Modernism is often equated 
with absence of ornamentation, but these panels show that postwar architectural modernism was 
not monolithic in rejection of ornamentation.  
Three buildings examined in this study were overtly promoted as advertising mediums. 
These are the Alcoa Building, The Reynolds Metals Executive Office Building and the Reynolds 
Metals Great Lakes Regional Sales Office. In the same way that Kawneer sought to employ 
aluminum as part of a “machine for selling,” these buildings were “silent salesmen” for 
aluminum. They were modernism as a marketing project. All three employed aluminum 
throughout, from furniture to mechanical equipment to the visible face, the aluminum cladding. 
The cladding was the element most visibly photographed and replicated in marketing material 
and magazine articles. This feedback loop was in service to selling aluminum. The buildings 
were advertisements for aluminum in overt and subtle ways, from feature articles in national 
magazines to small logos attached to the kick plate at the bottom of entry doors.  
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Alcoa announced their new Alcoa Building (1953) as, “Literally a thirty-story ‘showcase’ 
of aluminum construction innovations.”680 Reynolds described their new headquarters as “an 
aluminum showcase in a Virginia garden setting.”681 Kawneer described every store front 
designed according to their “Machines for Selling” criteria as a “silent salesman, day and 
night.”682 These buildings and commercial landscapes constituted spaces of marketing, and 
within this marketing apparatus, each were publicized as modern. The headquarters’ and sales 
offices, in bearing the names of their respective corporations — Alcoa, Reynolds or Kawneer, 
are the most overt sales agents, directly tied to visual and textual productions distributed to 
architects and potential customers of aluminum cladding and other aluminum architectural 
products.  
Other landscapes appropriated as marketed spaces are more covert. These are the 
thousands of store fronts manufactured by Kawneer across the country. Kawneer understood 
store fronts as playing a dual-agent salesman role. They are simultaneously sales agents for 
Kawneer, bearing labels, for instance, on door kick plates, impotent as marketing tools to all 
except those who might stoop down to notice. However, when these buildings are replicated in 
promotional brochures and distributed to potential customers, they become the silent salesmen 
Kawneer desired. The second sales agent in the dual-agent role played by store fronts is the 
marketing role Kawneer promoted that these aluminum-bearing store fronts could manifest a 
“silent salesman” for the merchant within. Kawneer marketed their aluminum store fronts as 
possessing the ability to convert the store into an efficient sales machine, often covering over old 
“outdated” façades. 
                                                 
680 Aluminum on the Skyline, 3. 
681 A Few Facts about This Building and Reynolds Metals Company, 3. 
682 Machines for Selling: Modern Store Designs by Kawneer. 
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Kawneer is notable because it used the entire downtown of its hometown, Niles, 
Michigan, as a commercial, marketing landscape for Kawneer products. Famous architects were 
asked to collaborate on store front designs in Niles, the street front façades were featured in 
promotional material, and finally much of the street front was clad in brown aluminum in 1972, 
later to be removed in the “Big Brown Take Down” in 2003. 
Not unlike the aluminum clad-street in Niles, a similar story unfolded in the small town 
of Paola, Kansas. In 1967, every façade facing the town square was clad in blue, red, green and 
yellow aluminum. Upon completion, the town newspaper declared that the town had finally 
“modernized. This section examines the notion of a building as a marketing medium for 
aluminum. After first examining the headquarters of Alcoa, Reynolds, and buildings related to 
these two through aluminum cladding design, Niles and Paola are explored as two cases of 
aluminum cladding whole commercial landscapes, revealing how space was appropriated for 
marketing aluminum. 
Any building, it is true, could be understood as a silent salesman, doing the marketing 
work for not only its owner but also the building component manufacturers whose products 
constitute the building. Trade magazines and websites commonly advertise buildings in 
association with various marketing promotions. The headquarters and sales offices of Alcoa and 
Reynolds, however, are notable for being designed specifically as images of modernity, 
employed as standing advertisements for aluminum. 
Architecture, harnessed as a marketing medium for building product manufacturers, 
gained publicity with their association with fairs and with the development of photographic 
reproduction in the late nineteenth century. For instance, Peter Behrens designed the 
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Delmenhorst Linoleum Pavilion (1906) as a promotional device,683 and Bruno Taut designed the 
Steel Pavilion (1913) at the Leipzig Fair and the Glass House at the Cologne Exposition of 1914 
for the German glass industry.684 One of the first multistory buildings to be enclosed with a glass 
curtain wall in the United States, the Higgens Armory Museum in Worcester, Massachusetts 
(1929-1930) was designed in part, as Wermeil shows, “to show that steel products could be 
beautiful, as well as functional.”685 A large, postwar example of building as marketing medium 
was the U.S. Steel Headquarters in Pittsburgh (1949-51) by Harrison & Abramovitz. This 
building was notable as a display of steel building products, including stainless steel metal facing 
and “15 miles of steel wainscot, washroom walls and toilet partitions, elevators and lobby to 
assure an impressive exposition of stainless and porcelain enameled steel in architecture.”686 
Harrison & Abramovitz had also been a favorite of Alcoa, having designed the Davenport 
Works Administration building (1949) in Davenport, Iowa as a “pilot” skyscraper for an as-yet 
to be named future exercise in aluminum, the Alcoa Building (1953). Alcoa hired Harrison & 
Abramovitz again for this exercise in aluminum as its headquarters in Pittsburgh, a “thirty story 
‘showcase’ of aluminum construction innovations.” The building was replete with aluminum, 
from the remarkable aluminum skin, to doors and window frames, ceiling tiles, ventilation 
carrying equipment, plumbing and furniture throughout. While the building was remarkable for 
its wide-ranging use of aluminum in all manner of applications, it also was remarkable for the 
way in which it was planned to be replicated across the country. Alcoa certainly hoped that 
buyers of aluminum building components would be inspired by individual components, such as 
                                                 
683 Massler, The World with the Silver Lining, 17. 
684 Newhouse, Wallace K. Harrison, Architect, 146. See also William J. R. Curtis, Modern Architecture since 1900 
(London: Phaidon, 1996), p. 106, quoted in Massler, The World with the Silver Lining, 17. 
685 Wermiel, “Early Curtain-Wall Buildings and the Higgins Armory Museum in Massachusetts,” 43-44. 
686 Myers, “The Development of Mid-20th-Century American Metal-and-Glass Architecture in the Curtain Wall 
Style,” 99-100. 
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all aluminum light fixtures. Alcoa’s larger vision for the building, however, was as a prototype in 
full, a new type, an aluminum skyscraper. As Alcoa’s glossy publication about the building, 
Aluminum on the Skyline explained, “In these pages you have followed the planning and creation 
of an office building that is new, startling, and remarkably rich in promise for the future. This 
structure introduces concepts of design, engineering, and erection that may well change the 
architectural face of America in the next half-century.”687 The tower was hoped to begin a 
cascade of aluminum high rises that at best, made full use of aluminum inside and out, and at 
worst, replicated at least one of the categories of “design, engineering” or “erection” in future 
buildings. 
The cladding, as the most visible constituent of the building, was the element that most 
readily contributed to the tower as the “silent salesman.” It was easily photographed. It’s 
“diamond” pattern, (more readable as an X,) was replicated on the Aluminum on the Skyline 
brochure, and, perhaps for future researchers to discover possible links, the X pattern would 
become replicated in many designs for Alcoa products and design proposals, including even the 
company’s logo.  As previously explained, the cladding was designed as a collaboration between 
Alcoa’s Research Laboratories, the Development Division and the Engineering Divisions, and 
the architecture firm of Harrison & Abramovitz. Fulfilling one of Alcoa’s objectives to see the 
building replicate in concept, the fundamental configuration of this cladding as a stamped panel 
with a geometric pattern was employed on several other buildings in the 1950s.  
Alcoa understood the Alcoa Building as playing a formative role in the spread of 
aluminum cladding in use on buildings, despite the causality of many factors. In 1956, Alcoa 
printed an ad declaring success in the venture of replication. Illustrating a perspective of the 
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Alcoa Building, the ad was headlined, “A New Kind of Architecture Was Born Here”. The ad 
continued, “Several years ago, Alcoa dared a venture into architecture’s never-never 
land….Result: hundreds of aluminum-skinned buildings have been completed or are under 
construction…Everything we predicted for aluminum as a basic building material has come 
true…our architectural consultation service is at your disposal.”688 
Bolstering Alcoa’s claim that the Alcoa Building helped unleash a cascade of aluminum-
skinned buildings across the United States was an account of a building owner switching from 
masonry construction to aluminum for a planned high rise in New York. As Alcoa explains the 
conceptual transformation of the 99 Park Avenue building (1954) (architects Emery Roth & 
Sons), “…after seeing the new Alcoa Building and its gleaming aluminum curtain wall, the 
builders689 decided to switch to a similar construction….Instead of a conventionally erected 
masonry façade, the giant air-conditioned office building was swiftly enclosed with a curtain 
wall of about 1800 prefabricated, die-pressed aluminum wall and window panels.” The building 
was strikingly similar in appearance and the panels shared similar erection and installation 
techniques as those employed on the Alcoa Building. The panels on 99 Park Avenue modified 
the X pattern with a vertical fold, a sort of “upright and upside down” Y pattern merged together. 
The aesthetic finish replicated the Alcoa Building: “External metallic reflection has been 
mellowed by a gunmetal gray finish.”690 
Other factors undoubtedly figure into the causality of the rapid spread in the postwar 
period besides the “never-never land” effect of the Alcoa Building. Many influences have been 
                                                 
688 “A New Kind of Architecture was Born Here,” advertisement, 1956, “Advertisement, Alcoa, 1956,” exhibit 
display in the Senator John Heinz History Center, Records of the Aluminum Company of America.  
689 Architectural Achievements: 99 Park Avenue (Pittsburgh: Aluminum Company of America, 1954), folder 15, box 
126, ibid. The builders and owners were Tishman Realty & Construction Company. 
690 Ibid. 
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examined in this study, including the infrastructure available after the war, the entry of new 
competitors, government-mandated transfer of patented processes and newly exploited bauxite 
sources in the global south. Myers, author of the dissertation “The Development of Mid-20th-
Century American Metal-And-Glass Architecture in the Curtain Wall Style”, and a former Alcoa 
employee in the advertising department, discussed the postwar spread of aluminum cladding 
with an Alcoa executive during his tenure with Alcoa. He writes, “H.F. Johnson of Alcoa once 
estimated that those covered with his metal alone jumped from about 100 buildings in 1953 to 
over 1,000 by 1958.”691 Myers phrase, “his metal alone” leaves unclear the deployment 
configuration of aluminum construction. Was this in the form of stamped-aluminum cladding, or 
glass and aluminum frame curtain walls, or other configurations? Further details are not given. 
Glass and metal curtain walls were a ubiquitous deployment of the material throughout the 1950s 
and 1960s, and to a lesser degree, the stamped-aluminum curtain wall. 
Another example of the stamped-aluminum configuration sourced from Alcoa-produced 
aluminum was strikingly similar to the 99 Park Avenue building. 460 Park Avenue (1954), a 
building also built and commissioned by Tishman Realty & Construction, employed the same 
panels as the 99 Park Avenue building, and was lauded for being clad in 9-1/2 hours. Utilizing 
stamped-aluminum panels in a less strikingly all-over aluminum shell configuration is the Bell 
Telephone Building (1957),692 by Press Dowler and William Dowler, architects. The façade 
consists of stamped-aluminum panels that resemble previously developed techniques of utilizing 
aluminum at the spandrel only, yet are actually unified spandrel and window units like the 
preceding examples. 
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Domains of expertise and the spread of stamped-aluminum cladding: fabricators 
While the marketing mechanisms of Alcoa constituted one medium through which 
stamped-aluminum cladding spread, other mediums were the associated bodies of expertise 
involved in the design and construction of buildings. Fabricators who developed expertise 
working with one metal found transferrable that knowledge into aluminum, which quickly grew 
to overtake other metals such as iron, bronze and copper in architectural uses. General Bronze 
Corporation, Garden City, New York, despite its namesake, was the subcontractor for the 
aluminum panels on the Alcoa Building.693 As such, their job was to fabricate the panels by 
pressing the panels in “press dies,” thus forming a sheet of aluminum by shaping, cutting, and 
fitting to prescribed dimensions and specifications.694 Having developed this expertise, they were 
subsequently employed by the contractor to fabricate the panels on the 99 Park Avenue Building. 
General Bronze fabricated them on assembly lines, after which they were transported to the 
building site and “stacked on the floors they were to enclose.”695 Following this building, 
General Bronze fabricated the stamped-aluminum cladding for many buildings, including the 
261 Madison Avenue Building (1954) by architect Sylvan Bien,696 Alcoa’s own District Sales 
Office Building (1954), by Paul Schell, architect, the Porter Building in Pittsburgh (1958), by 
                                                 
693 “Aluminum: New ALCOA Administration Building at the Davenport Plant is a Gleaming Package of the Many 
Mature Uses of this Metal in Building.” General Bronze Corporation pivoted to embrace aluminum fabrication of 
end-products, including work on the Davenport Administration building, such as extruded aluminum sash for 
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694 The Flour City Ornamental Iron Company, advertisement, Architectural Record, April 1954. Although this 
process is outlined by Flour City Ornamental Iron Company, the procedure was the similarly undertaken General 
Bronze Corporation. 
695 Architectural Achievements: 99 Park Avenue. 
696 Architectural Achievements: 261 Madison Avenue (Pittsburgh: Aluminum Company of America, 1954), folder 3, 
box 126, Records of the Aluminum Company of America. 
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Harrison & Abramovitz, and the Fashion Institute of Technology (1959) by architects DeYoung, 
Moskowitz & Rosenberg.697 
A second fabricator that was hired to make stamped-aluminum panels was Flour City 
Ornamental Iron Company, Minneapolis, Minnesota. Founded as a blacksmith shop and foundry 
in 1893, and advertising itself as “artisans in all metals,”698 it embraced the production of 
aluminum components for World War II. Following expertise gained in such production, the 
company was hired as the subcontractor for two banks in Texas, clad in Alcoa-derived 
aluminum. The first was the Republic National Bank Building (1954), Dallas, Texas, by 
Harrison & Abramovitz. Flour City facilitated mass production of the stamped-aluminum: 
“Complete forming, preassembling and finishing were economically accomplished by mass 
production methods at the plant of the aluminum subcontractor.”699 A second bank was the 
Texas National Bank Building (1955), Houston, Texas, by architect Kenneth Franzheim. 
Employing a similar “upright and upside down” Y pattern as in earlier buildings such as 99 Park 
Avenue Building, these panels replicated the Alcoa Architectural Gray 2020 finish employed on 
the Alcoa Building. 
 
Domains of expertise and the spread of stamped-aluminum cladding: architects 
The architects of Harrison & Abramovitz had long intersected with Alcoa, beginning 
with Wallace Harrison’s work on the Rockefeller Center and continuing into the 1950s with their 
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contribution to the development of the stamped-aluminum curtain wall, as well as glass and 
aluminum curtain walls.700  
A significant commission won by Harrison & Abramovitz after the Alcoa Building was 
the Republic National Bank Building (not to be confused with the afore-mentioned Texas 
National Bank), Dallas, Texas, in collaboration with Gill & Harrell, Architects.701 With its 
striking, simultaneously concave and convex diamond pattern, described in superlatives by 
Alcoa as “one of the largest and most impressive aluminum-clad skyscrapers in the nation,”702 
the aluminum panels were promoted by Alcoa as simultaneously functional and decorative: 
“Panels were impressed with a  distinctive prismatic design which stiffens as well as decorates 
the sheet.”703 The aesthetics of the bank panels were justified in terms of function, in the same 
way the Alcoa Building panels were lauded for their functional characteristics and aesthetics: “A 
concave prismatic design stamped into each panel gives added strength as well as architectural 
interest through the light and shade patterns produced.” Max Abramovitz may have revealed his 
position concerning the negotiation between the architect’s design agency and the 
manufacturers’ desires for increased standardization when he co-authored704 an article for 
Architectural Record titled, “Fenestration.” The article states, “…the skyscraper, America’s 
distinctive contribution to architecture, is not now, if it ever was, a standardized package. For all 
of the inventiveness already poured into its progress, there is room still for a great deal of 
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cleverness, to fit that inventiveness to the changing needs of big business and its big and little 
people.”705 While Abramovitz embraced standardization, he also sought ways to exercise design 
agency, understanding standardization to both limit and enable design. Answering a question at 
the Metal Curtain Wall conference, he stated, “Well, I wouldn’t be content to be limited to 
standard designs… There will be a great number, I am sure, of standard designs developed that 
can be arranged with flexibility, with a great deal of creative energy, and that also will allow for 
cost improvement. There will be certain areas where you will have work done on a job basis."706 
Abramovitz believed that retooling was not cost prohibitive on large buildings such as the Alcoa 
Building and the Republic National Bank Building, and he also believed that he could exercise 
“a great deal of creative energy,” arranging standardized components to incorporate his design. 
He exercised this design in both aesthetic treatment and in the functional design of the 
components themselves. 
The panels on the Republic National Bank Building exemplify Abramovitz’s 
simultaneous embrace of standardization and creative agency. The panels won praise in 
Architectural Forum, with one “Professor Thrugg,” glowingly writing, “…a fine new aluminum 
curtain wall, the contribution of its architects, carrying forward a new kind of design exploration. 
It glitters handsomely in the sun far across the cotton lands, and on gray days depends on its 
repeat pattern of embossed squares, like a fancy waistcoat.”707 The panels were also praised for 
their “advance” ahead of the Alcoa Building in an Architectural Forum article: “Anodize 
aluminum panels that fit over fireproofed spandrel beams are more advanced than those used on 
the Alcoa Building. Like the Alcoa panels, they have a pattern impressed on them to increase 
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rigidity and prevent oil-canning. But where the Alcoa panels are simply sheets of 1/8” aluminum, 
the Republic panels are complete sections in themselves.” This article referred to the 1-1/2” 
approximate thickness of the exterior wall panels – a sandwich of a thin sheet of aluminum on 
the exterior onto which was bound 1-1/2” of rigid insulation, a wall advantaged by the building 
code of Dallas which precluded the backup wall required in other cities such as New York. 
These authors saw the Republic Bank Building as an antecedent to the Alcoa Building, just as 
Alcoa desired. Of course, the hundreds of aluminum and glass clad buildings that emerged in the 
1950s do not all fit into a neat, linear Alcoa-derived narrative because they were influenced by 
other architects, manufacturers and forces beyond Alcoa. But the perception of linear influence 
was important to Alcoa, because linear influence could be traced, in this case, back to a source 
— Alcoa aluminum. 
 
Aluminum cladding spurs competition with stainless steel 
While Alcoa envisioned a burgeoning market for aluminum cladding, the steel industry 
envisioned the same for stainless steel. Even though Harrison & Abramovitz had closely allied 
themselves with Alcoa, they still were, and behaved as, an independent entity. Harrison & 
Abramovitz carried expertise developed through collaboration with Alcoa into the field of 
stainless steel. As an architecture firm independent of Alcoa, they exercised freedom to jump 
independently between steel and aluminum. Although they were hired to collaborate on an 
aluminum wall at the Alcoa Davenport Administration Building (1949,) the firm carried out 
dozens of projects, some of which included commissions benefitting steel companies. The 525 
William Penn Place building (1951), occupied by the Mellon National Bank and the U.S. Steel 
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Corporation predated the aluminum-clad Alcoa Building (1953), followed several years later by 
the stainless steel-clad Socony-Mobile building (1956) in New York City. 
Overtures of cooperation were publicly on display between Alcoa and the steel industry 
in reference to the curtain wall market, but they also kept a keen watch on each other’s product 
development. At the Metal Curtain Wall conference, Alcoa acknowledged the qualities of 
stainless steel, but defended aluminum as ultimately superior. Said Frederick (Fritz) J. Close, 
Manager of Market Development for Alcoa, “Stainless steel is an excellent material. My meat 
and potatoes is aluminum. I think aluminum is a better material. Porcelain enamel on steel is an 
excellent product. I think porcelain enamel on aluminum is a better product.  I believe I could 
defend this on the merits of aluminum.” Perhaps to soften any emergence of a public quarrel, he 
followed up with, “Let's develop the market and we will all profit — of that I am sure. And let's 
stop quarrelling with our kin, or even our real competitors, and build that better mouse trap.”708 
Reynolds, for their part, also defended aluminum against stainless steel, asserting that despite 
widespread belief, it does in fact rust and aluminum is three times lighter.709 Aluminum also 
enjoyed a price advantage over stainless steel. Yet, the aluminum industry held some anxiety 
about competition with the steel industry. One Alcoa executive stated, “…and while we dream of 
the day when we have metalized the world insofar as construction is concerned, it would be folly 
for us not to realize that competitive materials are not going to stand by and watch us steal their 
market.710 Executives overseeing the development of stainless steel envisioned for it a greater 
role in architecture. They got their chance to develop a rival “silent salesman”  when stainless 
steel was selected as the exterior cladding on the Socony-Mobile Building (1956) by Harrison & 
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Abramovitz with John B. Peterkin,, celebrated by the Committee of Stainless Steel Producers of 
the American Iron and Steel Institute as “the largest metal-clad building in the world”711 
Executives in the steel industry wanted a showcase competitor to the aluminum-clad 
buildings built in New York and other cities.712 Their friendship with building developers in New 
York City gave them the chance. The firm Harrison & Abramovitz would facilitate the 
opportunity. As was often the case with the origin story of aluminum-clad high rises, the 
Socony-Mobil building began in design as a masonry-clad structure. However, as reported in 
Architectural Forum, Harrison & Abramovitz, upon hearing this, “instantly suggested a review 
of later advances in building materials even though brick was used as a low-cost material in 
setting a budget figure.”713 The building’s developer operated two buildings associated with the 
steel industry, maintaining contact and friendship with steel industry executives.714 As 
Architectural Forum reported, “He found that his friends in steel, alarmed by the amount of 
publicity that the aluminum industry had been getting through a succession of aluminum skin 
buildings, very much wanted this major building to have a steel skin and a showcase for the 
industry.” Adding to the unfolding drama, the article continued, “And what about the cost?” 
asked Harrison and Horr. Would not a stainless steel skin cost half again as much as brick? But 
the steel industry wanted the building, and cost was not going to prevent them from getting it. To 
meet the competition, they were willing to write off any price differential as the cost of 
promoting steel. 
                                                 
711 “More Facts and Figures about the Stainless Steel Skyscraper (New York: The Committee of Stainless Steel 
Producers, American Iron and Steel Institute, undated), p. 2, folder 96, Abramovitz Architectural Records and 
Papers Collection. 
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The design for the pattern on the stainless steel cladding was entrusted to Harrison & 
Abramovitz. Referencing the Alcoa building, the “steel people are hopeful that Harrison will 
define their material for curtain wall use as dramatically as he did in aluminum.”715 The firm 
produced “hundreds” of variations for the stamped pattern, narrowing down to five, and selecting 
the final to avoid any “horizontals with the soiling and streaking they would bring in New 
York.”716 As in aluminum applications, the decorative pattern was justified in terms of functional 
requirements: “This small pattern was developed from the limitations of the material and the 
available stamping equipment to overcome the blistering caused by the temperature-change 
expansion and contraction…”717 The Socony Mobil Oil Company occupied the largest portion of 
the building, the American Iron and Steel Institute took a floor,718 the New York Times placed a 
rendering of the building on a cover of a special report on “Manhattan’s Newest Landmark,”719 
and the steel industry got their “silent salesman.” 
 
Reynolds and the aluminum showcase in a Virginia garden 
While the Alcoa Building was designed as an advertisement for Alcoa in an urban 
setting, Reynolds chose a different context for their new headquarters — a verdant, open 
landscape at the edge of Richmond, Virginia. This contrast exemplified the differing strategies of 
the two showpieces. While Alcoa was a tower meant to be replicated, Reynolds’ headquarters 
was meant to be a elegant original. Both, however, were conceive as marketing mediums. The 
Reynolds Metals Company International Headquarters, (1955-1958) building was designed by 
                                                 
715 Ibid., 88. 
716 Ibid. 
717 Ibid., 93. 
718 The Socony Mobil Building (New York: Socony Mobil Oil Company, undated,) 12-13, folder 96, Abramovitz 
Architectural Records and Papers Collection.This document provides a floor occupancy diagram. 
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Gordon Bunshaft of Skidmore, Owings and Merrill and the landscape was designed by Charles 
F. Gillette. The site was chosen, in part, as a visible contrast with the glistening modernity of 
aluminum, setting the building apart in the landscape. Louise Mozingo, in Pastoral Capitalism: 
A History of Suburban Corporate Landscapes, reveals the way in which many corporations were 
attracted to the amenities of verdant settings. She cites General Foods, for instance, which urged 
employees to move “out of the city…and into the trees.” Reflecting on their new setting, they 
wrote, “[T]he move has brought many changes…like a chance to stroll on tree-lined paths at 
noon.”720 Unlike the many corporate headquarters profiled by Mozingo, in which corporations 
sought exodus from the city and the economic and social disadvantages they perceived, 
Reynolds’ selection of this pastoral landscape was based on adjacency to a small city which had 
been their home since 1938, and a desire to inspirationally demonstrate to customers the myriad 
uses of aluminum. R.S. Reynolds, Jr., defined the goals for the design, mandating modernism: 
“The building will be of the most modem type, utilizing aluminum buildings materials to the 
greatest extent possible. The company expects the building to constitute a showplace illustrating 
what can be done with aluminum in modern construction."721 It certainly made an impression 
with the architectural community, as it was selected as “the most significant structure built in 
Virginia since Thomas Jefferson completed the University of Virginia in 1832.”722 This was 
quite an endorsement, especially due to the esteemed jury, including architect Pietro Belluschi, 
Walter Creese, President of the Society of Architectural Historians, and Mies Vander Rohe, to 
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name a few.723 This was exactly the type of attention the producer hoped the building would 
generate. They wanted to capture the attention of building products consumers. Reynolds loved 
the attention. It likely stroked the ego of the founder, R.S. Reynolds, Sr., who began a color 
brochure publicizing the headquarters with a poem he wrote, including these lines, “We defy 
precedent. We prove the impossible. We are God’s answer to the commonplace. Unbroken, 
untamed, and unafraid.”724 Gordon Bunshaft was charged with incorporating aluminum into the 
building, visible from the exterior and interior. He interpreted aluminum-as-advertisement in a 
visually subtler way than did Harrison & Abramovitz for the Alcoa Building, with generous use 
of glass on the exterior instead of complete aluminum cladding. Gordon Bunshaft remarked on 
the restraint, “But aluminum is used only where appropriate,” while softening what could be 
interpreted, perhaps, as a tamed approach, with a nod to Reynolds’ desire to make the building 
an advertisement, “and all aluminum items used are available today to any builder.”725 
The design presented to Reynolds executives, when resultant as a building, was said to 
encapsulate what Reynolds described as the “most apt” description of the many tributes paid: 
“gracious and efficient.” This condition was understood as manifest from “broad use of 
aluminum, tasteful use of other materials, and a design that is functional and strikingly modern, 
yet not afraid to borrow from tradition.”726 A design “unafraid,” echoing R.S. Reynold’s poem. 
A design that borrows from tradition, or as R.S. Reynolds might say, defying “precedent.” If 
precedent was a gleaming, urban, aluminum tower, Reynolds went low, broad and pastoral. If 
precedent was asymmetry and alienating abstract-patterns, Reynolds embraced an “over-all 
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symmetry of design,” and the familiar, with “Southern tradition, in the Williamsburg brick 
floor.”727 While it harkened back to tradition, the building was simultaneously understood as 
representative of progress and unabashed modernism: “The straight, clean lines of the exterior 
blend aluminum and glass to present a striking appearance that suggest efficiency and progress in 
an aesthetically pleasing way.”728 
The Reynolds Executive Office Building, or EXO as it was called by the company, was 
not meant to be replicated, as was the spirit of the Alcoa Building. It was elegant, a “one-off,” 
unique and designed for its setting with harmonious reflecting pools and verdant lawns designed 
by local landscape architect Charles F. Gillette. Modern art by modern masters adorned the 
walls, the executives possessing a taste for original works by Picasso, Le Corbusier and Albers, 
three of the 14 original paintings in the executive office collection.729 Taking the opposite tack 
from Alcoa, it was meant to inspire through its originality with a clearly defined purpose. It was 
promoted as “more than a building. It is many things. To begin with, our new main office 
becomes an important sales tool. As a showcase of versatility, beauty and usefulness of 
aluminum, it offers specific applications of our products to our potential customers.”730 
 
Jewel on stilts: Reynolds Great Lakes Regional Sales Office 
The Reynolds Executive Office Building was designed to be unique and modern. These 
became mandates for a second showpiece of aluminum, yet to these requirements were added 
another. Rather than sit protected and isolated by a vast landscape, it was “designed to attract 
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maximum attention,”731 fishing for aluminum customers from Detroit’s population teeming with 
automobile company executives — each a potential customer leading to work in the growing and 
important automobile market. The Reynolds Great Lakes Regional Sales Office (1959) was 
designed by Minoru Yamasaki. Described as a “Jewel on Stilts” by the architect, it placed 
emphasis on aesthetics as a mode of marketing. Reynolds described its ornamental qualities 
through the analogy of a gem: “The Great Lakes Sales Region Headquarters Building,732 
designed to demonstrate the beauty and utility of aluminum, has been described as a modern 
architectural gem. The building, a sparkling example of Yamasaki's "architecture of delight", is a 
jewel on stilts, designed to catch the eye of the passerby in the heavily trafficked northwest area 
of Detroit."733  
This building was understood by Yamasaki as simultaneously modern and ornamental. 
Neither Reynolds, nor Yamasaki saw these positions as antithetical. Yamasaki offered his 
opinion on ornamentation in modern architecture: “the other thing that I have been interested in 
is that buildings should have ornament. But at the same time I think that the ornament cannot be 
carved by hand. It can’t be handicraft because obviously this is solving nothing. If we do, we are 
just being somewhat sentimental and proving nothing. But if we can produce really lovely 
ornaments through machine — machine made ornament — then we are proving something 
because then again another element in architecture becomes a part of our technological 
building.”734 The building did in fact feature a machine-made gold-annodized aluminum screen 
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that Yamasaki called a “delight” in its treatment of transparency, depth and shadow.735 The 
architect eagerly promoted this “jewel on stilts,” with a gold anodized screen of rings glistening 
in the sun while screening out direct sunlight from striking the glass façade underneath.736 The 
mandate of function, however, was held conceptually close. A jewel was permissible, but only in 
service to the glass box. 
Reynolds hiring Yamasaki and enthusiastically endorsing his comments, publishing them 
widely in Aluminum in Modern Architecture and other promotional material was a clear 
endorsement of modern architecture as inclusive of ornamentation, with the Yamasaki-designed 
building an exemplar of this fusion. This position supported their ideology of, and portrayal of 
aluminum in aesthetic terms. Recall that Reynolds understood raw aluminum holding an 
“inherent beauty” with a “sheen-like surface texture…it is the metal itself,”737 and described that 
eminent representative of aluminum, the Reynolds EXO, as a “showcase for the versatility, 
beauty and usefulness of aluminum,”738 publicizing it as “suggesting efficiency and progress in 
an aesthetically pleasing way.”739 Reynolds summarized Yamasaki’s “jewel on stilts” as 
dramatically combining “both beauty and function.”740 For Reynolds, ornament was fully 
compatible with modernism.  
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Appropriating Niles, Michigan as a marketing landscape 
Kawneer understood World War II as causing a “complete break with the past”741 that 
necessitated a whole new line of store fronts for the postwar period. They initiated planning for 
this new “Store Front of Tomorrow”742 along with a competition open to students and 
professionals in 1943. Tomorrow couldn’t come soon enough for Kawneer, at which time, they 
promised, “you will see Kawneer leadership more vigorously reasserted than at any time.”743 
When Kawneer publicized “tomorrow,” they meant the moment the war ended. They aimed to be 
ready, which is why they began planning for tomorrow in the middle of the war. Kawneer began 
by studying how the individual store front itself could be “modernized,” later to be conceived as 
a “machine for selling.” By 1945, they aimed to modernize the entire commercial landscape, one 
town at a time. The town they began with was their own hometown of Niles, Michigan. When 
they were finished, every façade along Main Street would be covered in brown or gray 
aluminum. 
Front Street in Niles was appropriated by Kawneer as a marketing landscape for 
aluminum. It became a living showcase of aluminum products for the company. The 
appropriation happened slowly, at first, beginning in the ‘teens. Today, one can walk along Front 
Street in Niles and observe the legacy of Kawneer products, from prewar copper sash to 
remnants of vast expanses of brown aluminum cladding.  
Kawneer promoted that aluminum, as part of an assemblage in a store front system, was 
able to modernize. A store became modernized when it became a “machine for selling.” 
Modernization wasn’t just about a look, but it was that. Similarly, modernization wasn’t just 
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about reorganizing the interior of the store, but it was that too. Kawneer promoted modernization 
as a comprehensive reformulation of the store, and in the postwar period, aluminum was the 
medium through which modernization was achieved. Kawneer didn’t advocate stopping the 
modernization project with one store. They advocated that a town “take one block at a time.” As 
the “pilot study,” the first block began with Niles. 
 
Kawneer and the modernization of store fronts before World War II 
Kawneer publicized that it had developed the “first truly modern store front,” in 
Holdredge, Nebraska, in 1906.744 An advertisement captioned the photo with, “The first truly 
modern store front with large display windows in Kawneer resilient sash.”745 Although it didn’t 
state directly what made the store front modern, it implied it had something to do with the large 
display window and the sash. A slogan from 1912 provides a hint about the pecuniary 
characteristic of the store front, proclaiming, “It Stays and Pays.”746 A catalog from 1917 may 
provide additional clarity. In an article titled, “Another Small Town Success,” Kawneer implored 
the reader, “If you are located in a small town do not put off modernizing your Store Front, 
believing that only the large city Store can profit by such an investment. People of the smaller 
towns, as well as those in the rural districts, demand modern retailing — many times travel miles 
to trade under modern conditions.”747 The success story in this article was George Hollecker 
who, after installing a Kawneer store front, found the store front’s ability “to make show 
windows pay dividends.” Boosting Business was the title of this brochure. This brochure makes 
clear that by modern, Kawneer meant that the store was a profitable enterprise.  
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Kawneer also believed modern did not imply inexpensive. Instead, modern implied 
expensive in the short term, but cheap in the long term. “The High Price of Paying Less” 
explains that “You can install a wood or iron Store Front for somewhat less money than it will 
cost you to put up a first-class, modern Kawneer Front.” The wood, however, will rot, as 
Kawneer asserted, but installing a Kawneer Front means “putting off today that which lays a 
good foundation for your business tomorrow.”  
The emergence of modern architecture in small-town United States has been derided as 
“Drugstore Modern” by the notable definer of modern architecture, Henry-Russel Hitchcock, 
claiming that it was a mere “parodying of its more obvious aspects,” referring to what Hitchcock 
believed to be a more authentic architectural modernism.748 Hitchcock posed a defense of 
modern architecture on ideological grounds that store front architecture did not meet certain 
standards. Kawneer, however, was less concerned about ascribing to the international style, 
although it did feature dozens of European store fronts in a 1936 catalog extoling the virtues of 
store fronts that could easily pass the International Style test. Kawneer was more concerned 
about capital accumulation and believed the way to profit was to market store fronts as profitable 
investments and opportunities for good design. This same 1936 catalog reveals a modification of 
the 1917 strategy of arguing that customers want to shop in modern retail contexts. Where the 
1917 argument explained that “people…demand modern retailing,” the 1936 argument shifts to 
assert that people also demand “better design. Sensible, modern design.”749 This 1936 catalog 
illustrated examples of Kawneer-designed stark, minimalist fronts completely clad in aluminum. 
These photographs were included, Kawneer explained, to “furnish striking evidence of the 
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world-wide movement to employ better design and greater variety in the merchants’ most 
practical sales tool — the modern store front.” 
These brochures show that Kawneer understood modern to possess a dual meaning. It 
meant both to make a better retail condition, and paired with the word design, implied a specific 
design condition: “Better design. Sensible, modern design. Honest design for the purpose 
intended. People today respond to its appeal. They like its simplicity, its directness. They are 
attracted, interested and sold by its power.”750 These two senses of modern — a better retailing 
condition and a better design condition, they maintained and deployed as a marketing strategy in 
the postwar period. Modernism, for Kawneer, was a marketing project.  
           Joan Ockman argues in “Toward a Theory of Normative Architecture”, that modern 
architecture became normative when it was embraced by corporate America, while David Smiley 
argues in “Pedestrian Modern: Shopping, Modern Architecture and the American Metropolis, 
1935-1955” that the shopping center widely spread modern architectural tenets in the built 
environment through architect’s designs. Here on the Main Streets of the United States, modern 
architecture was normalized as an image. If a building is to be understood in this way, it must 
have a corresponding message to communicate. For Kawneer, the message was that aluminum 
could modernize by improving the performative characteristics of the façade (limiting upkeep 
and maintenance), attract customers and make a merchant more profitable. This is a message of 
instrumentality. But Kawneer also sought to promote that their aluminum store front systems 
could resemble already-established conceptions of modern architecture. This was a message 
about image. Richard Longstreth examining the emergence of the department store as a building 
type, shows that “the image of modernism (was) a tool to revive and sustain prosperity.”751 As 
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will be seen in the following sections, emulation of the image of regional shopping centers was 
an overt goal of modernization proponents after the war. Following Longstreth’s argument, 
image played a dual role. It sought to both represent prosperity and other images of prosperity. 
That is, in reference to Kawneers publicity, they claimed aluminum store front systems provide 
an image of prosperity by emulating extant forms of modern architecture, and provide an image 
of prosperity by associating aluminum store front systems, in their publicity material, with 
modernization. 
 
Kawneer and the modernization of store fronts after World War II 
Aluminum first advertised by Kawneer as a material that customers could select as early 
as 1912,752 making Kawneer one of the first manufacturers to use aluminum in architectural 
products. By 1937, Kawneer declared themselves “the largest American user of aluminum for 
architectural purposes,753 with fully 75 percent of their applications in store fronts employing 
aluminum.754 During the war, Kawneer produced no store fronts, yet they began planning for a 
future of store front work, with aluminum a key component: “War work today… Store front, 
Aluminum Doors and Windows Tomorrow.”755 The company sponsored a competition in 
coordination, “The Store Front of Tomorrow” with Pencil Points in 1943, featuring notable 
architects as advisors and judges.  
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In January 1945, Kawneer organized a formal “Design Department.”756 While Kawneer 
had employed designers before as product developers, these men were charged with speculative 
design. Their chief function was to “to create and develop, through research and design, modern 
ideas in stores.”757 Their largest project of 1945 was to immediately prepare a “Design Portfolio 
of fifty-three basic designs to which our customers can refer for ideas in developing individual 
and distinctive stores.”758 Out of this program, came a nationwide marketing campaign, called 
“Machines for Selling.”  
Kawneer’s “Machines for Selling” program was a major, nationwide undertaking, with 
Kawneer claiming to have reached “hundreds of thousands of retail merchants, associations, 
chains and civic groups.”759 The product was a comprehensive approach, in which the tangible 
materials, aluminum and glass, deployed as an assembled store front and sometime, slipcover 
over the upper stories, enacted a transformation of the store into a machine. Kawneer promoted it 
as a comprehensive transformation. A Machine for selling was  the “Store-front, interior and all 
the hidden gears and levers of trade…from sidewalk to service alley.” To be such a machine, 
Kawneer promoted aesthetics as critical, but ever tied to function: “To function efficiently, 
‘Machines for Selling’ must not only work well, but look their best.” This included lighting, 
product placement in the store and in the window, color texture and a critical component, the 
store front as advertisement with three components: “Whatever form it takes, the store-front has 
a definite advertising job to do. First, it must catch the eye and convey character, price range and 
type of goods or services on sale….Second, it must serve as a stage set, not only for showing 
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merchandise but for dramatizing it and creating the urge to buy. Third, the store-front must pull 
people into the store. The design of the front should invite the sidewalk shopper to come inside. 
The design of store fronts exhibited in the “Machines for Selling” portfolio of 53 
examples focused on two elements. First, the sidewalk level. This consisted of generous amounts 
of glazing held firmly in place by aluminum frame. Second, the upper stories, where aluminum 
was recommended, “from top to bottom.” Such cladding came to be known as a slipcover, and 
had been employed in the US and Europe before the war where the materials manufacturers, 
such as masonry, ceramic or steel promoted it as a means of “modernization.”  
The emergence of the windowless façade as a slipcover has been explained by scholars as 
an emulation of shopping centers,760 which were increasingly threatening downtown commerce 
as centers were constructed often at the edges of towns and cities. They have also been explained 
as a response to the automobile,761 necessitating a large billboard to catch the eye of the fast-
moving automobile’s driver,762 although story-height signage on buildings was nothing new, 
having long been an advertising strategy of merchants with ownership or rights to place a sign on 
the façade.763 They have been understood as resultant from the desire for improved control over 
air conditioning, precluding operable exterior windows.764 Kawneer justified it due to demand 
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for modernization resultant from three years of war.765 Aluminum, porcelain-steel, and stone-
cladding dealers were also influential all over the United States in selling the idea of the 
necessity of the slipcover. Reynolds sold aluminum cladding as slipcovers, arguing, “Aluminum 
has become synonymous with modern design, not only in new buildings, but to face-lift dingy, 
old exteriors, and transform them into colorful new fronts in tune with the times.”766 Reynolds 
portrayed aluminum slipcovers as a means to modernizing, but also ameliorating an “outdated 
look.” About a slipcover, aluminum screen installed over a bank, Reynolds wrote, “…the 
modernization required no alteration of the original façade…The…bank is a straightforward 
example of how aluminum cladding is being used today for low cost modernization of buildings 
that have an outdated appearance but a structure that is still sound.”767 Here is yet another 
argument, that the slipcover facilitated changing the appearance, ostensibly “modernizing,” 
without altering the building façade substantially underneath, and without disrupting operations. 
This was an appeal to aesthetics, but also to the merchant’s pocketbook. 
Kawneer’s approach was to portray aluminum slipcover as part of a package of 
modernization strategies, the “machine for selling,” which would make the merchant money, not 
just save money. The marketing efforts of Kawneer were effective in cladding the entire street 
front of Niles, Michigan in brown aluminum over the upper floors, as a “machine for selling,” 
which will be explored more below. Kawneer promoted the slipcover as a means to 
modernization. In the “Machines for Selling” portfolio, Kawneer labeled this the “modernization 
problem.” Juxtaposing a photograph of an existing brick façade with a color rendering of the 
same façade covered in aluminum, Kawneer argued, “The complicated architectural style of the 
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upper stories has long since ceased to be an advertising asset….To bring this building up to date 
and to insure that it will be an asset to its landlord and to its tenants for many years to come, it is 
clearly indicated the entire façade should be modernized from top to bottom.” Another example 
reveals Kawneer’s argument that the slipcover will not only make the merchant money, but also 
save him money, by simply covering up a façade in need of repair: “Modernization Problem: … 
the upper floors, equally undistinguished, have overlarge windows in bad repair, and an 
outmoded decorative treatment that distracts attention from the advertising and display features 
of the store-front.” Kawneer promoted a simple, clean-lined “modern” façade that rather than 
“competing with the products,” instead complements them, allowing the shoppers eye to fall not 
on building ornamentation, but on the product. 
In 1945, along with the “Machines for Selling” campaign, Kawneer also engaged in, 
perhaps justified — scare tactics, warning of future encroachment of shopping centers: “NEW 
COMPETITION is entering many fields — new kinds of stores are in the offing — both chain 
and independent. PLANS are being made in many quarters which will effect retailing operations 
everywhere…. merchants will demand better stores in order to maintain their position in the 
competitive picture.”768 This threat painted a picture of entire assemblages of stores, perhaps 
five, six or seven wide, emerging at the town’s doorstep, stealing customers away. But Kawneer 
envisioned towns competing with this threat, and aluminum was a key weapon. 
 
 
 
Marketing the commercial landscape: A town becomes a prototype 
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Along with the “Machines for Selling” marketing project, Kawneer launched a 
simultaneous marketing initiative that sought to transform the entire commercial landscape into a 
marketing landscape, not only for merchants to compete with shopping centers, but also for 
Kawneer to appropriate as a marketing platform. Kawneer promoted modernization of not one 
store at a time, but an entire block at a time, and the company proposed, and eventually won, the 
full length of Front Street in Niles, Michigan, its hometown, as a prototype, modernized, 
commercial landscape. “A Plan for Modernizing Main Street” was the initiative, and it took a 
district approach: “As a city or town is a “Machine for Living,” so is it business district a 
“Machine for Selling.” The trend, explained Kawneer, was towards Planning: “In every city, in 
every town, responsible and forward-looking groups are replanning their cities for 
tomorrow….Retail merchants, industrial management, city planning commissions, individual 
citizens…the thought is in every mind — what can we do, what can I do to make this a better 
place in which to live, to work, to shop, to play, to go to school, to carry on daily affairs?” To 
these questions, Kawneer had an answer: glass and aluminum storefronts, with aluminum 
slipcovers above. 
The architecture firm of Ketchum, Gina & Sharp was hired to “convert a block of 
outdated storefronts into a modern shopping center without sacrificing individuality…..Niles, the 
home of the Kawneer Company, was selected for the pilot study not because of any spectacular 
deficiencies, but because it is a typical American community.”769 The architects superimposed 
elevations drawings of aluminum façades over existing photographs of the street fronts, in a 
before and after format. Every store was covered with aluminum. Some received aluminum 
slipcover treatment above, while all were bestowed with a design for a new glass and aluminum-
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frame storefront below. The architects sought to create variety, despite the unity of materials. 
(more details here) 
Kawneer’s nationwide, “Machines for Selling” campaign, by some measures, found 
success. A Kawneer Front article stated, “In 1947 the full effect of the Sales Promotion Program, 
"Machines for Selling," was realized and plans were made for a 5-year building expansion 
program to accommodate the ever-growing production requirements."770 The trade name for the 
aluminum slipcover was Zourite. A Modern Metals article reported in 1956 the product had 
found a successful outlet: “The big market for Zourite is in remodeling — covering the face of 
an old store to make it look new.”771 The article quoted Dave Miller, Vice President in charge of 
Architectural Sales, “Although Zourite’s acceptance has far exceeded all our expectations, we 
now believe it is just getting started.”772 
 
Cladding the commercial landscape 
Beyond Niles, no towns had accepted the full make-over with Kawneer’s product, as the 
company had hoped. Slipcovers were sold all over the United States in a variety of materials and 
sold by many competing product providers, but rare was the incidence of whole-block cladding 
of façades at once. Despite the wider prevalence of a piecemeal approach, wherein cladding was 
applied one merchant at a time, two towns are examined here that did clad entire blocks at once. 
The first is Niles, clad with Kawneer aluminum and the second is Paola, Kansas, clad with 
aluminum sold by Fashion Company, Inc.  
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Together, these examples show how aluminum was sold as an image of modernity and 
also sold as instrumental in solving problems confronting the towns. These examples also bolster 
the indeterminacy of any essential identity for aluminum. In the 1960s and 1970s it was 
promoted as modern to these two towns. However, by the 1980s it was increasingly understood 
as conveying an unwanted identity. Towns people worked to remove the cladding using the same 
arguments against aluminum as had been used to promote its sale to begin with. These arguments 
were about its ability or lack thereof in producing prosperity.  
 
Covered in Kawneer 
It took decades of trying, but Kawneer finally achieved the goal of whole-block 
aluminum cladding in 1972. In fact, the cladding stretched several blocks all along Main Street 
from Front Street to Fifth Street, covered with brown corrugated aluminum. Although the 
specific aluminum cladding product was called Shadowform, a writer for the town newspaper 
simply referred to it by the company name, saying that the street is “completely covered in 
Kawneer.”773. Store front by store front, from the ‘teens to the 1970s, Kawneer’s building 
products had been used in Niles. In short order the image in total was Kawneer.  
Two reasons were given for the cladding project. First identified was the condition of the 
existing brick store front façades. Aluminum was promoted as the solution to the perennial 
problem of building façade maintenance. A Kawneer representative said, “The buildings looked 
terrible. Bricks were falling out, and some of them had broken windows.”774 Kawneer promoted 
aluminum as robust and able to withstand decades of weathering, defining a path to eliminate 
long-term maintenance. Aluminum also was promoted for short-term advantage, allowing the 
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building owner to forego immediate maintenance. In lieu of repairing the façades, sometimes 
brick by brick, a sheet of aluminum could protect the underlying façade from further decay. 
  A second main reason for the cladding project was a purported need to modernize. 
Modernization was said to provide a new image – long promoted by Kawneer as an advantage to 
commerce – and to act as a defense against competition from regional shopping centers. The 
Chamber of Commerce played a role in promoting business and defended down town merchants. 
The Four Flags Area Chamber of Commerce encouraged the downtown merchants to compete 
with the new, modern shopping malls through emulation.775 Their fears were not unfounded. As 
Lizabeth Cohen has shown, new regional shopping centers were promoted as civic centers 
helpful to the community, but instead often “crippled existing market centers.”776 Shopping 
centers often had an identifiable aesthetic. The blank, unadorned façade resultant from 
Shadowform in Niles was not foreign to the regional shopping malls that had emerged as a new 
building type in the postwar period. As Richard Longstreth has explained, “The huge, 
windowless mass not only created an imposing presence amid the forest of higher buildings, it 
also gave the store a distinct identity, emphasizing the great scale of retail distribution it 
manifested and dramatically setting it apart from all other building types.”777 The blank façade 
also afforded the opportunity to emulate the shopping center’s mode of signage. Large-letter 
signs deployed as an advertising and identity strategy were easily positioned on unadorned 
façades. 
Beyond reasons given, the erection of cladding also reflected changing technologies. 
Prior to the implementation of electric lighting, large windows were necessary to admit light 
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deep into the store. At the ground floor, plate glass afforded the deeper reflection of natural light, 
while also facilitating the display of merchandise. The upper floors were sometimes built as 
apartments, but often used for storage of stock goods and supplies. Large windows admitted 
daylight, but for the purpose of storage they were essentially unneeded. Incandescent lighting 
and the much brighter fluorescent lighting precluded the need for windows. Covering over 
windows with aluminum did not impact the level of illumination needed for storage. 
Fluorescent lighting was often paired with a new drop ceiling. Such a ceiling is built 
several feet below the existing ceiling and provides two advantages. The first is to create a 
smaller space to heat and cool. The lower ceiling reduces the volume of air in the space. Second, 
it allows the mounting of lighting closer to the floor. Where drop ceilings have been installed, 
tall windows were bifurcated. The top half of the window was above the new ceiling, and the 
lower half was below. Sometimes, building owners clad over the top half leaving the lower half 
of the window exposed. With aluminum facing, the obsolete window could be completely 
forgotten. 
 
Questioning the legitimacy of aluminum slipcovers 
In the 1980s, town leaders began to question the legitimacy of the aluminum cladding on 
several fronts. Towns across the United States received Urban development Action Grants 
through a program initiated in 1977 by the Carter Administration to aid in downtown 
revitalization. An ethic of preservation was reinforced by the availability of these grants. Earlier 
in the century, a series of congressional acts had been passed, notably the Historic Sites Act of 
1935 and the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, that focused the attention of 
policymakers on preservation and renovation. In 1980, the National Main Street Center of the 
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National Trust for Historic Preservation was formed to support downtown revitalization. Funds 
were available to renovate street front façades, but Niles was a Kawneer town. The director of 
the City of Niles History Department wrote in favor of preserving the aluminum façades. In a 
letter to the editor of the newspaper, he said, “As a historian, it seems to me that a valid argument 
can be made for the recognition and preservation of the Kawneer fronts in Niles, because of the 
company's impact on commercial architecture in the country and because of its local 
significance."778 The brown aluminum remained, but they would be challenged again. 
 
The Big Brown Take Down 
In 2002, town leaders and merchants organized to remove the brown aluminum. The 
Main Street revitalization Project was formed. The South Bend Tribune described the aluminum 
as having “stole much of the charm from originally ornate buildings.” It also questioned why the 
aluminum was ever erected in the first place. Speculating that it was because “there was some 
thought in the 1960s that a more modern and uniform look was necessary,” the newspaper 
concluded, “In hindsight, the decision was flawed.”779 One merchant agreed, saying “They need 
to fix this town up, and make it look like it did at the turn of the century….people would see this 
town for the first time.”780 Local leaders, merchants and state officials collaborated to effectuate 
a grand revitalization effort which they called the Big Brown Take Down. 
Grant funds were available and the city pursued them. The Michigan Economic 
Development Corporation (MEDC), in coordination with the National Main Street Center of the 
National Trust for Historic Preservation had already issued 44 block grants to assist 
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communities, and Niles was on their list of potential grantees. An MEDC spokesperson said their 
mission, through the grants, was to create jobs: “We want to help create jobs in the 
communities…we do a lot with infrastructure.”781 The MEDC believed the aluminum was in the 
way of jobs. The spokesperson said, “In Niles, they (have) an ugly aluminum façade over their 
buildings. Our team is helping them bring it back to the original brick façade.”782 Project leaders 
applied for and won a Community Development Block Grant. A second source was private 
grants. In a supreme irony, the Kawneer founder’s own legacy, The Plym Foundation, donated to 
the effort. The remainder of the funding came from the City of Niles and private investment.783 A 
total of 2.5 million in state and local funds were invested in the project.784 
To drum up broader support, city officials voiced arguments against the aluminum. Niles 
Community Development Director proclaimed, “who do you know that still wears their pants 
from 1972?”785 His ire was directed to the brown aluminum, as though the look was old and out 
of style. Then, in a twist, he used the same modernization argument as a reason for removing the 
aluminum as Kawneer and project advocates had used to support the erection of the aluminum 
façades decades prior: “The downtown is out of style. We’re modernizing it but we’re 
modernizing it in a way to make it look older.” In the Development Director’s argument can be 
seen a conception of modernism not linked to “the new” but linked to the “old.” However, his 
comment discriminates age as a relative factor. He was not in favor of old “pants from 1972,” 
but he was in favor of old building façades from the turn of the century. Ironically, his statement 
reflected a conception of modernism that was similar to that of the aluminum promoters, namely, 
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that underlying modernism is a belief that to be modern means to be superior. In this case, to 
produce a condition of superiority was to remove the old brown aluminum and preserve and 
revitalize the older brick façades.  
Despite the appeal for the project by merchants and community leaders, removal was not 
a unanimous aspiration. A few vocal preservationists defended the cladding. The same historian 
who defended the façades in a 1986 letter to the editor this time voiced caution in their removal. 
Describing himself as a historical preservationist, he said, “…One can legitimately argue a case 
for historic preservation in some way of the storefronts in Niles as a bona fide historic landmarks 
of American architectural history.”786 At least one merchant supported designation of the 
downtown as a state historic district, and advocated celebrating the aluminum façades as a 
“fitting tribute to honor (Francis Plym).”787 More support was garnered for removal than 
preservation. Furthermore, project leaders understood preservation as an act associated with 
removal rather than retention of the aluminum cladding. To preserve was to remove aluminum 
and expose the old brick beneath. 
Kawneer’s had long claimed that the “machines for selling” packages and individual 
storefront components could generate revenue for merchants. Kawneer argued that both the 
instrumentality and the image of their systems could maintain a vital economy of consumption 
down town. In contrast, with the new push to remove the cladding, city leaders believed the 
aluminum did only the opposite, driving customers away and defining a problematic image. Lisa 
Croteau, director of the Niles Downtown Development Authority predicted that the underlying 
brick façades would be “aesthetically charming.” Imagining the absence of the aluminum and the 
visual impact of the revealed underlying façades, she said “It makes people who wouldn’t want 
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to stop want to stop.” Merchants envisioned a downtown without aluminum: “It brings back that 
small-town feeling.”788  
In June of 2003, the Big Brown Take Down commenced. Tearing down the aluminum 
was described by the newspaper as a “face lift.”789 Citizens and city officials gathered across the 
street to watch as the first strips of aluminum were torn away. The newspaper captured the 
moment, writing that the “undamaged façade, revealed for the first time in more than 30 years, 
was met by squeals of joy.” Hugs were exchanged. “I’m speechless” said the Community 
Development Director. Gazing up with admiration at the newly revealed brick, the building 
owner said, “This really was a beautiful building…It makes me want to cry.”790 
In 2005, Niles received the Governor’s Award for Historic Preservation in honor for the 
result of the project. As of my visit in 2015, all brown aluminum cladding was removed except 
for a few merchants in town that elected to keep the cladding. The legacy of decades of 
storefront system purchases can be seen on many of the stores, with old Kawneer name plates, 
copper sash and aluminum cladding scattered about. The shifting identity of aluminum between 
conceptions of old and new, a subject of preservation or removal makes two points. The first is 
that materials are fundamentally without inherent identity. Only the human dimension assigns 
identity and it can and does shift with values and context. The second point is that, for the 
aluminum promoters and at least one City of Niles representative, modernism was more about 
superiority than it was about “the new” or “the old.” In the minds of Kawneer promoters, Main 
Street could become modern if the aluminum was erected. In the minds of the city official, Main 
street could become modern if it were removed. 
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An Aluminum Town Square 
Kawneer was successful in appropriating the commercial landscape in Niles as a 
marketing landscape. This was in part because Niles was so strongly associated with Kawneer, 
and also in part because Kawneer often referenced Niles in marketing publications, portraying 
the town as a living catalog. In addition, a much subtler form of appropriating the commercial 
landscape was by placing their nameplate on the architecture. Doors, for instance, are usually 
labeled Kawneer if one looks closely, acting as little advertisements scattered on thousands of 
buildings across the country. In contrast, although Paola also was a site of extensive aluminum 
cladding, it was not widely associated with a particular company. Kawneer was a market leader, 
but Paola project leaders selected a local contractor to provide the aluminum through a Kansas 
City firm called Fashion Company, Inc. The erection of aluminum façades in Paola reveals that 
project advocates saw aluminum as possessing the ability to define an image of modernity. 
Echoing aluminum promoters for Aloca, Reynolds and Kawneer products, Paola’s project 
leaders believed that aluminum cladding could bring prosperity to the town. Like the Niles 
leadership, they believed it could defend against the possible encroachment of regional shopping 
centers.  
In 1967, a grand celebration and parade commenced in the small town of Paola, Kansas. 
Dignitaries from across the state gathered to extol the virtues of a new, modernized downtown. 
Merchants took out full page advertisements beaming with pride at the new downtown look. 
Businessmen and politicians gathered at the local country club to toast the success of the 
modernization effort, and envision a future of comfortable commerce. The jubilant activity on 
this day, dubbed the “Parade of Progress,” celebrated a striking architectural intervention: the 
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complete and total cladding of every façade facing the town square in green, blue, red, and 
yellow aluminum.  
It was a radical departure from the previous visual character of the town, and it was 
implemented for a specific purpose. An idea hatched by collaboration between business groups, 
boosters, merchants and politicians, this new aluminum town square was meant to save 
merchants from changing modes of consumption and shifting demographics. It was their answer 
to a perceived existential crisis—a negotiation with national trends that extended far beyond the 
boundary of this small town. Although the façade cladding project borrowed the modern 
aesthetics of minimalism, it was not a completely appropriated modernism. Instead, it was a mix 
of emulation and innovation that rapidly developed and was initially celebrated, but over time 
became derided and blamed as the very condition leading to the decline of commerce downtown. 
Many merchants in downtowns across the United States installed aluminum façades for their 
buildings, yet Paola’s history with the intervention is important as an extreme case of 
transformation. 
 
A Vision of Main Street Modernization 
Paola is a charming town, and the square is a tranquil setting. It has a gazebo, benches, 
decorations, and a swing set for children. Paola is still a small town of around 5,000 people, in 
which an agricultural economy emerged in the nineteenth century. It is also a bedroom 
community for Kansas City, forty minutes to the north. The idea to modernize the town square of 
Paola can be traced to a program outlined by the chamber of commerce president, Melvin 
Stockwell. In 1964, four years before the official dedication of the newly clad town square, the 
chamber developed a bold vision titled, “A Pattern of Progress” that defined the chamber’s new 
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mission. Stockwell announced, “From this point on, all activities of the Chamber will be geared 
to this action program…the entire structure of the chamber will be built upon this program of 
work.”791 Of the six focus areas developed by this new mission, several were aimed at spurring 
increased commercial activity by installing “Paola’s ‘image’ as a commercial and cultural 
center.” The chamber’s vision was forward looking and would ultimately be expansive. 
Launching the program, Stockwell summarized, “this year must set the pattern for the years to 
come, and the pattern must be one of progress.”792 
 
Boosterism of public and private modernization in the United States 
The chamber’s vision for the town was underpinned by the idea of progress, which was 
also a central concept upon which previous main street modernization programs had been 
founded. Paola’s modernization effort was by no means the first. Efforts to modernize downtown 
Main Streets in the United States can be traced far earlier and far outside of Paola, beginning in 
the New Deal era. In the wake of the Great Depression, nearly three-fourths of the nation’s 
commercial structures fell into disrepair from deferred maintenance.793 As a part of New Deal 
initiatives, low-interest federal loans were consequently made available to renovate or rebuild 
business properties. Although the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) traditionally addressed 
only housing issues, in this critical period it was also a key tool in mobilizing Main Street 
modernization. It encouraged architects, builders and salesmen to “go after this main street 
business” and “sell the store owner” on the idea of store renovation and modernization.794 
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In addition to New Deal Era government boosterism, numerous private entities promoted 
commercial modernization. One architectural competition was held by Libbey-Owens-Ford 
Glass Company in conjunction with Architectural Record magazine in 1935, after which the 
Chairman of the jury remarked, “[N]one of the designs selected is extravagant, simplicity being 
one of the qualities required by the jury.”795  
Keeping small town retail establishments fresh and relevant was seen as important due to 
several economic and demographic trends in the mid-twentieth century. Years after recovering 
from the Great Depression, downtown businesses were challenged by additional economic forces 
that drew customers away from small town centers, pulling them to suburban and regional 
shopping centers. These shopping malls put additional pressure on the survival of small town 
retail businesses. Shopper’s World (1950) in Framingham, Massachusetts by architect Morris 
Ketchum was an early example of this developing force. It established the Dumbell 
Configuration whereby a string of developer-built retail shops were anchored on either end by 
larger department stores. Although Shopper’s World was an outdoor shopping center, indoor 
malls proliferated soon after. Southdale Center (1956) in Minneapolis, Minnesota by Architect 
Victor Gruen can be seen as an indoor street along which retail businesses were organized in a 
unified space for consumption. 
Twentieth-century demographic trends also weighed heavily on diminishing retail 
opportunities in small towns. Rural to urban migration and migration from the Northeast and 
Midwest to the West shifted people out of small towns and into cities or growing regions 
elsewhere during the latter-half of the twentieth century. Mechanization replaced labor in 
decreasingly available agricultural jobs and many young people left for economic opportunities 
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in urban areas. While rural America grew slightly as a whole between 1930 and 1970 due to 
more births than deaths, the important demographic of young, working age people was the key 
engine of out-migration. 796 Competing for increasingly limited customers made paramount retail 
establishments’ appeal to shoppers. Such appeal necessarily included selling consumer goods 
that people wanted and needed, but retailers also perceived the importance of attracting 
customers under increasingly difficult circumstances. 
 
Negotiating the Image of Modernity in the Commercial Sphere 
During the New Deal era, the government, architects and façade cladding manufacturers 
placed emphasis on appealing to customers’ aesthetic sensibilities. The objectives of the 1935 
Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Company Main Street modernization competition were to create 
designs which would “attract the public, display goods to the best advantage, and provide space, 
convenience, and light so that purchasing is a pleasure.” The competition chairman concluded 
that as a result of the competition, “it will be gratifying to see the gospel of good design and 
good taste permeating through the thousands of Main Streets all over the country.”797 The 
competition organizers believed the fifty-two winning designs would give merchants and façade 
dealers “a guide as to what an intelligent public taste will demand.” The judges asserted that the 
winning designers were “forced to analyze both the actions and reactions of purchasers, and the 
psychology, methods and routine of selling.” This suggested that the jury held that the designs 
were reflective of research and observation. 
                                                 
796 Kenneth Johnson, Demographic Trends in Rural and Small Town America (Durham: Carsey 
Institute, University of New Hampshire, 2006). 
797 Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Company, 52 Designs to Modernize Main Street with Glass, 1. 
256 
 
What did the winning designers theorize was an effective design to attract customers? No 
evidence of research by the designers is provided by the publication. However, other researchers, 
authors and the government itself believed that what attracted customers in the post-depression 
era was the “new”—which is a continuously moving target. During the FHA’s campaign 
promoting the modernization of Main Street in the 1930s, the public relations division aligned 
modernization with consumer’s desire for the new: “The buying public demand the new and the 
different in merchandise…They are no longer interested in the old stores, unless the old stores 
feel the urge to newness and the call of a new day. When prosperity dawns after depression, we 
suddenly realize how utterly tired we are of the fashions of yesterday… We tire of old 
architectural forms.”798 
This view was foreshadowed by Christine Frederick, author of Selling Mrs. Consumer 
(1929). Frederick maintained that consumers “are eager and willing to take hold of anything new 
either in the shape of a new invention or new designs or styles or ways of living.”799 Retailers 
aligned with this reasoning as well.  
This aesthetic of newness in retail façades has been found to draw on many sources, 
including metaphoric notions of beauty, the consumer items sold in the stores and the developing 
paradigm of modern architecture. Gabrielle Esperdy finds that an analog was formed between 
new building façades and plastic surgery in an advertisement selling building cladding by 
Republic Steel Corporation. The ad reads, “There’s a lot of plastic surgery going on all over the 
country today. Old buildings are having their faces lifted…emerging again in a few days with a 
new metallic face that draws business like a magnet.” Vitrolite, another cladding manufacturer, 
claimed their product offered “ageless beauty” for which “a damp cloth is the only facial 
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treatment Vitrolite ever needs.” These advertisements claim the new is also the beautiful and the 
ageless. 
 
Re-Imaging the Square in Paola 
Like previous modernization programs in the 1930s New Deal Era, the Paola Chamber of 
Commerce outlined a commercially progressive agenda, entailing notions of “the new” and 
envisioning a thriving commercial landscape. However, unlike programs to modernize Main 
Street in the 1930s, Paola’s effort was neither led nor funded by the federal government. 
Eschewing federal funding was a matter of pride for many of Paola’s businessmen and residents. 
Years earlier, residents of the town built Lake Miola in order to counteract what had been a 
history of water shortages in the 1950s. This project was asserted to be “paid for completely by 
the community through use of general obligation bonds”, and was celebrated as paving “the way 
for future self-help community developments.”800 
Instead of seeking federal funds, the Chamber led what would become a consortium of 
private interests, given support and legitimacy by the town’s elected leaders, with the goal to 
gain buy-in from the public, and critically, buy-in from building owners and retailers around the 
town square. The Chamber’s first step was to establish a planning council in 1964, composed of 
area businessmen, to plan wide-ranging future economic programs for Paola. The goals of the 
eight-man Paola Economic Policy Council was to “map Chamber strategy in areas of industrial 
acquisition, industrial services, agri-industry, community analysis and development of facilities 
and resources, and to create within the Chamber of commerce a full-scale economic development 
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program for Paola.”801 The Chamber’s planning council was followed the next year by a city 
committee. In 1965, Mayor Rex Kiser appointed a ten-member Mayor’s Advisory Committee, 
consisting of businessmen and professionals from Paola. The committee was characterized by 
the local newspaper as being charged with “studying the possible ways the downtown core area 
could be modernized as a trade center at a minimum cost with maximum convenience and eye 
appeal to the customers.”802  
 
Identifying Crisis, Winning Support 
According to the committee’s own documents, in addition to its focus on planning a 
modernized downtown, it also sought to gain buy-in for the idea from the public and from 
merchants. To this end, it enacted a three-step process. First, it interviewed several companies to 
propose a design and produce renderings of modernized façades. The committee chose Fashion 
Company Incorporated, because they had a local authorized dealer (Sharp Improvement 
Company) for their aluminum facing product. Second, Fashion Company produced color 
renderings of the aluminum clad façades (informally called slipcovers), which were then 
displayed at Messer’s Drug Company and Asher’s Pharmacy, two businesses located around the 
town square which were frequented by town residents. Lastly, the Mayor’s Advisory Committee 
produced a brochure designed to convince downtown merchants of the necessity to modernize. 
Photographs in the brochure juxtaposed the aluminum façades of the rendering against 
photographs of the same streets, taken in 1931, asserting the imperative to change. In reference 
to the portrayal of the downtown as having remained aesthetically the same in the 1960s as it 
was in the 1930s, it sarcastically asked, “Progress? The horseless carriage and consumer are 
                                                 
801 “Industrial Development Target of Paola’s New Chamber Council,” The Western Spirit, September 31, 1964. 
802 “Unveils Plans for Beautifying Downtown Paola,” The Western Spirit, May 8, 1966. 
259 
 
keeping up-to-date. Are we?” After suggesting that the town square was deficient and outdated, 
it announced, “the choice is yours.” 
The committee appealed to both what the merchants stand to gain if they act, as well as 
what they stand to lose should they not. It explained how it could yield greater profits and 
customers, but also suggested an alternate future, where shoppers are lost to competing interests 
outside of the downtown core shopping area. 
In addition to the Chamber’s leadership and the Mayor’s Advisory Committee, 
community civic organizations also perceived a pressing need to improve Paola. The Friendship 
Committee of Human Relations met in 1966 to make plans for city beautification. This 
committee included the Presbyterian Women’s Guild, Methodist WSCS, St. James AME 
Women’s Missionary Society, Holy Trinity Altar society and the Business and Professional 
Women Organization. They sought opinions from many stakeholders, including town residents 
and public officials. The Friendship Committee developed questionnaires that were distributed to 
cover all the streets of Paola’s residents, and plans were set to meet with city and county officials 
to consult on the beautification of Paola. Additionally, their meetings were open to anyone 
interested in the improvement and beautification of Paola. 
 
Innovation and Emulation 
Inside the Mayor’s advisory committee brochure, the committee elucidated its arguments 
in favor of the aluminum façades.803 Among its arguments, it asserted the need to meet consumer 
demand for “modern, attractive and convenient surroundings” and “create a Park Square 
shopping center effect.” Important elements of this effect not only entailed appropriation of the 
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minimalist aesthetics of new shopping malls developing across the country, but also a covered 
sidewalk that wrapped the square. Here, the project emulated new shopping centers, but instead 
of proposing a new development on the town’s periphery with enclosed circulation, Paola 
proposed a shopping configuration that borrowed existing infrastructure, protected shoppers 
from weather elements and intersected with public space. 
 
Innovation, Infrastructure, and Public Space 
Paola’s vision for a shopping center was not the first, nor the only proposal for an 
exterior circulation configuration. Recall that Shopper’s World utilized outdoor circulation. The 
plans for Paola’s town square renovation, however, were innovative in that they proposed 
combating the threat of new shopping centers by renovating an existing shopping area. Paola’s 
plans called for the provision of “all-weather shopping regardless of season”804 In addition to 
new aluminum façades, a covered canopy was proposed to ring the square, allowing merchandise 
to spill out onto the sidewalk. 
Paola’s shopping center project utilized the existing infrastructure of streets, utilities and 
buildings extant to the square. As such, it posed an alternative to the dominant configuration of 
new shopping centers. Rather than sprawling outside the town, shopping was hoped to become 
reinvigorated in the heart of town. In many ways, Paola’s shopping center fulfilled Victor 
Gruen’s vision that shopping malls serve as community centers. Instead, as architectural 
historian Richard Longstreth asserts, shopping malls were primarily spheres of mercantilism.805 
These malls had a private ownership structure discouraging, and often prohibiting, public use of 
mall space outside of strictly controlled events. Paola’s vision, on the other hand, would set the 
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town square at the core of the new shopping venue, anchoring public space in the center, 
extending under covered sidewalks right up to the door of each store. 
 
Aesthetic and Functional Emulation 
Slipcover façades were not original to Paola, having been installed in other towns and 
cities, notably Niles, Michigan, the former home of Kawneer. Neither was the minimalist 
commercial aesthetic endemic to Paola—Kawneer’s Machines for Selling proposed dozens of 
minimalist façade designs, and Federated Department Store’s president, Fred Lazarus, added fuel 
to the minimalist trend in shopping retail architecture with his endorsement of such façades for 
department stores.806 As Longstreth argues, by the 1950s, “little question seems to have existed 
that the building as a giant unadorned box was the favored symbol of the department store’s 
continuance as a motor force in retailing.”807  
Functionally, the slipcovers proposed for Paola were a way to reduce heating and cooling 
of second story spaces. Windows were blocked off or reduced in height on many street front 
façades across the country as electric lighting systems developed to provide ample lighting 
without windows and ceiling heights were lowered with the advent of drop ceiling systems. Such 
justification was cited even for large department stores. The minimalist, blank façade design of 
Foley’s department store (1945–1947) was justified, in part, by the savings it would produce in 
heating and cooling cost (Longstreth 2010, 51). Paola’s project emulated these functional and 
aesthetic considerations, while simultaneously yielding an innovative retail space that embraced 
the public sphere. 
 
                                                 
806 Longstreth, American Department Store Transformed, 56. 
807 Ibid., 55. 
262 
 
A New Town Square 
Over the course of the year in 1967, aluminum façades were under construction or being 
prepared. The mayor’s committee found success in effectuating aluminum cladding of buildings 
facing the town square on all four sides. Drew McLaughlin, the president of the publishing 
company controlling the town newspaper, The Western Spirit, explained how the mayor’s 
committee, the Chamber of Commerce and civic groups managed to persuade all business 
owners around the square to erect the aluminum façades. He stated, “It took a lot of meetings, a 
lot of persuasion and, in some instances, a pressure to get it done, but it was worth all the 
effort.”808 Ted McIntire, a member of one of the planning committees, explained the process is a 
bit more detail. “We sold the idea to a few of the more interested ones first…then we started 
spreading it to the rest. In a few instances, it took a lot of persuading. There were a couple of 
instances where we thought we would be completely out of luck, so we said nothing to them.”809 
The additional pressures and persuasions that were enacted against the disagreeable merchants 
were not mentioned further by members of the committee. However, by late spring of 1968, all 
four sides of the square were aluminum clad. During this time, the city began planning the 
“Parade of Progress,” a grand celebration and official dedication of the façades to be held in the 
early summer of that year.  
Near the completion of the project, it began attracting attention from national 
competitions. In late 1967, while it was still under way, the project won an improvement award 
sponsored by the Kansas Engineering Society for new downtown improvements.810  In early 
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1968, the recently completed project was entered into a competition sponsored by Look 
Magazine’s All American Cities contest.811 
 
Celebrating Commercial Progressivism and Local Independence  
Such publicity aligned with the much wider attention the project would receive over the 
course of its dedication at the official full-week celebration in June 1967: The Parade of 
Progress. This celebration included four days of events, beginning with dinners honoring 
merchants, businessmen and dignitaries, leading to a celebration of agriculture and the crowning 
of the dairy princess, a square dance, free bar-b-que, a parade of marching bands and floats and 
finally culminating in a closing speech by the state governor. 
Throughout the four-day celebration, and in the build up to the event itself, three themes 
emerged which were touted repeatedly through official proclamations, newspaper stories and 
advertisements. First, the town of Paola was portrayed as beaming with pride at the new project, 
which was furthermore asserted to have registered a shift in public attitude. Newspaper headlines 
and articles captured Paola’s proud spirit. “Paola to Celebrate Face-Lifting With Self Esteem;” 
“Paola Kansas, Proud of New Look.” Local contractor Ted McIntire reflected on the town’s shift 
in mentality, proclaiming, “The really big change has been the town’s attitude. I’ve been here 21 
years, and until this happened, merchants were fighting each other. Now they’re working 
together because they realize what helps one helps all of them.”812  
Second, this pride was underpinned by the project’s independence of federal aid. At the 
dedication ceremony, Kansas state governor Robert Docking declared to the gathered 
townspeople, “Rather than asking for a hand out, you have extended a helping hand—one to 
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another and together you are literally building a new town within a town.” Newspaper copy 
echoed the refrain, writing, “Using their initiative and financial resources, city officials, civic and 
business leaders, spurn(ed) any idea of federal aid…” Another article captured the aversion to 
perceived government bureaucracy. The publisher of the local newspaper explained, “The first 
thought was federal funds, of course, but there was too much red tape involved. We were going 
to have to hire planners, submit the plans and wait five or ten years for results. We decided we 
knew what we needed and that we could do it a lot faster and a lot cheaper.” Advertisements 
placed in the newspaper by merchants during the Parade of Progress also announced their pride 
in eschewing federal support. Sherar’s Men’s Clothing wrote, “The skeptics said it couldn’t be 
done without aid from the federal government but it was done through splendid community 
effort by those who believed Paola is on the go!” 
The third, and most loudly proclaimed theme, is a word that was used consistently from 
the very seeds of the project, through its completion: progress. Recalling the chamber president’s 
vision, titled, “A Pattern for Progress,” everything from the name of the final celebration to 
congratulatory messages in the newspaper echoed this theme. A press release distributed by 
project leaders was subtitled, “The Paola Spirit: An inspiring account of a small city making such 
giant strides of progress, that it continues to amaze even itself.”813 The idea of progress seeped 
through the capillaries of the town in both spoken and printed word. Concomitant with this 
dogma of progress was a belief that now, with the shiny new aluminum façades, new red painted 
sidewalks, and aluminum awning covering the sidewalk, the town had modernized.  
These three themes of pride, independence and progress were deftly tied to the idea of 
modernity by the projects promoters. James Sullinger, writer for the Kansas City Star, when 
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interviewing the city manager, wrote that, “Now, the stores around the square look like a modern 
shopping center with the addition of new store facings, constructed at owner’s expense.”814 A 
congratulating advertisement by Hayes Quarries concrete company pronounced, “We are as 
proud as we can be with our new modern ‘shopping center—on the square!”815 The city manager 
believed in an architectural determinism in which the new modern project was a direct influencer 
on the town’s identity. Before the aluminum project, he maintained the “town’s physical 
deterioration was reflected in a decay of civic pride among Paola’s citizens.” However, after the 
project, he said, “this project…has given us a real sense of community pride.”816  
 
Faith in Modernization as a Rescue 
There was a belief espoused in newspaper reports and by the views of project promoters 
that this modernizing project was only the beginning—a catalyst for a continued upward trend in 
the commercial prosperity of the town. The seven page city press release, which constituted the 
official narrative of the project, proclaimed, “Important too, is the fact that leaders in the 
community consider this only ‘stage one’ with much more improvement and progress for the 
near future…in other words, this story is the beginning—not the ending. Progress and 
improvements are like the measles, it’s catching.”817  
The narrative next asserted that after the new downtown modernization project, crisis had 
been averted. It claimed, “There is no more talk of downtown business owners joining with 
outside interests to form a suburban shopping center. The core area is now a shopping center 
itself.” City leaders were utterly optimistic, drawing contrasts with Paola’s previous, imagined 
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dystopian future, with its new utopian future. Mayor Rex J. Kiser, who at one point was called 
the “Aluminum King” said, “It was simply a matter of saving our town…most small towns are 
losing their core areas, and we didn’t want that to happen here. We decided it was up to us to 
work out our own salvation.” In contrast, reflecting on the completed aluminum town square, he 
exclaimed that in less than two years, the town has “moved from the Model T era to the Space 
Age.”818  
 
Deconstructing the Image of Modernity in Paola 
The Space Age didn’t last in Paola. Outmigration of people from rural areas to cities 
continued, shopping centers outside of core areas proliferated, and downtowns continued to lose 
prosperity. A slow trickle of outmigration reflected national trends for rural areas. The 
revitalized downtown did not stop the development of shopping centers on the edges of Paola. 
Ten years after the Parade of Progress, Wal-Mart chose a site at the edge of town near the 
highway, and a year later, a big box grocery store, Price Chopper, opened as well. The Paola 
Wal-Mart would in 1987 receive accolades and a congratulatory visit by Sam Walton himself for 
being—on some measures—the most successful Wal-Mart in the country.819 Today, the square is 
not at full occupancy, yet it does have businesses, many of which are professional and non-retail 
in nature. 
Over time, the aluminum façades themselves proved to be problematic. By 1979, it 
wasn’t the measles that was catching, but instead, it was fear of other diseases being spread by 
the façades. The screens covering windows and the interstitial space between the old brick 
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façades and the aluminum façades were reported in the newspaper as popular roosting locales for 
pigeons. The resultant droppings and association with disease were frustrating merchants. The 
county health nurse, Linda Neal, said that “histoplasmosis, torulosis and psittacosis all could be 
contracted (by humans) from contact with pigeons or their droppings.”820  
By 1986, the downtown again was seen as in need of revitalization. A city meeting with 
area business owners and citizens asserted that despite the “apparent shifting of the city’s trade 
area to the outskirts of town,” a collaboration between the city and the private sector could 
enhance the image of the downtown as a “neighborhood” retail center. The meeting concluded 
that the “building(s) reflect not only the community’s history, but also its culture.” Architecture 
students from the University of Kansas and Kansas State University were invited to develop 
proposals for downtown revitalization.821 Two years following this, one downtown building 
owner completely removed the aluminum façade and canopy. The exposed brick once again saw 
the light of day, and before sandblasting and painting it, they dealt with the pigeon problem. “We 
had about six inches of pigeon stuff piled up out here…we filled about a third of our truck bed 
with it,” the owner said.822  
Over the years, other events would precipitate the removal of the aluminum façades. In 
1993, an ice storm caused some aluminum cladding to crash down, bringing with it some of the 
original brick façade of one building. Later that year, some of the same banks that provided loans 
to building owners financing the aluminum façades in 1967, now provided grants to business 
owners for the façade’s removal. In conjunction with Paola’s downtown revitalization group, 
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grants up to $5,000 were given to eligible building owners around the square. Today, all 
aluminum façades are gone.  
Paola’s modernizing project consciously emulated what promoters believed to be the 
benefits of new shopping malls, while simultaneously innovating modern modes of shopping by 
appropriating existing infrastructure and superimposing on it an image of modernity associated 
with the newest shopping malls emerging across the country. Many towns are still dotted with 
slipcovers of aluminum and other materials. Yet, few if any embraced a completely new 
aesthetic as did Paola’s town square. The lessons of Paola show that their solution was a quickly 
implemented architectural intervention once championed and hailed as a savior that quickly fell 
out of favor. Regional shopping venues and big box retailers proliferated throughout the 
twentieth century, changing patterns of consumption on Main Street. Despite their pride in 
independence, Paola’s challenges were a negotiation with trends outside of their control which 
the cosmetics of aluminum could not solve.
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EPILOGUE 
 
 
The production of aluminum today is a global-scale enterprise to a much greater degree 
than the organization of the aluminum industry in the twentieth century. Chinese corporations 
dominate the landscape of production, dwarfing aluminum output in other nations. National 
producers have merged into multinational conglomerates, reducing any singular national 
orientation, while corporate entities organized in disparate countries reorganized into global 
entities. The two largest producers in the United States, Alcoa and Reynolds, merged in 1999 
upon the purchase of the latter by the former. Kawneer was also merged into Alcoa, and in 2016, 
Alcoa split into two companies — Arconic as an aluminum manufacturer, and a separate 
company retaining the historic name was formed as Alcoa Corporation, operating as a producer.  
Although corporate structures and names have changed, threads from the past have 
persisted. An homage to Reynolds, two products sold by Arconic, called Reynobond and 
Reynolux, carry a reference to the former rival on new, aluminum-clad buildings. As a smaller 
collaborator and sometimes-competitor to Alcoa in the mid-century period, the Kawneer name 
has been retained for an entire subsidiary company of Arconic, continuing to manufacture 
aluminum cladding products. Kawneer and Reynolds have been delaminated from their former 
independent, corporate structures and redeployed with accompanying name recognition to buyers 
still specifying aluminum, the most abundant metal from the earth’s crust. 
The relationships of these corporate entities over the duration of the twentieth century are 
tangled and complicated, regulated by legal frameworks and driven to pursue shareholder profit 
by expanding, reorganizing and competing to control sales territories and resource territories too, 
such as the world’s largest rivers for hydropower, land for mining, regulatory environments 
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agreeable to profitable operation, wherever on the globe these resources may be. The wider-
scope of analysis offered in the first two chapters of this study has shown the way in which 
twentieth-century architecture has been materially produced, often out of sight, by a global 
apparatus of industrial capitalism — a view that is often physically masked in the industrial 
zones of cities or the erased spaces of indigenous peoples once occupying lands sold or leased to 
aluminum producers wherever bauxite was found to be extracted economically. Yet, there is 
another hidden aspect, and that is the mask of authorship — the mythology of the genius 
architect so celebrated in Ayn Rand’s The Fountainhead. Rand eludes to an industrial production 
underpinning architecture when Howard Roark works in and visits a rock quarry, but it is his 
genius of authorship that retains the focus. 
The authorship of modern architecture is complicated by the producer-manufacturer 
enterprise. This study has explained the relationships engaged in the spread and use of aluminum 
cladding as transversal, and these relationships suggest that authorship and disciplinary 
boundaries are quite subjective. Regulatory entities both enabled and disabled corporate and 
production goals. Collaborators were sometimes competitors. Research and development (R&D), 
and the positionality of design as a practice both within the R&D structure and outside its 
structure in the offices of architects or other designers, was not a clear boundary. Naming an 
author is exposed as a contractual exercise in the manufacture of aluminum cladding. The 
cladding systems employing Alcoa-produced aluminum that became widespread in the 1950s 
and 1960s were designed by collaborations between researchers, designers and architects both 
inside and outside Alcoa. Further, later aluminum cladding components benefitted from the 
trials, errors and discoveries afforded by previous iterations. While a building is more than its 
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constituent parts, and the architect rightfully deserves a note of authorship, manufacturers played 
a crucial role in the production of modern architecture.  
A multivalent historical perspective, informed by the transversal modes of relationality in 
aluminum cladding production, suggests increased scrutiny of modern architecture as an 
outcome of profit-seeking industrial enterprise, in addition to the creative capacities of architects 
and any quest for formal representation of the age. What other materials and building 
components might be scrutinized to discern the way underlying logics of production have shaped 
modern architecture? The role of materials and components has long been claimed to be among 
the historical forces underpinning the development of modern architecture. Reductionists might 
point to steel, or the elevator, or more broad conceptualizations of technology as the historical 
determinants. Instead, this study advocates spotlighting transversal relationships between the 
human and material domains where they are dislocated, distributed and countervailing as a 
productive methodology. 
Aluminum cladding producers and manufacturers held beliefs, in turn deployed as 
arguments in marketing materials, that aluminum held certain capacities, or the agency to enact 
prosperity. Believing that a material holds agentic capacity is a specific epistemology of 
materiality, not articulated as such by promoters, but instead held as a reality. Recent scholarship 
of philosophy has claimed a return to, or an increased consciousness of an ontology of realism. 
Other theories have developed which examine the relationality between things as a network. 
These agendas have emerged as one of several claims about materiality and more broadly “the 
object,” with intellectual inquiry subsumed under the constructs of Actor Network Theory, 
Speculative Realism, Object Oriented Ontology and New Materialism(s). These theoretical 
registers pose questions about the essence of objects — seeking to delimit the degree to which a 
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thing has an essential being — and pose questions about agency — probing the agentic capacity 
of things, or for the materialists within this domain, the capacities of materials to figure as an 
actor.  
Each of these scholarly domains extend their own theories with ontological and 
disciplinary boundaries. For example, Graham Harman claims for an object an essence that is 
never fully accessible to either people or other objects, while Manuel DeLanda disputes the 
ontology of essences, instead advocating processes of becoming, such as affect. Despite their 
differences, what unites them, along with other scholars such as Karen Barad, Jane Bennett, and 
Bruno Latour, is a scholarly focus on things, less a world defined by meanings, symbolism or 
representations. DeLanda has criticized the primacy of linguistics and semiotics in scholarship, 
which he asserts, “leads you to an absolute relativism in which the objective world just 
disappears and all that exists is just the subjective worlds created by different languages.”823 For 
example, geographer David Matless has asserted that “representations, images, knowledges, 
fantasies are . . . not to be regarded as merely reflective or distortive of the world . . . but as 
constitutive, as what the world is made of, really.”824 
Finding a confederation with a focus on materiality, or more specifically, to borrow a 
term from Karen Barad, the “material-discursive,” I ask how philosophical theory can be 
applicable to architectural history. 825 An examination of the past need not sacrifice the discursive 
lens for the material lens. In the words of Manuel DeLanda, it is not a concern of “Matter vs. 
Meaning.” The promoters of aluminum cladding present a potent subject of study at which to 
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aim this lens of the material-discursive. Their promotional efforts, and their beliefs, combined 
the instrumentality and image of aluminum as a material ontology and a mode of marketing 
aluminum cladding. They believed that from the properties of aluminum — its light weight, 
resistance to corrosion, malleability, and “beauty,” among others, that aluminum conferred 
special advantages which promoters marketed as such in promotional materials. These 
advantages were marketed as the ability of aluminum to reduce cost, modernize, and bring 
prosperity to the building owner, merchant, and the community at large. Their aluminum 
materiality was not outside of the human domain, however. They believed that it was in 
interaction with the human domain that it found its full potential. They were quick to promote 
their own intentionality, exhuming raw materials from the earth and through industrial processes, 
unlocking aluminum and bringing to the world this shiny metal. They believed the agency of 
aluminum could only become fully realized as far as they instrumentalized it for use. 
Although aluminum was for the promoters an agentic material, it was not understood to 
be a mere body to be represented. It was for them a material reality with definitive abilities, but 
importantly, an indeterminate identity. Discursive frameworks do not productively explain their 
epistemology. Henri Lefebvre has written, “In modern space, the body no longer has a presence; 
it is only represented, in a spatial environment reduced to its optical components.”826 Lefebvre 
offers only one-half of an important analytical framework. In the marketing operation activating 
both Instrumentality and Image, a study only of representation is inadequate. To the aluminum 
advocates, the body had both a presence and a need to be represented. The latter was especially 
crucial in their formulation, as aluminum was a site which could, and did, take on multiple, 
sometimes competing identities. Claiming no inherent meaning for aluminum reflects Arjun 
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Appadurai’s conception of matter, wherein, “things have no meanings apart from those that 
human transactions, attributions, and motivations endow them with.”827 Aluminum became 
categorized as modern largely through the purposeful work of marketers. 
Maintaining that aluminum is indeterminate also suggests a particular viewpoint about 
matter, namely, that it withdraws from full understanding, never fully accessible. This theory, 
which we find elucidated IN Graham Harman’s approach to Object Oriented Ontology, is 
applicable to aluminum as a cogent explanation of promoters work to shape the identity of 
aluminum.828 It was new to the nineteenth-century eye and susceptible to misunderstanding, or 
worse for the promoter, conducive to the formation of beliefs that discouraged its sale to buyers. 
On the one hand, if it were believed to be more valuable than silver, justified by its high price in 
the nineteenth century, then a utilitarian identity and widespread use was complicated. On the 
other hand, if it were believed to be ersatz, as the historian of technology Robert Friedel has 
revealed about its malleable nineteenth-century identity, this belief could exclude it from 
consideration where prestige is important.829 What producers wanted was the widest use of 
aluminum possible, while simultaneously guarding its identity. They wanted to sell aluminum tea 
kettles, but also implements of war. They wanted to sell aluminum foil to a domestic market, but 
also commercial aluminum cladding. They believed that a multidimensional marketing project 
was a way to assign identity to aluminum, a material which was fundamentally indeterminate in 
identity. 
                                                 
827 Arjun Appadurai, The Social Life of Things: Commodities in Cultural Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1986), 5. 
828 For an explanation of Harman’s theory of the withdrawn object, see Graham Harman, Immaterialism: Objects 
and Social Theory (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2016). 
829 Robert Friedel, “The Psychology of Aluminum,” working paper, 1975, Department of Science, Johns Hopkins 
University, Baltimore, MD., folder 2, box 51, Records of the Aluminum Company of America 
 
275 
 
Reflecting on the image of aluminum, the words of Beatriz Colomina come to mind, as 
she has written “to think about modern architecture must be to pass back and forth between the 
question of space and the question of representation.” 830 By examining the dialectic between 
instrumentality and image, this study brings increased scrutiny to an epistemology of material 
agency as an underlying assumption of modern architecture. Modernist architects were no 
stranger to architectural determinism. For the aluminum promoters, the claimed ability of 
architecture to enact prosperity, as a “machine for selling,” for instance, was underpinned by 
their belief in the agency of materials. Extending this study by recalling that modern architecture 
is sometimes situated as a break from the past, comparative analysis might illuminate the 
attitudes concerning agency shared between aluminum advocates and advocates of other 
materials prefiguring its development. Rather than a break from the past, a shared assumption 
about the agentic capacity of materials might show distinct continuities. How might productive 
historical perspectives be formulated which analyze shared assumptions about agency across 
what have traditionally been cast as disparate, even discontinuous eras? This study suggests 
material agency as a productive analytical lens. 
The visual, cultural and ideological landscape of the historical antecedent to the twentieth 
century and the period examined in this study has been characterized by intellectuals as an epoch 
of social and cultural change so rapid, the subjects of this condition of change struggled to 
engage successfully. Baudelaire characterized the modern condition as transient and fleeting, 
historian Carl Schorske identified modernity as a “ruthless centrifuge,” and Marshall Berman’s 
analysis of modernity explained a “maelstrom of perpetual disintegration and renewal, of 
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struggle and contradiction, of ambiguity and anguish.”831 In contrast, aluminum cladding 
promoters had specific and quite contrary views of what it means to be modern in the twentieth 
century. Theirs was an optimistic modernism, aligned with progress, the future and 
emancipation. Modernity for the aluminum promoter was to relax in a position of comparative 
advantage and prosperity — the modern subject having been granted this position by electing to 
modernize his environment.  
Rectifying these oppositional assertions is to engage in an analysis of perspective. 
Marxists afford a view of disruption wrought by capitalism and a corporate hegemony, as David 
Harvey has characterized, “in a society where a corporate capitalist version of the Enlightenment 
project of development for progress and human emancipation held sway as a political-economic 
determinant.”832 Rather than engage in the debate of ideological perspective, this study explains 
modernism as a mode of characterization. For the aluminum promoters, modernism — the 
visual, textual and ideological productions of modernity — was a specific, well-funded 
characterization. It was a marketing project. Claims that modernization with aluminum could 
bring prosperity was more than the snake-oil of slick salesmen. These were their beliefs, their 
modernism, that aluminum could bring a bright and shining future to the present. Although they 
believed this to be true, they professed this modernism as a meticulously-planned marketing 
project that entailed distributable forms of communication, including print, presentation, 
associations with famous designers, and dramatically the aluminum-clad buildings themselves. 
Cladding the landscape was modernization, and the result was a modernism they invited 
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one that asserts that to be modern is to make one's self at home in the chaos, or the "maelstrom" 
832 Harvey, The Condition of Postmodernity, 35. 
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prospective buyers to witness in person or admire in advertisements and feature articles, thus 
producing a cyclical loop of marketing.  
As a framework of characterization, how different is Berman’s modernism? This study 
advances as productive an analytical framework whereby Berman’s modernism and the 
aluminum producer’s modernism are equally a mode of characterization. Both advance a specific 
agenda, and both seek to sway perceptions of an audience. The corporate capitalist version of 
modernism might be conveyed as liberation, while a Marxist version of modernism might be 
conveyed as oppression. Reflecting upon such perspectival relativism, this dissertation thus 
contributes to debates questioning the efficacy of terminologically distinguishing the twentieth 
century as a modern era. This is a question of historiography that has yet to be settled. 
Now that aluminum cladding has been removed in Niles and Paola, and furthermore, 
aluminum slipcovers have been removed across the United States, it is tempting to try to write a 
postscript to aluminum cladding, leaning on evidence of cheap aluminum cans, shoddy 
residential aluminum siding and shady salesmen as the new image of aluminum leading to it 
downfall. However, commercial aluminum cladding is still widely used in the twenty-first 
century. Arconic and a host of competitors continue to sell cladding. Often designed today as a 
“rain screen,” its functional performance has been improved to allow rain to purposely slip 
behind the outer wall layer of aluminum and subsequently take a path of exit down and out, 
preventing water intrusion into the inner-wall cavity. The overall market for aluminum is strong.  
As Eric Schatzberg points out, some applications of aluminum have indeed ceased 
because of limits to its appropriate and successful use. Aluminum household wiring has been 
claimed to be dangerous, and thus finds little domestic use. Perhaps some negative associations 
have been formed in buyers’ imagination, as Schatzberg notes, “in part through its associations 
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with mundane artifacts like beer cans and cheap cookware.”833 If it is true that some buyers 
eschew aluminum for these reasons, we can recognize that aluminum continues to be used across 
a spectrum of markets. The very indeterminacy of any essential meaning engaged with promoters 
to form multiple, concurrent identities for aluminum.
                                                 
833 Schatzberg, “Symbolic Culture and Technological Change,” 233. 
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